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This study builds upon the theory of entrepreneurial effectuation; a theory that 
explains how new firms come to be through the means oriented, iterative, and 
experimental actions of entrepreneurs and their engagement with diverse stake-
holders. Despite this theory being strongly stakeholder dependent in nature, I 
argue that the role stakeholders play in opportunity creation processes through 
effectuation remains underdeveloped and ill-defined. In an effort to address this 
issue, I ask the question: How are stakeholder commitments engaged towards the 
process of opportunity creation through effectuation? 
In order to answer this research question, I take a position within the pragma-
tist tradition which emphasises the human propensity towards habit and creativity 
in action. I employ a collection of methodological tools including a systematic 
literature review and a qualitative meta-analysis of the extant effectuation litera-
ture to reframe effectuation theory to a perspective with the stakeholder, rather 
than entrepreneur, at its focus. From my analysis I then produce a typology that 
describes a set of four ideal types of rationale that stakeholder may utilise in their 
decisions to make commitments of time and resources towards the effectual de-
velopment of opportunities. Using these ideal types as inputs, I reconceptualise 
the model of the way in which the process of effectual opportunity or market cre-
ation unfolds. Finally, I summarise the theoretical ideas generated through my 
research as a number of propositional statements that can be used to guide future 
empirical enquiry.  
My research suggests that stakeholders may differ in rationale along dimen-
sions of instrumental versus subjective rationality, and in their emphasis on teleo-
logical versus non-teleological or autotelic rationality. These differences in ra-
tionale for making commitments will subsequently influence their post-
commitment behaviour, and their interactions with other stakeholders engaged in 
the focal effectual process. Stakeholders may be driven primarily by the theoreti-
cally established causal or effectual logics, but may also be guided by more sub-
jectively rational logics of faith and self-belief. These logics will inevitably in-
fluence the way in which opportunity creation processes, and the creation of new 
markets and firms, unfold. 
 




Tämä tutkimus rakentuu effektuaalisen yrittäjyyden teorialle, joka selittää miten 
uudet yritykset syntyvät yrittäjien keinolähtöisestä, iteratiivisesta ja kokeellisesta 
toiminnasta sekä yhteistyöstä erilaisten sidosryhmien kanssa. Vaikka teoria on 
vahvasti riippuvainen sidosryhmistä, väitän että sidosryhmien rooli mahdolli-
suuksien effektuaalisissa luomisprosesseissa on yhä kehittymätön ja huonosti 
määritelty. Käsitelläkseni tätä haastetta, kysyn: miten sidosryhmien sitoutuminen 
effektuaaliseen mahdollisuudenluontiprosessiin tapahtuu? 
Vastatakseni tähän tutkimuskysymykseen asettaudun osaksi pragmatistista 
traditiota, joka korostaa ihmisen taipumusta tapoihin ja toiminnan luovuuteen. 
Käytän valittuja metodologisia työkaluja, mukaan lukien systemaattista kirjalli-
suusanalyysiä ja laadullista meta-analyysiä effektuaatiokirjallisuudesta, uudel-
leenasemoidakseni sidosryhmien näkökulman, ei niinkään yrittäjää, effektuaatio-
teorian keskiöön. Analyysiini perustuen tuotan typologian, joka kuvailee neljä 
ideaalityyppistä ajatusmallia, joita sidosryhmien edustajat voivat käyttää päättä-
essään sitoa aikaa ja resursseja mahdollisuuksien effektuaaliseen kehittämiseen. 
Käyttämällä näitä ajatusmallien ideaalityyppejä, käsitteellistän uudelleen effektu-
aalisen mahdollisuuden tai markkinan luomisen prosessimallin. Lopuksi kokoan 
tutkimukseni synnyttämät teoreettiset ideat ehdotuksellisiksi väittämiksi, jotka 
voivat opastaa tulevaa empiiristä tutkimusta. 
Tutkimukseni esittää, että sidosryhmien ajatusmallit voivat erota toisistaan 
ulottuvuudessa, jonka ääripäissä ovat instrumentaalinen ja subjektiivinen ratio-
naalisuus, sekä painottamalla joko teleologista tai ei-teleologista, autoteelista ra-
tionaalisuutta. Nämä sitoutumista ohjaavien ajatusmallien erot vaikuttavat edel-
leen sitoutumisen jälkeiseen käytökseen, sekä vuorovaikutukseen samaan ef-
fektuaatioprosessiin sitoutuneiden välillä. Sitoutumista voi ajaa ensisijaisesti teo-
reettisesti perusteltu kausaalinen tai effektuaalinen logiikka, mutta sitä voivat 
ohjata myös subjektiivisemmat logiikan muodot, usko ja luottamus itseen. Nämä 
logiikat väistämättä vaikuttavat siihen, miten mahdollisuuksien luomisprosessit 
sekä uusien markkinoiden ja firmojen synty kehkeytyvät. 
  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
What a fun time I have had! Over the past few years I have been afforded the 
privilege to spend much of my time reading and thinking, conversing and writ-
ing, all the while others toil beneath the sun. It is with immeasurable gratitude 
that I can only hope to eventually transfer onto others some measure of the sup-
port I have received from my mentors, my colleagues, my friends and family, 
and the wider academic community during this doctoral process.  
I would like to express my deepest thanks and appreciation to my supervisors, 
Dr Peter Zettinig and Professor Niina Nummela. Peter’s boundless enthusiasm 
for our discipline and his ceaseless encouragement through the years has kept me 
motivated even during the depths of my confusion; while Niina’s amazing abili-
ties as an administrator and an advisor have ensured the road I have travelled has 
always been smooth and free of obstacles. I extend the same thanks and apprecia-
tion to Dr Birgitta Sandberg and Dr Valtteri Kaartemo, who supervised my mas-
ter’s thesis, and whose comments helped me in developing this research into the 
form it holds today. 
I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to Professor A. Rebecca Reuber 
and Professor Tuija Mainela, who agreed to be the pre-examiners of my disserta-
tion. I am humbled to have these two esteemed scholars sacrifice a significant 
amount of their own time and energy to read my work, and the insights and sug-
gestions they have provided will continue to benefit me in my future research. 
I would like to thank all of my colleagues here at the University of Turku 
School of Economics. Particular thanks to Anna Karhu, who has patiently helped 
me over the years with my incessant questions regarding things that are seldom, 
if ever, her responsibility to know; Dr William Degbey, who, as my office neigh-
bour when I first started this D.Sc., quickly acclimatised me to academic life; and 
Danijela Majdenic and Matti Karinen (one who has been a great source of con-
sternation, the other who has been quite the opposite). Thank you to the rest of 
the Department of International Business and Marketing: Professor Aino Ha-
linen-Kaila and Professor Esa Stenberg, Dr Maria Elo, Dr Eriikka Paavilainen-
Mäntymäki, Dr Elina Pelto, Dr Innan Sasaki, Dr Johanna Raitis, Dr Salla Laaso-
nen, Dr Taina Eriksson, and Dr Mekhail Mustak; fellow doctoral candidates 
Marcus Laine, Majid Aleem, Isabel Galvis, Elisa Kallio, Riikka Harikkala, Mu-
hammad Sufyan, Irfan Ameer, Mari Ketolainen, Marion Bitsch, and Ekaterina 
Panina. Many thanks, also, to the amazing administrative staff who have often 
had to deal with my disorganised self but always respond with geniality – Jenni 
Heervä, Sanna Kuusjärvi, and Auli Rahkala-Toivonen. 
Thank you to the TSElosophers, Professor Kari Lukka, Otto Rosendahl, Dr 
Katja Einola, and Milla Wirén (special thanks to Milla for her help with transla-
tion!), the vigorous philosophical discussions we engage in are both insightful 
and a lot of fun.  
As for the organisations which have kept me fed and sheltered for the duration 
of this enterprise, I would like to thank for their financial support: The University 
of Turku Graduate School; The Dr.h.c Marcus Wallenberg Foundation; and The 
Jenny and Antti Wihuri Foundation.  
I came to this strange and distant northern land back in 2011 and since then I 
have met and befriended a number of colourful characters from across the globe 
who have made, and kept, my life here in Finland interesting (and the psycholog-
ical burden of thesis writing tolerable). Thank you to Raphael Rosito, Eini 
Torala-Rosito, Paulo Santochi, Shkar Maruf, Stephen Phillips, Paulina Chávez, 
Elkhan Jafarov and Kamilla Aliyeva, Marilda Lindvall, Dr Milena Doroszko, 
Jonathan Loaiza, Reinis Pļaviņš, Dr George Varna, Sofia Vasilyeva, Maryna 
Sasunkevich, and Jerry Chang. Do not concern yourselves with the order in 
which you have been named, because your worth in my eyes is measured purely 
by the cups that you flip.  
I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my partner (in crime) Yekate-
rina Pak who has supported me even while she has been under the same (if not 
greater) pressures of academic life, and patiently listened to all of my complaints 
while seldom from voicing her own.  
Finally, to my parents Peter and Kim-Anh, and my brothers Nicholai and Pat-




Jonathan Van Mumford 
  




1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 13 
1.1 Entrepreneurship and Opportunity ..................................................... 14 
1.1.1 Entrepreneurial action in opportunity discovery and  
creation contexts ...................................................................... 15 
1.1.2 Effectuation theory .................................................................. 18 
1.2 Theoretical Gap and Research Questions ........................................... 20 
1.2.1 Research questions .................................................................. 22 
1.3 Value of the Study .............................................................................. 24 
1.3.1 Intended contribution to theory ............................................... 24 
1.3.2 Intended contribution to international entrepreneurship ......... 27 
1.3.3 Intended contribution to practice ............................................. 28 
1.4 Structure of the Study ......................................................................... 29 
2 METHODOLOGY ...................................................................................... 33 
2.1 Philosophical Background of the Research ........................................ 35 
2.1.1 An evaluation of the meta-theoretical assumptions of 
effectuation .............................................................................. 36 
2.1.2 A brief overview of pragmatism ............................................. 41 
2.1.3 Pragmatism in effectuation and the following study ............... 43 
2.2 Data Collection and Analysis ............................................................. 48 
2.2.1 Systematic literature review of effectuation theory ................ 49 
2.2.2 Qualitative meta-analysis of the role of Stakeholders in 
Opportunity Creation ............................................................... 52 
2.3 Products of Theorising ........................................................................ 54 
2.3.1 Typology .................................................................................. 56 
2.3.2 Process modelling .................................................................... 60 
2.3.3 Propositions ............................................................................. 61 
3 THE STATE OF THE ART OF EFFECTUATION THEORY .................. 63 
3.1 Opportunity Creation through Effectuation ........................................ 63 
3.2 The Market Creation Design Space .................................................... 65 
3.3 Rationality and Effectuation as a Form of Reasoning ........................ 68 
3.4 Effectuation as a form of Behaviour ................................................... 70 
3.4.1 Means orientation versus goal orientation ............................... 75 
3.4.2 Affordable loss versus expected return .................................... 76 
3.4.3 Exploiting contingencies versus exploiting knowledge .......... 76 
3.4.4 Control logic versus prediction logic ....................................... 77 
3.4.5 Strategic alliance versus competitive analysis ......................... 78 
3.5 Effectuation as a Process ..................................................................... 79 
3.5.1 Effectual stakeholder commitments ......................................... 82 
3.6 Limits of Current Theory – Stakeholder Involvement ........................ 86 
4 TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY OF STAKEHOLDER COMMITMENTS .... 88 
4.1 Treatment of Stakeholder Commitments in the Extant Effectuation 
Literature ............................................................................................. 89 
4.2 Elements of a Commitment Decision.................................................. 94 
4.2.1 Uncertainty perceived in the commitment decision space ...... 95 
4.2.2 Reasoning that guides stakeholder decisions ........................... 99 
4.2.3 On motivation ........................................................................ 102 
4.3 The Typology .................................................................................... 104 
4.4 Commitment Decisions Based on Instrumental Rationality ............. 105 
4.4.1 Type 1: Causal commitments ................................................ 106 
4.4.2 Type 2: Effectual commitments ............................................. 108 
4.5 Commitment Decisions based on Subjective Rationality ................. 109 
4.5.1 Type 3: Faith based commitments ......................................... 110 
4.5.2 Type 4: Self-belief based commitments ................................ 112 
4.6 Summary of Propositions .................................................................. 114 
5 STAKEHOLDER COMMITMENTS IN OPPORTUNITY  
CREATION - A PROCESS MODEL ........................................................ 116 
5.1 Pre-commitment Logic from the Stakeholders’ Perspectives ........... 117 
5.1.1 View of the future .................................................................. 118 
5.1.2 Basis for taking action ........................................................... 122 
5.1.3 Predisposition toward risk and resources ............................... 124 
5.1.4 Attitude towards outsiders ..................................................... 126 
5.1.5 Attitude towards unexpected contingencies .......................... 127 
5.2 Implied Post-commitment Stakeholder Behaviour ........................... 128 
5.3 Negotiating Commitments ................................................................ 131 
5.3.1 Failure to secure commitment ................................................ 132 
5.3.2 Reducing uncertainty to secure commitment......................... 133 
5.3.3 Promoting effectual reasoning to secure commitment .......... 134 
5.3.4 Influencing affect and extrinsic motivation to secure 
commitment ........................................................................... 135 
5.4 The Accumulation of Stakeholders in the Opportunity Creation 
Process .............................................................................................. 137 
5.4.1 General effect of causal commitments to effectuation  
processes ................................................................................ 142 
5.4.2 General effect of effectual stakeholder commitments to 
effectuation processes ............................................................ 144 
5.4.3 General effect of faith-based commitments to effectuation 
processes ................................................................................ 145 
5.4.4 General effect of self-belief based commitments to  
effectuation processes ............................................................ 146 
5.5 Summary of the Theoretical Propositions of this Chapter................ 147 
6 CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................... 150 
6.1 Theoretical Implications ................................................................... 151 
6.1.1 Implications for international entrepreneurship .................... 153 
6.1.2 Limitations and suggestions for future research ................... 155 
6.2 Practical Implications ....................................................................... 158 
6.2.1 Implications for active and prospective entrepreneurs, and 
managers ................................................................................ 159 
6.2.2 Implications for policy makers .............................................. 162 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................. 165 
ANNEX A: REVIEW OF EXTANT EFFECTUATION LITERATURE ......... 177 
 
  
List of figures 
Figure 1 The structure of the study .......................................................... 30 
Figure 2 Theoretical framing of the study using a pragmatist theory of 
social mechanisms ..................................................................... 47 
Figure 3 Methodological steps of the study. ............................................ 48 
Figure 4  Composition of reviewed literature .......................................... 51 
Figure 5 Components of a theory. Adapted from Bacharach (1989,  
499) ............................................................................................ 54 
Figure 6 Intended theoretical contribution of this study .......................... 56 
Figure 7 The components of effectuation theory ..................................... 64 
Figure 8 Causal and effectual sub-categories of instrumental  
rationality ................................................................................... 68 
Figure 9 Causation and effectuation constructs. Based on Chandler  
et al. (2011) ................................................................................ 72 
Figure 10 A dynamic model of the effectual network and the new  
market as an effectual artefact (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b) ..... 80 
Figure 11 Effectuation vs. Causation in forming initial commitments. 
Based on Sarasvathy and Dew (2005) ....................................... 84 
Figure 12 Uncertainty, ambiguity, and equivocality in the commitment 
decision space ............................................................................ 97 
Figure 13 Four categories of reasoning guiding a commitment decision  
to an effectual network............................................................. 102 
Figure 14 Four types of commitment decision to an effectual network .. 105 
Figure 15 Scenario 1 – No commitment .................................................. 132 
Figure 16 Scenario 2 – Reduce uncertainty ............................................. 134 
Figure 17 Scenario 3 – Promote effectual reasoning ............................... 135 
Figure 18 Scenario 4 – Increase willingness to bear uncertainty ............. 136 
Figure 19 A model of group development (Weick 1979, 91) .................. 138 
Figure 20 Effectual network development (Based on Weick 1979, 91) .. 139 
Figure 21 A dynamic model of the accumulation of stakeholders in an 




List of tables 
Table 1 Effective entrepreneurial actions in discovery and creation 
contexts (Alvarez & Barney, 2007, p. 17) .................................. 15 
Table 2 Specification of a pragmatist theory of social mechanisms 
(drawn from Gross, 2009, pp. 370–372) .................................... 46 
Table 3 A model of theory explication through qualitative  
meta-analysis (drawn from Schreiber et al., 1997, p. 317) ........ 53 
Table 4 Differences between causal and effectual behaviours, adapted 
from Dew et al. (2009) ............................................................... 71 
Table 5 Problematisation of the issues and assumptions within 
effectuation process theory ......................................................... 86 
Table 6 Examples of effectual stakeholder commitments in the 
effectuation literature.................................................................. 89 
Table 7 A summary of four different possible commitment ideal  
types to effectual processes ...................................................... 114 
Table 8 Different stakeholder behaviours depending on commitment  
type ........................................................................................... 129 
Table 9 Securing stakeholder commitments under uncertainty - three 
actions ....................................................................................... 148 
Table 10 Effect on effectual network of stakeholder commitments  
based on different motives ....................................................... 149 
Table 11 Summary of contributions of the study .................................... 152 
Table 12 Representing theory as tools for practitioners within this  









What, if anything, separates human beings from other members of the animal 
kingdom? Theologians since time immemorial would assert that it is some form 
of divinity bestowed upon us by a higher power. However, the knowledge we 
have accumulated since Charles Darwin first published ‘On the Origin of Spe-
cies’ suggests that we are no more that another branch of evolution extending 
back to a single common ancestor. It is therefore a fact that even mosquitos are 
our cousins and, at some distant point in the past, the nth-times-great-
grandparents of a sardine or a blue whale got together over a coffee and started a 
chain of procreation that eventually resulted in you, me, and the neighbour’s cat. 
We then might ask ourselves, as Hamlet did: “What is a man, if his chief good 
and market of his time be but to sleep and feed? a beast, no more”. Of course, 
human beings as a whole do a lot more than merely eat and sleep, so what, then, 
is it in our actions that provides our distinctiveness as a species? 
One might argue that human distinctiveness as a species comes from our use 
of tools, or speech, or clothing, but these, too, have been observed in the behav-
iours of other non-human animals. Despite this, no other animal on earth, alive or 
extinct, displays the sheer diversity of activity that we do. We build huge elabo-
rate structures and machines, we organise ourselves into complex social hierar-
chies and distributions of skills and labour, and we produce detailed theories and 
philosophies to describe nature and society. It is this, our ability to take some-
thing that someone else (or something else) has created and modify it, build upon 
it, connect it with the creations of others – to create something new that is greater 
than the sum of its parts – which makes us distinct. In other words, it is our abil-
ity to innovate.  
Innovation is a perennial topic of organisational science and international 
business and within this field innovation is principally understood to be carried 
out through entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship is seldom, if ever, a single person 
enterprise, yet the vast bulk of entrepreneurship research, following in the foot-
steps of eminent scholars such Schumpeter, invariably fixates upon a single, 
seemingly mystical individual known as the entrepreneur. Little attention is giv-
en to the diverse yet faceless swathes of enablers and collaborators that bear the 
entrepreneur along upon their shoulders towards success, or failure. It is therefore 
my intention with the following study to contribute a small part to our under-
standing of how these actors, the committed stakeholders to entrepreneurship, 
play a role in the "gale of creative destruction" (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 84) 
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1.1 Entrepreneurship and Opportunity 
Entrepreneurship as a field of research has, since Schumpeter’s (1934) early extol-
ling of the virtues of the entrepreneur up until near the end of the 20th century, been 
dominated by a fixation on the entrepreneur as a unique species of beast who is 
qualitatively different from the common man. This led to numerous studies aimed 
at classifying the entrepreneur; attempting to profile the personality characteristics 
that separate entrepreneurs from the rest of society (e.g. Begley & Boyd, 1987; 
Brockhaus & Horwitz, 1986; Chen, Greene, & Crick, 1998). This ‘trait approach’ 
to entrepreneurship ultimately proved to be unsatisfactory, and gradually began to 
lose favour after Gartner (1988) declared that ‘“Who Is an Entrepreneur?” Is the 
Wrong Question’. Gartner called for a behavioural perspective of entrepreneurship, 
i.e. one that focusses not on who an entrepreneur is, but what an entrepreneur does. 
Shane and Venkataraman went further, critiquing research that defines the field 
“solely in terms of who the entrepreneur is and what he or she does” (Shane & 
Venkataraman, 2000, p. 218), claiming instead that: 
In contrast to previous research, we define the field of entrepreneurship as the schol-
arly examination of how, by whom, and with what effects opportunities to create future 
goods and services are discovered, evaluated, and exploited [...] Consequently, the field 
involves the study of sources of opportunities; the processes of discovery, evaluation, 
and exploitation of opportunities; and the set of individuals who discover, evaluate, and 
exploit them. (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000, p. 218) 
And thus was cemented the opportunity perspective of entrepreneurship that per-
sists to this day (c.f. Foss & Klein, 2017). 
Out of this opportunities perspective, several different views have emerged, in-
cluding the dominant and competing views of opportunity discovery versus oppor-
tunity creation (Alvarez & Barney, 2007). Discovery views, following in the foot-
steps of Israel Kirzner (1973, 1979, 1997), include opportunity identification 
(Ardichvili, Cardozo, & Ray, 2003), and opportunity recognition (Baron, 2006; 
Baron & Ensley, 2006), while opportunity creation views, suggested to be the intel-
lectual legacy of Schumpeter (1934), include bricolage (Baker & Nelson, 2005; 
Stinchfield, Nelson, & Wood, 2013), and effectuation (Sarasvathy, 2001). While all 
of these views have shifted focus away from the entrepreneur as an individual, and 
on to the multidimensional concept of opportunity made up of cognitive, affectual, 
environmental, social, and processual elements, they generally, still, rely on a single 
person perspective. As such, and for the sake of theoretical parsimony, these theo-
ries invariably assume a single type (or theoretical conception) of ‘opportunity’ is at 
play. If, however, we choose to view entrepreneurial processes from the perspec-
tives of a diversity of stakeholders, it opens the possibility of more than one con-
ception of ‘opportunity’ to be relevant in a single instance of entrepreneurship. That 
is to say, in a scenario where an entrepreneur embarks on a process which eventual-
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ly leads to the creation of a new product or service serving an entirely new market, 
while the action being taken on the part of the entrepreneur may be rightfully de-
scribed by a model of opportunity creation, given the involvement of other actors in 
the process, other models of opportunity may describe their actions differently and 
more accurately, although the end result is the same for all parties.  
1.1.1 Entrepreneurial action in opportunity discovery and creation contexts 
Alvarez and Barney (2007, p. 17) suggest that “the assumptions underlying discov-
ery and creation theory are both internally consistent, though largely contradictory”. 
Because any empirically observed case of opportunity formation can potentially be 
interpreted ex ante from either of the two perspectives, they argue that the assump-
tions of each view only have empirical implications if they are linked to specific 
entrepreneurial actions. Whether their actions are consistent with opportunity crea-
tion or opportunity discovery will depend on how the entrepreneur perceives the 
context in which he or she is operating and, if his or her hypothesis about the envi-
ronment is incorrect, the wrong action will be chosen (they will apply the wrong 
theory), and these actions will therefore prove to be ineffective. Alvarez and Barney 
summarise seven such entrepreneurial actions, which are generally held to be im-
portant, in the two different contexts of creation and discovery - Table 1, below.  
Table 1 Effective entrepreneurial actions in discovery and creation contexts 
(Alvarez & Barney, 2007, p. 17) 
 Discovery Context Creation Context 
Leadership Based on expertise and (per-
haps) experience 
Based on charisma 
 
Decision Making Risk-based data collection 
tools; Risk-based decision mak-
ing tools; Importance of oppor-
tunity costs 
Iterative, inductive, incremental 
decision making; Use of biases 




Recruitment: Specific human 
capital recruited broadly 
Recruitment: General and flexi-
ble human capital recruited from 
preexisting social networks 
Strategy Relatively complete and un-
changing 
Emergent and changing 
Finance 
 
External capital sources: Banks 
and venture capital firms 
‘Bootstrapping’ and ‘friends, 
families, and fools’ 
Marketing 
 
Changes in marketing mix may 
be how new opportunities mani-
fest themselves 
Marketing mix may fundamen-
tally change as a result of new 
opportunities that emerge 
Sustaining Compet-
itive Advantages 
Speed, secrecy, and erecting 
barriers to entry may sustain 
advantages 
Tacit learning in path dependent 
process may sustain advantages 
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The fundamental difference between the two views, which make these very dif-
ferent approaches to action sensible to the individual who is doing the perceiving 
of the context, relates to how they perceive the existence of the opportunity. The 
‘discoverer’ hypothesises that the environment presents an objectively and inde-
pendently existing opportunity which can conceivably be exploited under certain 
conditions of risk (if the discoverer does not exploit the opportunity, eventually 
someone else will). The ‘creator’ does not hypothesise that the opportunity has 
an independent existence, but it is merely an artefact that only comes into being 
as a direct result of the creator’s interventions in the environment under condi-
tions of uncertainty (Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Sarasvathy, Dew, Velamuri, & 
Venkataraman, 2010) 
The discovery view characterises an opportunity as an objective fact; that it is 
something that exists independently of the perceiver. In the traditional, Kirzneri-
an sense (Kirzner, 1973, 1979, 1997), opportunity discovery is simply a matter of 
identifying new resource combinations that can be matched to more effectively 
serve existing market needs. Ardichvili et al.’s theory of opportunity identifica-
tion and development, on the other hand, incorporates an element of creation into 
the process which “involves redirecting or recombining resources in order to cre-
ate and deliver value superior to that currently available” (Ardichvili et al., 2003, 
p. 111). An entrepreneur who sees the context as one of opportunity discovery 
relies on prior knowledge (Shane, 2000), and pattern recognition ability devel-
oped through experience (Baron & Ensley, 2006) to be alert to possible opportu-
nities ‘out there’ in the environment. Essentially, an individual with the particular 
personality characteristics that make them ‘entrepreneurially alert’ processes in-
formational cues from various sources, such as their various forms of prior 
knowledge (Shane, 2000) and their social or professional networks (Ardichvili et 
al., 2003; Arenius & Clercq, 2005; Ozgen & Baron, 2007), to identify the exist-
ence of a potential unexploited market. 
Once an opportunity is recognised as such, the entrepreneur devises a strategy 
or plan by which to develop and exploit it. This strategy is relatively complete ex 
ante¸ a linear plan to get from point A to point B. A simple example might be of 
an individual who (from various cues in the environment) perceives that there is 
an unexploited or underexploited market explicitly for portable outdoor saunas. 
He or she will devise a detailed strategy for how to assemble or recombine the 
resources necessary to bring portable outdoor saunas to the market in the most 
efficient and effective way possible with the least amount of risk relative to the 
greatest amount of anticipated return. 
So, what do theories of opportunity discovery tell us about those, other than 
the entrepreneur, who are directly involved in the process? In this perspective, 
other stakeholders or human resources are treated just the same as non-human 
resources. Individuals possessing the specific skills required by the entrepreneur 
17 
as means to contribute to the achievement of predetermined ends are passively 
selected (Alvarez & Barney, 2007). Financial resources are secured from external 
parties, such as banks and venture capitalist firms, through transactions backed 
by contract. Collaborators and partnerships are selected based upon how well 
they fit into the entrepreneur’s grand strategy. In other words, the role of others 
in opportunity creation contexts is generally transactional. For the most part, oth-
er individuals within the entrepreneur’s networks merely serve to provide the 
entrepreneur with streams of information, or act as a sounding board by which 
the entrepreneur evaluates resources and opportunities (De Koning & Muzyka, 
1999). Ultimately, it is the entrepreneur who decides what the opportunity is, and 
how it should be realised. Therefore, perhaps the opportunity creation view might 
offer a more fruitful avenue for which to begin theorising about the involvement 
of others in innovation processes. 
The creation view characterises an opportunity as an artefact that does not 
have an independent existence from the actions of the one who creates it. Entre-
preneurial opportunities, in the case of effectuation, and resource environments 
from which opportunities emerge, in the case of bricolage, are considered to be 
socially constructed (Fisher, 2012). The ultimate outcome or form of the oppor-
tunity is not predictable ex ante and it involves an iterative and changing strategy 
that transforms an extant environment or reality from one state to another. Actors 
other than the entrepreneur also play a more active role in opportunity creation 
processes than discovery process, particularly when it comes to goal setting and 
the determination of entrepreneurial actions. As I noted above, the two main en-
trepreneurial opportunity creation theories currently in vogue are entrepreneurial 
bricolage (Baker & Nelson, 2005) and effectuation (Sarasvathy, 2001). While I 
am mostly interested in effectuation, for reasons I will examine presently, I will 
now provide a brief summary of bricolage. I provide a more detailed summary of 
effectuation in the following section, and effectuation theory as a whole is elabo-
rated in detail throughout this study. 
Bricolage begins with an entrepreneur acting in a ‘penurious environment’: 
“An environment is penurious from a firm’s perspective if it presents new chal-
lenges, whether opportunities or problems, without providing new resources” 
(Baker & Nelson, 2005, p. 353). Faced with such an environment, an entrepre-
neur has three options: avoid new challenges, seek new resources, or engage in 
bricolage, i.e. “making do by applying combinations of resources at hand to new 
problems and opportunities” (Baker & Nelson, 2005, p. 353). This can be done in 
a number of environmental domains open to the entrepreneur, including: physi-
cal, labour, or skill inputs; customers/markets; or institutional and regulatory en-
vironments. In each case, the entrepreneur, constrained by the penurious envi-
ronment, will find novel ways to leverage one or more of the aforementioned 
environmental domains in ways that might otherwise have been ignored. This 
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can be done, for example, by imbuing existing physical inputs at hand with ‘new 
use value’, involving customers, suppliers, and other individuals within the en-
trepreneurs social circle in projects, or by providing products or services to cus-
tomers who may otherwise be ignored (due to low value). The entrepreneur tests 
out these different combinations through direct enactment, and by efficiently rou-
tinizing new valuable actions, their firms are able to grow. 
Although there are a number of similarities between bricolage and effectuation 
– such as their focus on means, iterative experimental actions, contexts of re-
source scarcity – there a number of reasons why I believe that effectuation theory 
is a better place to start an investigation of the role of other stakeholders in inno-
vative opportunity creation processes. Firstly, bricolage is primarily concerned 
with the survival and growth of established firms, while effectuation is more 
concerned with the pre-firm and new venture creation. Secondly, bricolage’s as-
sumption of a penurious environment is sustained, and the theory’s explanatory 
power is therefore limited in to a certain subset of venture types – those within 
penurious environments (Fisher, 2012). Effectuation has much broader boundary 
conditions, and is relevant for any form of entrepreneurial action under uncer-
tainty. Finally, while leveraging interactions with other actors is one potential 
solution for a bricoleur, for the effectuator, it is the only solution. It is, therefore, 
the emergent theory of effectuation, with its emphasis on an expanding network 
of stakeholder commitments providing the necessary additional means and goals 
to the process of new market creation, which provides the best starting point 
from which to develop theory with a multi-person or intersubjective perspective 
of opportunity. It is at this point that I should explain what ‘effectuation theory’ 
entails. 
1.1.2 Effectuation theory 
Effectuation is a relatively new theory of entrepreneurial action. Introduced by 
Saras Sarasvathy in ‘Causation and Effectuation: Toward a theoretical shift from 
economic inevitability to entrepreneurial contingency’ (Sarasvathy, 2001), it dif-
fers from earlier entrepreneurship theory principally due to its emphasis on non-
teleological action. In short, effectuation deemphasised the importance of teleo-
logical strategies involving planning, and search and selection. Instead, the gen-
eral argument made by Sarasvathy was that entrepreneurs are often faced with a 
problem space where teleological action is simply not possible. They are con-
strained by a lack of resources and face a preponderance of uncertainties that 
prevent any attempts at careful planning. Instead, she argued, entrepreneurs (par-
ticularly those who have, through experience, developed entrepreneurial exper-
tise) will act iteratively, creatively, and experimentally. She refined a set of 
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logics that are associated with such action, which are: a focus on what can be 
done with means in hand rather than clear end goals; taking creative or experi-
mental actions towards a number of different possibilities, but with a focus on 
ensuring that the downside potential of failure is ultimately affordable rather than 
focussing on the upside potential of anticipated returns; seeing unexpected con-
tingencies as something that can be used for one’s own advantage rather than 
being something that should be avoided; focusing on what can be controlled 
about the environment rather than what can be predicted about it, and, finally; 
accumulating resources and goals through partnerships with other actors, includ-
ing potential customers, suppliers, or even competitors, rather than relying on 
competitive analysis. 
Sarasvathy contrasts effectuation with ‘causation’ which she uses to describe 
the teleological models of entrepreneurial action which rely heavily on the utili-
sation of pre-existing knowledge, careful planning, and competitive analysis to 
achieve goals which are clearly formulated ex ante – models that Sarasvathy, 
Dew, Velamuri, and Venkataraman (2010) argue are better suited to the discov-
ery views of opportunity. I will describe effectuation, and its contrasts with cau-
sation, in much greater detail in Chapter 3. For now, I will simply describe a 
common metaphorical example used by Sarasvathy et al. to explain the differ-
ence between causation and effectuation. The metaphor is of a person, or chef, 
cooking dinner. 
 An individual using causal reasoning will decide that they want to cook some-
thing specific for dinner, such as duck a l'orange, for example. This person may 
look up a recipe for duck a l'orange online, check to see if he or she has the in-
gredients necessary in the pantry and refrigerator, go to the market to buy any 
missing ingredients, and then follow the recipe step by step until the dinner is 
completed as planned. A person using effectual reasoning, on the other hand, will 
start off by opening the pantry and the refrigerator, and looking around the kitch-
en, to see what ingredients and utensils he or she has access to. He or she then 
imagines what possible meals can be created from these means at hand. While 
the causal actor begins with a clear goal (cook duck a l'orange) the effectual ac-
tor only begins with a vague aspiration (cook something for dinner) and a num-
ber of means with which to imagine different possibilities.  
What this simple metaphor is missing, however, are the two key elements 
which are the implicit antecedents of effectuation; the reasons why effectuation is 
often necessary to begin with – resource scarcity and uncertainty. If we factor 
these elements into the metaphor, it becomes a bit more complicated. In such a 
case, we must imagine that the aspiring cook has the task of creating dinner for 
number of guests, who are known to be picky eaters but whose tastes are un-
known. Also, when the cook surveys the kitchen, he or she finds nothing but a 
box of salt, one pot, and a spatula. He or she could go to the market, but pay day 
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is not until next week. This means that the cook must enlist the help of others, to 
contribute ingredients and utensils, and ideas about what to cook. Who are these 
others? The guests? Housemates? Someone else? Why would they contribute 
ingredients, such as a cup of flour or a leg of lamb, and what would they expect 
in return? The extant effectuation theory suggests that these other stakeholders 
will share the same effectual reasoning as the cook. They will each contribute 
some ingredients towards the dinner in return for a plate at the table and some 
say over what will be served. Does the cook, however, have to rely on the hope 
that the people who have ingredients to contribute share his or her reasoning, that 
they even know how to cook themselves, or that they are willing to contribute to 
a dinner which they may ultimately find unpalatable? These are the metaphorical 
questions that I hope to answer with this study. The actual research questions I 
will arrive at shortly, but first I will discuss the purpose of this study. 
1.2 Theoretical Gap and Research Questions 
There is a clear gap in opportunity creation literature with regard to how the in-
teractions that occur between entrepreneurs and stakeholders facilitate the pro-
cess of opportunity creation. Some scholars (e.g. Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 
2011; Venkataraman, Sarasvathy, Dew, & Forster, 2012) acknowledge the cur-
rent lack of research with the intersubjective as a key unit of analysis of entre-
preneur-stakeholder relationships and negotiations involved in entrepreneurial 
opportunity creation, and have called for research in this area. I will discuss the 
origins of this pragmatist theory of intersubjectivity in the philosophical back-
ground to this study in the following chapter, however, Venkataraman et al. 
(2012, p. 25) provide a succinct summary of the meaning of the term 
‘intersubjective’ based upon Donald Davidsons (2001) thesis of knowledge as an 
“irreducible tripod consisting of the objective, subjective, and intersubjective”: 
Note that in this thesis the vast and disembodied “social” is replaced with the more 
local and bounded concept of “intersubjective.” This serves to refocus social construc-
tionist perspectives in a novel way while at the same time offering a more nuanced and 
scientifically coherent notion of constructivism. Davidson is concerned not with the 
myth of the objective but with the more intriguing idea that the mind (or the subjective) 
itself is constructed out of lived experiences—hence, it is the notion of subjective that is 
largely a myth. Furthermore, these lived experiences include actual interactions with 
physical reality as well as with other people. It follows, then, that intersubjective does 
not equal interpersonal. When we use the term interpersonal, we assume two or more 
people with independent “subjective” viewpoints who exchange and come together 
through interpersonal interaction. Davidson’s notion of intersubjective refers to the fact 
that our subjective viewpoint already assumes vast areas of coherence with others be-
cause we share in and experience the same objective reality. Hence, intersubjective re-
fers to the ex ante taken-for-granted shared core between the persons interacting, not to 
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their ex ante differences overcome through negotiation. (Venkataraman et al., 2012, p. 
25) 
They go on to declare that (most) opportunities are artefacts that are formed 
through actions and interactions among stakeholders who take materials and con-
cepts found in their environments, and use them to create or transform new reali-
ties. Opportunities therefore have elements of both discovery and creation. While 
effectuation theory, in its current state, has initiated the dialogue on how the in-
teractions between stakeholders and entrepreneurs transform environments and 
create opportunities, there is much theoretical work yet to be done. It is this gap 
that I am seeking to address in this study and, as such, intersubjectivity is a key 
component of my analysis.  
Alvesson and Sandberg argue that mere ‘gap spotting’ is not sufficient to gen-
erate interesting and influential research as it does not “deliberately try to identi-
fy and challenge the assumptions underlying existing literature in the process of 
constructing research questions” (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011, p. 252). They in-
stead argue for problematization as a methodology for generating research ques-
tions that are more likely to lead to influential theories, through identifying and 
challenging the assumptions that underlie the existing literature. Problematization 
involves identifying a domain of literature, identifying and articulating the as-
sumptions underlie this domain, evaluating them, and developing and evaluating 
an alternative assumption ground (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011, p. 256). As I 
have already identified the domain of literature I am investigating above, I will 
now address the assumptions of this domain and propose some alternative as-
sumptions to arrive at my overarching research question. 
One important assumption that underlies the body of conceptual literature that 
surrounds effectuation as opportunity creation relates to the conceptual divide 
between the two perspectives of opportunity described above, i.e. creation versus 
discovery or causation versus effectuation. Most of the conceptual literature 
treats these concepts as clearly separated and incompatible. Opportunity creation 
and opportunity discovery are treated as completely different scenarios with dif-
ferent sets of considerations and rationales from which to approach them. How-
ever, Sarasvathy (2001) herself explains that the divide between these two con-
cepts is merely for conceptual clarity, and that they are both important forms of 
reasoning that would likely be empirically observable to be running concurrently. 
Empirical research on effectuation, indeed, often does show a mixing of the 
logics in practice (see, for example, Berends, Jelinek, Reymen, & Stultiëns, 
2014; Dutta, Gwebu, & Wang, 2015; Nummela, Saarenketo, Jokela, & Loane, 
2014; Reymen et al., 2015). Despite this, there is no concrete theoretical devel-
opment, to my knowledge, that explains how this might unfold conceptually. By 
investigating the ways in which different stakeholders – who hold different logics 
or rationales from one another – interact with one another in opportunity creation 
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processes, I believe this may shed some light on the potential combining of caus-
al and effectual reasoning.   
A second, and more concrete, assumption from effectuation theory which I 
address in this study is the idea that stakeholders ‘self-select’ into effectuation 
processes (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b). The idea here that is often put forth by 
Sarasvathy et al. is that we do not need to enquire about the potentially unlimited 
number of reasons why stakeholders decide to make (or not make) commitments 
towards effectual processes of new market creation, because all that is important 
is that they did so. Related to this is the assumption that those who do make 
commitments to the effectual processes utilise the same effectual reasoning as the 
entrepreneur, an assertion that has generated some debate (c.f. Karri & Goel, 
2008). In this study I directly challenge this assumption by examining scenarios 
in which stakeholders may make their commitments based on rationales that are 
not the same as effectuation. This moves effectuation theory away from the more 
deterministic view that ‘those who are willing to commit will commit’, to offer 
some propositions as to how an effectual entrepreneur can take fate into his or 
her own hands, and incorporate decision-making regarding different types of 
stakeholders into his or her strategic toolkit. 
1.2.1 Research questions 
Given the above discussion, the overarching research question I composed to 
guide my research is as follows: 
RQ 1: How are stakeholder commitments engaged towards the process of op-
portunity creation through effectuation? 
I use the word ‘engaged’ here, rather than ‘used’ or ‘employed’ to emphasise the 
assumption that the stakeholders are not merely passive inputs into the opportuni-
ty creation process (as per the discovery view) but are actively involved in the 
way in which it unfolds. While my use of the word ‘engaged’ may seem to make 
my use of ‘commitments’ seem redundant (i.e. I could just ask how stakeholders 
are engaged toward the process of opportunity creation through effectuation), I 
have specifically included commitments into the question as they are, in fact, the 
primary focus of my study. The reasons for this focus on commitments, as I will 
explain in more depth in Chapter 3 (specifically section 3.5.1), is that this study 
is primarily concerned with those stakeholders who are bound more closely to 
the process than through mere arms-length transactions. My focus is on stake-
holders who actively share in the risks and rewards of creating a new opportuni-
ty, or new market, with the entrepreneur; for example, through shared equity re-
lationships. Also, while the assumption is that a particular entrepreneur is the one 
who initiates an opportunity creation process, this question does not assume that 
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the process will be entirely controlled or controllable by the entrepreneur, nor 
does it assume that all commitments are necessarily made between the entrepre-
neur and another party. By excluding the entrepreneur from this main research 
question, I refocus attention away from the usual emphasis on the entrepreneur’s 
reasoning and action, onto those of the stakeholders. Finally, I make explicit in 
the question that my focus is on processes of opportunity creation through effec-
tuation. This sets some certain boundary conditions around my study, where I am 
examining the environmental (or otherwise) context in which effectuation is said 
to be most applicable. I.e. contexts characterised by uncertainty and ambiguity in 
which it is impossible ex ante to predict what the likely outcome will be (see 
Chapter 3). 
As this is quite a complex question, I believe it is best answered by further 
breaking it down into three separate sub-questions. They are as follows: 
SQ1: Why would stakeholders make commitments to effectual processes? 
SQ2: How are commitments secured by an effectual entrepreneur? 
SQ3: How do different stakeholder commitments impact the way in which the 
opportunity creation process unfolds? 
The first sub-question is aimed at classifying stakeholders and their behaviour. It 
implicitly suggests some additional descriptive questions (sub-sub-questions) 
such as ‘who are potential stakeholders?’ ‘What do potential stakeholders think?’ 
‘In what way would potential stakeholders act?’ This sub-question forms the 
main basis for my analysis in Chapter 4 in which I develop a typology of poten-
tial stakeholder commitments (see subchapters 1.4 and 2.3, below). The second 
sub-question then brings the focus back onto the entrepreneur (or other key deci-
sion maker already embedded in the effectual process) to identify how, given the 
categorisation developed by answering SQ1, they might be able to proactively 
secure the different types of commitments described. This question challenges 
the assumption within extant effectuation theory that stakeholders simply self-
select into the process. While it may be so that self-selection is ultimately the 
mechanism by which commitments are formed, I attempt to analyse what actions 
might be taken by the entrepreneur (or other decision maker) that will make 
commitment more likely. The answer to SQ2 I tackle mainly in subchapter 5.3. 
The final sub-question, SQ3, is designed to generate theoretical propositions 
about the process implications of the commitments described by answering SQ1. 
In my attempt to answer this question, I seek to analyse how different types of 
commitment being secured may alter the path of the process of opportunity crea-
tion, and how it may also affect subsequent interactions with other potential 
stakeholders. This final piece of the theoretical puzzle I mainly address in sub-
chapters 5.1, 5.2, and 5.4 .  
In sum, the purpose of this study is to develop theory that explains how stake-
holder commitments contribute to the unfolding of opportunity creation process-
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es. To do this, the study is divided up into three interlinked parts. The first part 
aims to define and describe a categorisation that encompasses all potential stake-
holder commitment types; the second part aims to analyse how entrepreneurs or 
other actors already engaged in opportunity creation processes might be able to 
proactively secure commitments of different types; and the third part aims to fit 
this accumulation of stakeholder commitments into a predictive model of how 
opportunity creation processes might unfold. Now I would like to briefly explain 
why I believe this should be done. 
1.3 Value of the Study 
I envision this study to be of value to theory, both for the ongoing development 
of effectuation theory specifically, as well as for entrepreneurship theory more 
generally. I can also imagine a number of possibilities for this study to act as a 
potential launch pad for new enquiry within international entrepreneurship as 
well. However, I am in agreement with scholars such as Corley & Gioia (2011) 
who argue that, in organisational and management science, scientific utility is too 
often emphasised over practical utility in theory building. For this reason, my 
aim is for this study to have a greater scope, and provide real value in practice 
and not just theory. In this subchapter, I will now briefly describe the three areas 
of contribution I would like to make. 
1.3.1 Intended contribution to theory 
Effectuation is not a mature theory. According to Edmondson and McManus: 
Mature theory presents well-developed constructs and models that have been studied 
over time with increasing precision by a variety of scholars, resulting in a body of work 
consisting of points of broad agreement that represent cumulative knowledge gained. 
Nascent theory, in contrast, proposes tentative answers to novel questions of how and 
why, often merely suggesting new connections among phenomena. Intermediate theory, 
positioned between mature and nascent, presents provisional explanations of phenome-
na, often introducing a new construct and proposing relationships between it and estab-
lished constructs. (Edmondson & McManus, 2007, p. 1158) 
Perry, Chandler, and Markova (2012) reviewed the extant effectuation litera-
ture and found that it had only just begun to make the ascent from nascence to-
wards becoming an intermediate theory. More recent evaluations (e.g. Arend, 
Sarooghi, & Burkemper, 2015) have shown that effectuation has still not reached 
a level consisting of ‘increasing precision’ or ‘broad agreement’ among a variety 
of scholars. Therefore, effectuation remains ripe for theoretical development. 
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Perry et al. (2012) suggest that the trajectory of effectuation research should 
be towards developing it into an intermediate theory by asking less open con-
ceptual questions, and increasingly explore the relationships of causation and 
effectuation with other established constructs. They are suggest that: “In addi-
tion to the relationships that have been proposed between effectuation and trust 
and effectuation and expertise, researchers should consider whether effectuation 
is conceptually related to other theories” (Perry et al., 2012, p. 848). Contrib-
uting to this area, in my development of a classification of stakeholder types, in 
Chapter 4, I draw on a number of constructs and concepts from other estab-
lished theories such as different views of uncertainty (e.g. McMullen & 
Shepherd, 2006; Milliken, 1987), of rationality (e.g. Weber, 1978), different 
forms of motivation (e.g. Amabile, 1993, 1997; Ryan & Deci, 2000a), and non-
rational forms of decision making (e.g. Baron, 2008; Griffin & Varey, 1996). 
See section 2.3.1 for a discussion on the way in which I use typology towards 
this end. 
In a number of recent dialogues in the Academy of Management Review, sev-
eral scholars have made a number of other suggestions on how effectuation theo-
ry should continue to be developed. Reuber, Fischer, and Coviello (2016) suggest 
bringing effectuation back to its roots in pragmatism, with an emphasis on exam-
ining the role of ‘habit’ in the theory, where it has been neglected in favour of 
effectuations focus on ‘creativity’. This study is heavily influenced by the princi-
ples of pragmatism (see subchapter 2.1 for this discussion). Furthermore, I exam-
ine habit in relation to stakeholder decision making, i.e. the routine behaviours of 
actors developed over time and through experience, and contextualised within 
social situations (see subchapters 5.1 and 5.2).  
Gupta, Chiles, and McMullen (2016), on the other hand, call for a greater em-
phasis on process theory and research to be made in the investigation of effectua-
tion. They argue that a process-theoretic approach to effectuation has been inhib-
ited by an underlying emphasis on an equilibrium perspective. Instead, they ar-
gue that “effectuation scholars may want to rethink their affiliation with equilib-
rium, which relies on variance theory and methods, and embrace the many dise-
quilibrating aspects of entrepreneurship, which are better suited to process theory 
and research” (2016, p. 542). As I have stated above, one of the main aims of this 
study is develop theoretical propositions about the process effects of stakeholder 
commitments. This forms an important part of Chapter 5, particularly subchapter 
5.4. See also section 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 for the methodological considerations of this 
aim. I do not treat effectuation as an equilibrium theory with stable system states, 
but rather as a dynamic process in constant disequilibrium with an ever changing 
problem space being faced by decision makers within it. 
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Finally, the core effectuation scholars themselves, Read, Sarasvathy, Dew, and 
Wiltbank, make seven suggestions for the future research of effectuation. These 
are: 
1. “Clarifying the concept of effectual control”; 
2. “Specifying the unit of deliberate practice in developing entrepreneurial 
expertise”; 
3. “Transitioning from effectual to causal approaches, and vice versa”; 
4. “Understanding goal hierarchy and precommitment”; 
5. “Endogenizing selection mechanisms”; 
6. “Delineating means and resources”, and; 
7. “Exploring equity and cocreation”. (Read, Sarasvathy, Dew, & Wiltbank, 
2016, pp. 531–532). 
Although this study touches on a number of these suggestions to a greater or 
lesser extent, (number three in particular forms an important part of the discus-
sion in Chapter 5), the main intended contribution is in relation to suggestion 
number seven. On this point, Read et al., (2016, p. 532) note: “Although cocrea-
tive equity relationships may be important for the structure and performance of 
new ventures, they are currently a black box in entrepreneurship research”. The 
main, overarching goal of this study (as encapsulated in the primary research 
question) is to open up this black box and explore what could potentially be in-
side. 
As I will discuss in the following chapter, this study is predominantly concep-
tual in nature. MacInnis (2011) advocates for the necessity of conceptual work 
and provides a typology of different types of conceptual contributions to guide 
research. In this typology, under the general conceptual goal of ‘envisioning’ are 
the specific conceptual goals of ‘identifying’ and ‘revising’, under ‘explicating’ 
are ‘delineating’ and ‘summarising’, under ‘relating’ are differentiating and inte-
grating, and, finally, under ‘debating’ are ‘advocating’ and ‘refuting’. My goal 
with this study is not to enter into the theoretical debate concerning effectuation 
to either refute the theory or advocate for it (although I fall do into the latter cat-
egory), and although I spend some time on explicating effectuation, with both a 
limited amount of delineating and summarisation (in Chapter 3), nor is it is to-
wards these ends that I wish to make a contribution. The primary conceptual con-
tribution to theory I intend to make with this study is towards envisioning 
(through revising effectuation to a new perspective – that of the stakeholder), and 
relating (though differentiation between stakeholders as different types of enti-
ties).  
Given my conceptual goals as stated above, according to MacInnis (2011), my 
metaphorical role in this study as a researcher is both that of an artist who paints 
a revised perspective of a known phenomenon, and a naturalist who works to 
classify the newly identified entities within this newly created picture. It is my 
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belief, however, that, in general, a researcher falls into the old cliché of a detec-
tive who is seeking to solve a mystery. My suspects in this case are the stake-
holders to effectuation processes. Their ‘crime’, as it were, is the commitments 
they make. The old adage I have used in the title of my thesis suggests that to 
determine the guilt of a suspect, one must establish the suspect’s ‘means, motive, 
and opportunity’. Effectuation theory has well established how it is the stake-
holders who possess the means in effectuation processes. It is now my task in this 
study to establish their motive, and how they perceive their opportunity. 
1.3.2 Intended contribution to international entrepreneurship  
Jones, Coviello, and Tang (2011) and Mainela, Puhakka, and  Servais (2014) 
identify effectuation as a promising area of research for international entrepre-
neurship. Despite this, there are few current studies that specifically investigate 
effectuation within, or apply effectuation towards the context of international 
entrepreneurship. In fact, the systematic literature review I conducted for this 
study only turned up thirteen studies on effectuation in an international context in 
total, with six of these thirteen being published only in the last four years. Only 
one of these studies, Harms and Schiele (2012), was quantitative – a simple 
quantitative study examining the relationship between an entrepreneur’s interna-
tional and entrepreneurial experience with their use of causal or effectual logic in 
entry mode decisions, which found that experienced entrepreneurs tended to use 
effectuation, and that those using causal logic tended to use export-type entry 
modes. The remaining studies are all qualitative case-based research (both single 
and multiple cases) that apply effectuation in the context of firm internationalisa-
tion, international new ventures (INVs), and ‘born global firms’. For example 
one of the earliest studies, Mainela and Puhakka (2009) examines the use of ef-
fectuation in a Polish INV in a turbulent market context and highlights the im-
portance of relationship building with stakeholders in relation to a number of en-
trepreneurial behaviours; Nummela et al. (2014), a qualitative and longitudinal 
investigation of three case companies found that decision making in born global 
firms goes through alternating periods of causal and effectual logic; and 
Sarasvathy, and Forza, (2014), an empirical, qualitative investigation of five case 
companies found that entrepreneurs quickly transition to effectual logic from 
causal logic when internationalising due to a lack of knowledge and information. 
Effectual logic helps fill the lack of knowledge that prevents (preferred) causal 
planning. Entrepreneurs then simply act, and in doing so gather the new goals 
and means they need to operate internationally. The qualitative case-based re-
search into effectuation in an international context all invariably observed the 
combining, alternation between, and simultaneous use of both effectual and 
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causal logic by decision makers, depending a number of contextual factors (such 
as the role and type of stakeholders involved). 
Although in the following chapters I am also guilty of not discuss international 
entrepreneurship in particular, I do believe that the findings and theoretical de-
velopment of this study provide a potential contribution to furthering the investi-
gation of effectuation in an international context. Jones et al., (2011) identify 
three main branches of international entrepreneurship: Type A are studies on en-
trepreneurial internationalisation; Type B are international comparisons of entre-
preneurial behaviours by countries or cultures, and; Type C studies are compari-
sons of how entrepreneurial internationalisation differs across countries or cul-
tures. By classifying different types of stakeholder commitments and their under-
lying logics and reasoning, I believe that this serves as a platform for novel Type 
B studies which investigate how these logics and reasoning may differ depending 
on country or culture. Furthermore, by investigating how different types of rea-
soning and logic affect the way in which entrepreneurial processes unfold, this 
could lead to Type A studies which investigate how geographical and psychic 
proximity may affect the commitment forming process. Finally, new Type C 
studies could investigate how the process modelled in this study may differ 
across countries and cultures. I discuss these prospects further, at the conclusion 
of this study in subchapter 6.1.  
1.3.3 Intended contribution to practice 
Corley and Gioia (2011) make the argument that research in organisation and 
management studies has been increasingly emphasising or displaying a bias to-
wards scientific utility to the detriment of the generation of theory that has real 
practical utility, despite the fact that relevance to practice has long been suggest-
ed as being an important part of what constitutes theory and theoretical contribu-
tion. They state that: “Simply put, we believe that theoretical contributions in 
management and organization studies have not done an adequate job of anticipat-
ing the important conceptual, as well as practical, needs of society’s now most 
prominent members – business and social organizations” (Corley & Gioia, 2011, 
p. 20). To remedy this, they suggest that, in addition to scientific utility, theoreti-
cal contributions should emphasise practice – they should be problem driven and 
should have an explicit appreciation for applicability – and they should be ‘pres-
cient’. By prescient they mean that theory should be directing attention towards 
future problem domains.  
The aim of this study, as is befitting the principles of pragmatist philosophy in 
which it has been conducted (as I discuss in the following chapter), is to generate 
useful theory, for both science and practice. As discussed in subchapter 1.2, this 
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study is, as Corley and Gioia recommend, problem driven. The problem being 
how to engage the vitally important stakeholder commitments towards 
opportunity creation processes. Applicability to practice is a theme throughout 
the study, and I intend that practitioners, should they read this work, will be able 
to use the analysis and findings herein useful for thinking about how they might 
be able to attract and secure stakeholder commitments, and what the likley 
outcomes of different types of commitment might be.  I dedicate a large part of 
my concluding chapter to the discussion of the practical implications of this 
study for entreprneurs, managers, as well as policy makers (see subchapter 6.1). 
As for the matter of prescience, the phenomenon of opportunity creation through 
networks of entrepreneurs and their stakeholders is of great relevance in this 
regard. Today, innovation is speeding up; product life cycles are getting shorter, 
advances in technology are putting the capacity for innovation into the hands of 
more and more individuals, and uncertainties and upheavals within established 
industries are forcing firms to rethink their relationships with their stakeholders 
and the way they do business. In the future we are likely to see an increasing 
amount of innovation occurring across multiple national borders and between 
individuals and firms, rather than within single firms, as new phenomena such as 
crowd-sourcing become increasingly prevalent. 
1.4 Structure of the Study 
Before we dive headlong into the philosophical and methodological discussion of 
the following chapter, I would like to briefly outline the structure of the study as 
it is presented within these pages. By doing so, I will make the intended logical 
flow of my discussion clear and explicit. The structure of the study is illustrated 
in Figure 1, over the page. 
Chapter one. In this chapter I have discussed the positioning of this study. I 
have established that the general subject of concern is multi-person explanations 
for innovation. Towards explaining this phenomenon, I have discussed how op-
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provides the most appropriate basis for investigation. To guide this study I pre-
sented my primary research question and three sub-questions. Finally, I have dis-
cussed the potential value of this study for entrepreneurship theory, international 
entrepreneurship research, and for practice. 
Chapter two. In this chapter I conduct an evaluation of the meta-theoretical 
assumptions of effectuation theory and outline some of the criticisms that have 
been weighed against it. I discuss the philosophical background to this research 
which, in following with the philosophical roots of effectuation, is based upon 
the pragmatist school of thought. I then describe my methods of data collection 
and analysis which include systematic literature review of all of the key works of 
extant effectuation theory, and a qualitative meta-analysis of these works. This 
chapter concludes with a detailed discussion of the theory building products of 
this study, including a typology of stakeholder commitments, a modelling of how 
stakeholder commitments affect the opportunity creation process, and two sets of 
formal theoretical propositions which summarise the key theoretical implications 
of both types of theorising. 
Chapter three. This chapter presents the results of the systematic literature 
review of effectuation theory. I present a detailed breakdown of all the constitu-
ent concepts and constructs relating to the theory and describe how they relate to 
one another. I outline some of the debates and critiques that are present within 
the body of literature in relation to different aspects of effectuation. I then focus 
in on the role of stakeholder commitments in the effectuation process and discuss 
how this is a current area of weakness of the theory. Finally, I refine the prob-
lematisation I introduced in Chapter 1 that guides my analysis in the following 
two chapters.  
Chapter four. In this chapter I take some time to reconceptualise, in detail, 
the problem of stakeholder commitments to the perspective of the stakeholders 
themselves. I identify a ‘commitment problem space’ that forms the context in 
which potential stakeholders will perceive and evaluate the potential commitment 
decision. From this, I develop a typology of four potential stakeholder commit-
ment ideal types along two dimensions of teleological versus non-teleological 
action, and instrumental versus value rational action. This chapter aims to answer 
to answer the first of the research sub-questions. 
Chapter five. Taking the ideal types developed in chapter five, in this chapter 
I further explicate them based upon the likely cognitive and behavioural con-
structs that will be attributed to each type. I then discuss how effectual entrepre-
neurs, or other actors within effectual networks, might be able to negotiate com-
mitments of the aforementioned types. This is intended to answer the second re-
search sub-question. I then develop a process model for the commitment forming 
process towards opportunity creation and discuss how the different types of 
commitment will affect the process (and subsequent commitments and commit-
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ment negotiations) in different ways. This is intended to answer the third and fi-
nal research sub-question.  
Chapter six. In this chapter I present a concluding discussion to summarise 
the theoretical development of the previous two chapters. I then conclude the 
study by discussing the theoretical implications and limitations of this study, and 
offer some suggestions for future research. Finally, I offer a number of practical 




The study I have conducted herein is heavily theory driven and mostly conceptu-
al in nature. The rationale for this is twofold, based upon my personal belief that, 
firstly, the nature of my research purpose and questions precludes the utility of an 
empirical approach, and, secondly, the extant literature on effectuation provides 
sufficient and underutilised raw material for the explication and development of 
effectuation theory, particularly with regard to the role of stakeholders. My justi-
fication for these assertions shall become clear over the following paragraphs of 
this chapter. 
The central research question of this study (How are stakeholder commitments 
engaged towards the process of opportunity creation through effectuation?) con-
cerns entrepreneurial dynamics, the process by which entrepreneurship unfolds. 
It has been suggested that a traditional variance approach is limited in its suitabil-
ity for research into the dynamic aspect of entrepreneurial processes: 
The variance approach works perfectly well for examining research questions about 
comparisons among entities or relationships among variables. However, in the study of 
change and development, its assumptions prove too restrictive. (Van de Ven & 
Engleman, 2004, p. 351) 
Several entrepreneurship scholars have appealed for more suitable event driven 
or process approaches to be utilised instead (Aldrich, 2001; Davidsson & 
Wiklund, 2001; Low & MacMillan, 1988; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Such 
an approach generally involves the longitudinal study of events as they occur and 
the resultant outcomes of these events. However, longitudinal studies present a 
number of difficulties including, but not limited to, sheer labour intensity (Huber, 
1990). While a longitudinal study can be conducted retrospectively, this results in 
the researcher being subjected to a great degree of recall bias on the part of the 
subjects being studied, particularly where the study of thought process in deci-
sion making is involved and where verbal reports cannot be concurrently  com-
pared with actual behaviour (Ericsson & Simon, 1980), or recalled details are not 
considered important by the respondent (Huber, 1985). Furthermore, as my re-
search is concerned with the reasoning strategies and behaviour of stakeholders 
rather than of a single focal entrepreneur, to conduct a retrospective longitudinal 
study would require me to track down a number of various individuals who may 
have long since ceased being part of the central process under investigation. 
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A real time longitudinal study, on the other hand, should utilise data collected 
at multiple points over a period of many months, if not years, for meaningful in-
sight to be gleaned (Van de Ven & Engleman, 2004). However, this kind of em-
pirical investigation posed a number of difficulties in my case. If I were to 
choose to conduct my empirical observation in real-time, because it cannot be 
known whether an opportunity will be created ex ante, and that effectuation is 
essentially a theory about firms and markets in their nascence or before they even 
are founded or created, finding a case in progress becomes highly problematic 
task. There would be no guarantee that any opportunity process I began to follow 
would survive long enough to yield sufficient data on stakeholder commitments. 
Furthermore, due to time and labour constraints, I would be able to consider only 
a limited number of cases, thereby severely limiting the generalisability of my 
findings (Huber, 1990)1.  
Therefore, rather than case research, I instead settled upon conducting this 
study as a work of theory explication and development, combining systematic 
literature review (Petticrew & Roberts, 2008), qualitative meta-analysis 
(Schreiber, Crooks, & Stern, 1997), and conceptual methods (Cornelissen, 2016; 
Meredith, 1993). I favoured this approach due to the fact that the body of litera-
ture that has built up around effectuation since it was introduced in 2001 has al-
ready produced a large amount of theoretical discussion and empirical testing of 
the concepts and constructs that form the effectuation principles and process. It is 
therefore plausible that a theoretical explanation of how the commitments neces-
sary for opportunity creation are formed within effectual networks can be derived 
from this extant theory. I use a systematic literature review to identify and syn-
thesise the most relevant literature to date relating to effectuation in order to es-
tablish what we already know about the concept and the phenomenon of effectual 
new market creation. This also helps to establish clear boundaries around my 
research. To go beyond what-we-know, and further develop effectuation theory, I 
then use qualitative meta-analytical techniques to critically examine effectuations 
underlying constructs and assumptions; to reconceptualise effectuation to a 
stakeholder perspective. Finally, the outcomes of my analysis I present through 
conceptual methods.  
The conceptual methods I have chosen for the study are conceptual modelling 
through typology (Doty & Glick, 1994), and the creation of a predictive frame-
work, based upon the typology I have modelled, through conceptual deduction 
(Cornelissen, 2016; Meredith, 1993). A typology is an a priori, conceptually de-
rived identification of ideal types in a strict methodological way in order for it to 
be modelled appropriately and tested empirically (Doty & Glick, 1994; Pinder & 
                                                 
1 While this could be remedied using a dual methodology, combining a single longitudinal case study 
with several retrospective cases (Leonard-Barton, 1990), such a study would have still been hindered by 
time constraints. 
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Moore, 1979; Pugh, Hickson, & Hinings, 1969; Rich, 1992). While ideal types 
can be modelled theoretically or empirically, there are a number of advantages to 
using conceptual methods. Using typology as a method allows me to describe 
and classify the diverse potential reasoning strategies that may be held by differ-
ent types of stakeholder who make commitments and contribute to effectual pro-
cesses of opportunity creation. Using these ideal types, I then deduce the proba-
ble decision-making criteria and behaviours that each ideal type denotes and pre-
sent them as a series of propositions. Armed with these propositions, I can then 
build a predictive framework around how different stakeholders will impact upon 
the way in which the opportunity creation process unfolds which in turn I present 
as a second set of simple, generic propositions.  
In subchapter 2.2 I will describe in explicit detail the way in which I collected 
and analysed the data for this study, and in subchapter 2.3 I will clearly outline 
the theoretical methods I utilised to present my analysis and theorising, or my 
‘products of theorising’. However, first, I will outline my understanding of the 
various philosophical issues and discussion surrounding the theory and concepts 
that contribute to this study. 
2.1 Philosophical Background of the Research 
Before I embark on a detailed description of the methodological choices I have 
made in my research, I would first like to discuss the philosophical underpin-
nings of an intersubjective perspective to opportunity creation. There is currently 
a battle being waged across the pages of journals; one between those who argue 
that effectuation constitutes a self-contained theory, and those who, somewhat 
vehemently, disagree. The latter camp, represented by Arend, Sarooghi, and 
Burkemper (Arend et al., 2015; Arend, Sarooghi, & Burkemper, 2016), use their 
‘3E framework’ (experience, explain, and establish), based in part upon, and 
aimed at augmenting the work of Robert Dubin for the critique of theory in the 
social sciences, to evaluate effectuation as theory, and find it lacking. They ar-
gue, instead, that effectuation should be considered: 
… not as a theory but, rather, as a collection of marketing choices that includes its 
construction as an umbrella of previously established concepts, its misrepresentation of 
what it contrasts with, and its “form” as the kind of message that people want to hear. 
(Arend et al., 2016) 
On the other hand, in the former camp, the proponents of effectuation represent-
ed by Read, Sarasvathy, Dew, and Wiltbank rebuke Arend et al., arguing that: 
“…the 3E framework is, in fact, inapplicable to effectuation theory because it em-
bodies positivist criteria inappropriate for effectuation’s pragmatist stance.” (Read et al., 
2016) 
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While I count myself among the former camp, I acknowledge the arguments of 
the latter. I believe that the reason for this debate is rooted in the philosophical 
stance of the theorists in question, and the fact that effectuation literature, due to 
its pragmatist roots, can seem to be tenuously straddling positivism and interpre-
tivism. In the following section, I use Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) famous ‘So-
ciological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis’ as a framework to analyse the 
underlying meta-theoretical assumptions of the extant effectuation research, and 
to shed some light on the ongoing debate. 
According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), there are four sociological para-
digms into which all social theory falls, these are functionalist sociology, inter-
pretivist sociology, radical humanism, and radical structuralism. These para-
digms are located in relation to one another along two separate dimensions, the 
first concerning assumptions on the nature of society, the order-change dimen-
sion, and the second concerning assumptions on the nature of social science, the 
subjective-objective dimension. In the following paragraphs I take a critical eye 
to effectuation literature and attempt to identify where effectuation theory ap-
pears to fall within Burrell and Morgan’s framework. While, as shall be seen, it is 
clearly a theory within the sociology of regulation, what is not clear is whether it 
tends to be a functionalist theory, interpretive theory, or both. 
2.1.1 An evaluation of the meta-theoretical assumptions of effectuation 
Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 13) argue that all theories of society follow one or 
the other of two views, the ‘order’ or ‘integrationist’ view, or the ‘conflict’ or 
‘coercion’ view of society. With its emphasis on cooperation, collaboration, and 
consensus between networks of stakeholders towards the integration of various 
means into the ‘transformation’ of new products, innovations, and markets (Dew, 
Read, Sarasvathy, & Wiltbank, 2011; Sarasvathy, 2001; Sarasvathy & Dew, 
2005b), the nascent theory of effectuation clearly shows a tendency towards the 
former. Effectuation theorists are interested in explanations of how groups within 
society can unify and cooperate to create new organisational forms within the 
status quo of society rather than expressing dissatisfaction with the status quo. 
This indicates that effectuation falls under Burrell and Morgan’s (1979, p. 17) 
definition of a ‘sociology of regulation’ where theorists are “primarily concerned 
to provide explanations of society in terms which emphasise its underlying unity 
and cohesiveness” rather than a ‘sociology of radical change’. While it is clear 
that effectuation tends towards the order side of the order-change dimension of 
Burrell and Morgan’s framework, what is not clear is where it stands in relation 
to their second dimension of subjective-objective. 
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Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 1) argue that “all social scientists approach their 
subject via explicit or implicit assumptions about the nature of the social world 
and the way in which it may be investigated”. All social science is located 
somewhere along the subjective-objective dimension, and where a particular the-
orist falls along this dimension depends on a further four separate sets of assump-
tions concerning ontology, epistemology, human nature, and methodology. Sub-
jectivist approaches tend to be nominalist in ontology, anti-positivist in episte-
mology, voluntarist in their view of human nature, and ideographic in their ap-
proach to methodology. In contrast, the objectivist approaches tend to be onto-
logically realist, epistemologically positivist, take a determinist view of human 
nature, and utilise nomothetic methodologies. In the case of effectuation litera-
ture, these assumptions are invariably implicit, often hard to identify, and some-
times contradict one another, as will be seen in the following paragraphs. Recent-
ly there has been a shift in organisational science to find a ‘third way’ to resolve 
this clash between objectivist and subjectivist approaches, and pragmatism has 
been offered as a possible solution (Martela, 2015; Morgan, 2007). As effectua-
tion is stated to be a pragmatist theory, I will draw the philosophy of science for 
organisational research based upon the Deweyan pragmatism described Martela 
to supplement the Burrell and Morgan framework. 
1. Effectuation and assumptions on ontology. Effectuation is positioned as an 
alternative to the ‘opportunity discovery’ view within the domain of entrepre-
neurship that views opportunities (i.e. undiscovered markets) as having an inde-
pendent, objective existence somewhere ‘out there’, where they can be found by 
particularly alert individuals (Kirzner, 1997; Sarasvathy et al., 2010). Instead, 
they discuss markets (as well as organisations) as being humanly created ‘arte-
facts’ that can be created, destroyed, or transformed from being one form to be-
ing something entirely different (Dew et al., 2011; Sarasvathy, 2001; Sarasvathy 
& Dew, 2005b). While this may first appear to indicate that they follow a more 
constructivist or nominalist view of ontology, which holds that there is no ‘real’ 
structure to the world, and that “the social world external to individual cognition 
is made up of nothing more than names concepts and labels which are used to 
structure reality” (Burrell & Morgan 1979, p. 4), this does not mesh well with the 
normative propositions made by effectuation, e.g. statements that successful (or 
‘expert’) entrepreneurs are more likely to employ effectual processes and deci-
sion making (Sarasvathy, 2001). Many of aspects of effectuation suggest the ex-
istence of an independent, objective reality for which underlying regularities and 
cause-effect relationships can be identified – a position more congruous with on-
tological realism.  
However, Martela (2015) argues that the ontological position of pragmatism is 
neither realist nor constructivist; instead, it involves ontological experientialism. 
This alternative to realist and constructivist ontology is not concerned with what 
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is real and what is not, but instead concerns whether or not the theory produced 
can help people to navigate and act within the continued flow of human experi-
ence. As such, pragmatism holds that “even though no theory can claim the status 
of objectivity, in practical terms some theories are better maps for navigating the 
world than others” (Martela, 2015, p. 550). 
2. Effectuation and assumptions on epistemology. In regard to epistemology, it 
may seem that effectuation tries hard to be positivist, particularly in the way it 
seeks to make generalisations and push a normative agenda (c.f. Williams, 2000). 
Furthermore, many of the possible avenues for subjectivist perspectives are 
downplayed, as is evident in the downplaying of the reasons for stakeholder 
commitment, explained away simply by stating that stakeholders self-select into 
effectual processes and questions of why are irrelevant. However, the nature of 
the effectuation constructs relating to rationale and uncertainty, and the nature of 
the effectuation process as it is described prove to be problematic for positivist, 
empirical research, as is explained by Arend et al. (2015, p. 640): 
Effectuation theory has no stable system states; its process is dynamic and occurs 
within uncertain and changing conditions. This calls into question the objectivity of any 
measured unit values, the persistence of any such measures, and the idea that any states 
could be proven distinct in what appears an ambiguous process. 
The reason for this is that the concepts and constructs of effectuation have much 
to do with human consciousness rather than concrete structures in reality, i.e. 
matters of non-prediction, non-teleological rationales, perceptions of uncertainty, 
consensus and collaboration between diverse individuals. As such, one might be 
inclined to attribute to effectuation an anti-positive epistemology which contends 
that “one can only ‘understand’ by occupying the frame of reference of the par-
ticipant in action” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 5).  
Pragmatism offers an alternative solution: fallibilistic instrumentalism 
(Martela, 2015). Fallibilistic instrumentalism is fundamentally a fusion of 
Peirce’s (1974a) notion of fallibism and Dewey’s ‘warranted assertibility’ 
(Dewey, 1941). Fallibilism is the notion that “we cannot in any way reach perfect 
certitude nor exactitude. We never can be absolutely sure of anything (Peirce, 
1974a, p. 60)”, while warranted assertions are “outcomes of inquiry that are so 
settled that we are ready to act upon them, yet remain always open to be changed 
in the future” (Martela, 2015, p. 540) or “hypotheses which we see as so secure 
that we are willing to alter our behaviour according to their guidance to see 
whether this brings us to our desired experiential outcomes” (Martela, 2015, p. 
544). Ultimately what this means is that pragmatist research (of this Deweyan 
variety) follows an epistemology whereby the theory it produces is judged on its 
practical use in moving a particular human action forwards over and above alter-
native theories, and may be re-evaluated, amended, or discarded through ongoing 
inquiry. When applied to effectuation, as I will expand upon further, below, falli-
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bilistic instrumentalism allows for the use of any number of a variety of methods 
from which to develop the theory, as long as they produce the best explanation 
for the phenomenon in question (i.e. new market creation) that provides the in-
struments necessary to take some kind of practical action in relation to the phe-
nomenon. Furthermore, effectuation theory is open to transformation through 
further inquiry where better explanations and instruments are creatively pro-
duced. 
3. Effectuation and assumptions on human nature. Effectuation seems to have 
a rather volunteerist view of human nature where “man is completely autono-
mous and free willed” (Burrell & Morgan 1979, p. 6). They do not claim that 
effectual rationale is the only way for entrepreneurs to think; they illustrate clear-
ly that individuals can tend towards more goal oriented or means oriented deci-
sion making, and that it is a choice that the individual makes. Interestingly, how-
ever, is their argument that so-called ‘expert’ entrepreneurs will invariably tend 
towards effectual logic. Volunteerism is also evident in their descriptions of 
stakeholders who they say self-select into effectual processes. This implicitly 
assumes that those stakeholders who share effectual logic with the focal entre-
preneur will be the ones who make commitments of means. Pragmatism, in gen-
eral, however, locates human action somewhere between volunteerism and de-
terminism. While human actors possess certain autonomy to their actions, they 
are also embedded in a flow of experience. As stated by Martela (2015, p. 539): 
“as human beings we can never escape our embeddedness within the world of 
experiencing into which we are thrown as actors. Experiencing itself must here 
be understood as an active process of exploration within an embodied stream of 
experience in which the more cognitive dimensions are just one part”. Human 
action is therefore constrained by both historicity and sociality – I will return to 
this discussion when I elaborate further on pragmatism, below. 
4. Effectuation and assumptions on methodology. The extant empirical effec-
tuation literature utilises both nomothetic as well as ideographic methodology. 
Nomothetic methodology is “epitomised in the approach and methods employed 
in the natural sciences, which focus upon the process of testing hypotheses in 
accordance with scientific rigour. For example, a significant amount of the em-
pirical effectuation literature uses quantitative analysis to find statistically signif-
icant relationships between variables operationalised from effectuation constructs 
(see, for example, Brettel, Mauer, Engelen, & Küpper, 2012; Dew et al., 2011; 
Read, Song, & Smit, 2009). This is despite the fact (as noted in the quote from 
Arend et al. [2015 above]) that the concepts and constructs described by effectua-
tion do not really lend themselves well to such methodology.  
Effectuation, as a process, happens in the everyday flow of life of the entre-
preneur and his or her stakeholders. I would argue that an ideographic methodol-
ogy would much better suit the study of effectuation in the real world. Such a 
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methodology would “emphasise the subjective accounts which one generates by 
‘getting inside’ situations and involving oneself in the everyday flow of life – the 
detailed analysis of the insights generated by such encounters with one’s subject 
and the insights revealed in impressionistic accounts found in diaries, biographies 
and journalistic records” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 6). Indeed, as I discussed 
at the beginning of this chapter, it is such a longitudinal and processual rather 
than cross-sectional and variance approach that has been advocated as most ap-
propriate for entrepreneurship in general (Van de Ven, 2005; Van de Ven & 
Engleman, 2004). Interestingly, despite this, there are far fewer empirical articles 
on effectuation that use more ideographic methodologies (See, for example, 
Nielsen & Lassen, 2012; Nummela et al., 2014; Schirmer, 2013). A pragmatist 
stance does not specify any particular methodology, or whether one methodology 
should be used over another. Instead, in line with its instrumentalist epistemolo-
gy, pragmatism is open to using whichever methodology is most useful for the 
current task – which is why it is often advocated as an approach by proponents of 
mixed-method research (Goles, 2000; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). This does 
not mean, however, that any methodology goes, and I would argue that strictly 
nomothetic methodologies hold only limited usefulness for the development and 
investigation of effectuation for the reasons I discussed above. 
I believe, and hope I have made clear, that the current state of effectuation lit-
erature suffers from implicit, obfuscated, and often contradictory assumptions 
with regard to the nature of social science which leave it straddling the border 
between the functionalist and interpretive paradigms described by Burrell and 
Morgan (1979). Furthermore, I believe the emergent theory of effectuation ex-
hibits the characteristics of what Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 266) call ‘onto-
logical oscillation’, where there is an ontological inconsistency between the theo-
retical work and empirical research. While effectuation theory points to nominal-
ist explanations for how organisational and market ‘artefacts’ are produced 
through interaction between entrepreneur and stakeholders within effectual pro-
cesses, empirical research on the subject tries to force objectivistic approaches 
and positivist epistemology in a way that does not mesh well with the theory.  
The above analysis leads me to the conclusion that effectuation could benefit 
from more research that explicitly discusses and implements the principles of 
pragmatism, i.e. the ontological experientialism and epistemological fallibilistic 
instrumentalism described by Martela (2015), or similar ontological and episte-
mological approaches derived from the pragmatist philosophy. To this end, in the 
following section I will provide a brief overview of the fundamental principles of 
pragmatism and their origin. Following this, I will discuss the relationship be-
tween pragmatist philosophy and effectuation as it has been established in the 
literature, and I will discuss how pragmatism is congruent with this study. 
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2.1.2 A brief overview of pragmatism 
As I have noted above, in Read et al. (2016) effectuation theorists explicitly de-
clare that effectuation is a pragmatist theory. Despite this fact, few articles writ-
ten about effectuation ever explicitly mention pragmatism, and none discuss how 
it is so in any great detail. Therefore, it seems reasonable to me at this point to 
(briefly) discuss exactly what pragmatism is, and how it relates to effectuation 
research. 
Pragmatism (American pragmatism or classical pragmatism) originated in the 
works of influential American philosophers such as William James, C. S. Peirce, 
John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead, among others, around the turn of the 
20th century (Goles, 2000; Gross, 2007, 2009; Morgan, 2007; Tashakkori & 
Teddlie, 1998). The pragmatic tradition has been advanced by contemporary phi-
losophers such as Donald Davidson (Murphy, 1990), and applied by contempo-
rary social theorists such as Hans Joas (Joas, 1993). Much has been written under 
the philosophical umbrella of pragmatism over the past century and a half by 
these authors and others; however, it is difficult within a limited amount of words 
to give a coherent summary of what this label denotes. This is because, even dur-
ing the time of Peirce, James, and Dewey, there was disagreement among schol-
ars about what pragmatism is, and several different versions could be found (and 
can be found still). As noted by Gross (2007, p. 188): “it is not wrong to say that 
classical American pragmatism was never a unified philosophical doctrine but a 
family of closely related philosophies.” Despite this, assisted by the contempo-
rary interpretations of the classical pragmatists by Joas and Gross, I shall attempt 
to give a brief overview of the generally held ethos of pragmatism. 
As the name suggests, pragmatism is concerned with what is ‘practical’. It was 
devised as a method to resolve metaphysical disputes (James, 1907, p. 45) or as a 
“method of reaching a clearness of thought of higher grade than the "distinct-
ness" of the logicians” (Peirce, 1878) by evaluating ideas based upon their practi-
cal consequences. I.e., as James (1907, p. 45) states: “What difference would it 
practically make to any one if this notion rather than that notion were to be true?” 
This was Peirce’s pragmatic theory of meaning (Gross, 2007), or the ‘pragmatic 
maxim’ (Peirce, 1974b): 
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive 
the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole 
of our conception of the object (Peirce, 1878). 
From this maxim, its associated methods and theory, Peirce, James, and Dewey 
developed their theories about what constitutes truth or knowledge in quite dif-
ferent directions: Peirce maintained that truth is what is what would ultimately be 
agreed upon by researchers investigating a problem through experimentation 
(Gross, 2007); James (in an attempt to reconcile material and spiritual disputes) 
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argued that truth is whatever best serves an individual’s needs while not clashing 
with “other, greater vital benefits” (James, 1907, p. 77); while Dewey, taking a 
position somewhere between those of Peirce and James, argued that “knowledge 
is warranted assertion” (Dewey, 1941, p. 173). 
Pragmatists were impressed by Darwinism and critical of the Cartesian view 
that the mind and body are completely separate. Instead, they believed that hu-
mans are essentially problem solvers who use thought to overcome and adapt to 
problems they encounter in their environment (Gross, 2007). As such, according 
the pragmatists’ model of human action, to overcome problems, humans alternate 
between habit and creativity (Joas, 1996). When a problem is encountered in 
their environment, an actor will first act based upon habituation, i.e. they will 
utilise rules of action that have been developed through experience of similar 
situations in the past. If habit proves insufficient to resolve the problem being 
faced, the actor will then turn to creativity; “generating novel hypotheses about 
how to resolve the problem and testing those hypotheses in experience by putting 
into practice the actions that comprise their meaning” (Gross, 2007, p. 189). It is 
this conception of creativity that is well reflected in effectuation theory (Reuber 
et al., 2016). 
In addition to a postulating human action as being an oscillation between habit 
and creativity in response to problems encountered in a perpetual stream of expe-
rience of the real world, the pragmatists, particularly Mead in his concept of 
‘symbolic interaction’, expounded the view that humans are inherently social, 
and this adds an important dimension of intersubjectivy to pragmatism (Gross, 
2007; Joas, 1990). Symbolic interaction came about as a result of Mead’s theoris-
ing on the origin of human speech and language, the development of which Joas 
(1985) carefully traces with reference to both Mead’s published and unpublished 
works – a severely abridged account I provide in following.  According to Mead, 
bodily and vocal gestures are the “external parts of emotional acts” (Mead [1904] 
cited by Joas, 1985, p. 97). These gestures gain their meaning (their internal rep-
resentations) only through social interactions. Consciousness of meaning, in this 
case, is an actor’s consciousness of the specific readiness for a response by an-
other to the actor’s initial act. Meanings themselves, however, exist independent-
ly of consciousness, as they are the relations between stimulation and response 
that “become habitual and should sink below the threshold of consciousness” 
(Mead [1910] cited by Joas, 1985, p. 103). Meaning only arises in situations 
where it is functional for an actor to give attention to his or her own actions (ra-
ther than simply responding out of habit to the environment) and: “This kind of 
situation is given only in the case of interaction between or among individual 
actors” (Joas, 1985, p. 104 emphasis in the original). Out of these meaningful 
interactions, a ‘social object’ emerges – an image of one’s self as a participant in 
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the interaction as perceived by the other, or the ‘me’– and numerous new ‘me’s’ 
are synthesised into a unitary self-image. 
Intersubjectivity, as it relates to pragmatism (and as it is applied in this study) 
can be defined simply as the collectively understood meanings and interpreta-
tions assigned to actions and situations that arise through the interactions be-
tween two or more individuals. Gross succinctly summarises this Meadian under-
standing, as adopted by the Chicago School sociologists, as follows: 
[…] humans, immersed in a world of language and culture, always interpret the be-
havior of others as comprising “significant symbols” indicative of their social intentions 
and formulate their responses on the basis of those interpretations. Communication – the 
grasping of another’s intentions through such an interpretive process – requires that we 
take the role of the other in our imaginations, trying to understand what particular sym-
bols mean to her or him. Intersubjectivity therefore hinges on prior processes of sociali-
zation in which actors learn not only role-taking skills, including the capacity to take the 
role of the other with regard to themselves, but also the common meanings of symbols, 
so that when I engage in an action, you are familiar enough with it to have some idea as 
to what I’m up to. For this reason, intersubjectivity is easier to achieve when actors 
share a culture and harder when they do not (Gross, 2007, pp. 193–194). 
Thus completing the general overview of pragmatist principles, I can summarise 
a pragmatist theory of action in brief. Pragmatists see human action as practical 
problem solving by an experimenting entity that is both habitual and creative. 
Human action is not separable from its situatedness in both a continuous stream 
of experience and chains of social interaction. Therefore, humans are “a life form 
whose world is always already schematized in a practical manner prior to all re-
flection”, and as such their actions, by nature, can only be only “diffusely teleo-
logical” (Joas, 1990, p. 178). In the following section I shall elaborate on the 
connections between these pragmatist principles and effectuation where they 
have been explicitly put forth in the literature and I shall discuss how they have 
been applied in this study. 
2.1.3 Pragmatism in effectuation and the following study 
Sarasvathy counts among the intellectual lineage of theory of effectuation the 
“pragmatic philosophers at the turn of the century”, and cites works by Peirce 
and James (Sarasvathy, 2001, p. 254). Her unpublished doctoral dissertation on 
which effectuation is based integrates theories the of Joas, James, and Dewey 
(Steyaert, 2007, p. 466). The influence of pragmatism is clear to see in the result-
ing theory. An effectual entrepreneur essentially engages in a series of experi-
ments, testing various hypotheses, in order to address a problem – the problem 
being the creation of an enduring new firm. New market creation through effec-
tuation is presented as a social process that is only diffusely teleological, with the 
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entrepreneur being driven by broad, generalised aspirations based upon their ex-
perience and their perception of ‘who they are’, and clear goals only emerge 
gradually through interactions with others, i.e. the acquisition of stakeholders. 
Their analysis, in questioning the assumptions that conscious goal setting pre-
cedes a consideration of means, Sarasvathy and Dew (2005a, 2005b) explicitly 
state is consistent  with the position on human action espoused by Joas who “lo-
cates human action firmly within the continual interaction of the human body 
(corporeality) with the real world (situation) and with other people (sociality)”  
(Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b, p. 554). 
Effectuation’s theorists demonstrate their pragmatist influences in a second 
way; in their adoption of the notions of fallibilism and practical ‘usefulness’. 
Sarasvathy, Dew, Read, and Wiltbank (2008) argue that as they have demon-
strated that principles of effectuation have been shown to be useful to expert en-
trepreneurs empirically (they have passed the test of ‘will it work’) then effectua-
tion has not only theoretical validity, but also what Worren, Moore, and Elliott 
(2002, p. 1228) call pragmatic validity, i.e.: “The pragmatic validity of 
knowledge can be judged by the extent to which goals or intended consequences 
can be achieved by producing certain actions or using particular instruments”. Of 
course, this notion of pragmatic validity is inspired in part by Dewey, and can be 
considered an update upon the Deweyan warranted assertibility as described by 
Martela (2015) in my discussion above. Combining this emphasis on pragmatic 
validity with an implicit sensitivity to Peirce’s (2012) notion of fallibilism, the 
effectuation theorists defend a position that their theory should be judged more 
on its practical usefulness rather than whether or not effectuation can be conclu-
sively proven as being true. This position is made clear in the following argu-
ment made by Read et al. in response to the criticisms weighed against effectua-
tion by Arend et al. (2015): 
Therefore, the issue of importance here can be stated in the form of a pragmatist cri-
tique of effectuation, as follows: What difference does it make if people act as though 
they believe in an effectual worldview? What difference might it make for entrepreneur-
ship scholarship, pedagogy, and practice? The central difference between a positivist 
critique (Is effectuation true?) and a pragmatist one (Is effectuation useful?) boils down 
to the effort to uncover and delineate details of how, when, where, and to whom effec-
tuation makes a difference […] (Read et al., 2016, p. 531) 
It is this spirit of pragmatism which in which I have conducted the research pre-
sented in this study. My aim is to provide a useful framework by which to under-
stand stakeholder commitments in the process of new market creation through 
effectuation that hold some practical usefulness for both theorists as well as prac-
titioners. That is, the aim of this study is ultimately one of establishing a theoreti-
cal contribution that produces conceptual tools that fulfil the criteria of pos-
sessing pragmatic validity.  
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The approach I apply in this study is consistent with the pragmatist ontological 
experientialism and epistemological fallibilistic instrumentalism described by 
Martela (2015) and the ‘pragmatist theory of social mechanisms’ proposed by 
Gross (2009). According to Gross (2009, p. 367): “Pragmatists would view so-
cial mechanisms as composed of chains or aggregations of actors confronting 
problem situations and mobilizing more or less habitual responses”.  Gross 
draws upon Hedström and Swedberg’s (Hedström, 2005; Hedström & Swedberg, 
1998) work on social mechanisms and adapts to it the pragmatist principles to 
advance a pragmatist theory of social mechanisms. Such a theory seeks to under-
stand social mechanisms, described as the structures or processes S by which 
some particular input I is observed to lead to some particular output O. In order 
to understand the mechanism S, Gross argues that: 
A pragmatist theory of mechanisms would hold that to understand S, we must exam-
ine the individual and collective actors A1–n involved in the I–O relationship. For each, 
our goal should be to understand why and how, when confronted with problem situation 
Pn and endowed with habits of cognition and action Hn, along with other resources, re-
sponse Rn becomes the most likely. S will then consist of all the relations A1–n –P1–n –
H1–n –R1–n that, in aggregate or sequentially, bring about the I–O relationship (Gross, 
2007, p. 368 emphasis in original). 
Gross hypothesises that most social mechanisms can be understood as these A-P-
H-R chains or aggregations. Actors acting in response to problem situations 
based on habituation with the potential for creativity if any of the actors find 
novel solutions to problems – in which case the mechanism may be altered. 
This pragmatist theory of social mechanisms precisely describes the approach 
I have taken in my research and will be explicated in the following chapters. The 
social mechanism S for the purposes of this study is process of new market crea-
tion through effectuation. The actors A I examine to understand this social mech-
anism are the various potential and actual stakeholders to the process; the prob-
lem situations are, under uncertainty, the commitment decisions they need to 
make, as well as the decisions regarding action subsequent to commitment; the 
habits of cognitions and action they are endowed with are the reasoning strate-
gies and behavioural heuristics they have developed as habit through their situat-
edness their streams of experience and social interaction as well as the means 
they possess; and the response is simply the action they likely to take in light of 
the preceding factors (i.e. commitment or non-commitment, and action subse-
quent to commitment). It is this kind of habituated action and response that 
Reuber et al.(2016) note has been thus far overlooked in in the evolution of effec-
tuation theory, and is a promising area in which to generate novel insights. 
Gross further specifies his pragmatist theory of social mechanisms by pre-
emptively addressing potential objections to it.  These specifications I have 
summarised in Table 2, below. 
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Table 2 Specification of a pragmatist theory of social mechanisms (drawn 
from Gross, 2009, pp. 370–372) 
Regarding 
Resources 
“[T]he habits an actor is endowed with will affect the ways in 
which she understands the significance of and uses the nonhu-
man resources at her disposal, while the availability of re-
sources—an objective feature of problem situations—may help 
instill in her distinctive habits”. 
Regarding 
Habit 
Individual cognitive-affective habits: The “habitual ways indi-
vidual actors have of understanding and responding emotionally 
to situations in general, resulting from their psychosocial experi-
ence or their biological endowments or propensities”. 
Individual behavioural habits: “[T]he disposition to enact specif-
ic behavioral responses or routines when individual actors are 
faced with particular kinds of problem situations”. 
Collectively enacted habits: The “ways that groups of individual 
actors, including those who comprise collective actors of various 
kinds, have of working together to solve problems”. 
Regarding 
Habit Sets 
Habit sets are the “relatively coherent repertoires for thinking 




The “mechanisms resulting from the formal structure of social 
relations are best seen as more or less obdurate features of the 
problem situations individual or collective actors confront—that 
is, features that enable or constrain lines of activity. How actors 
understand and respond to the situations they face will be no less 
important in the context of such confrontations”. 
The key concerns listed in Table 2 are all addressed in my study. Regarding re-
sources, in extant effectuation theory the lack of tangible resources and the intan-
gible ‘means’ available to an entrepreneur already play an important role in de-
termining the entrepreneur’s actions (Sarasvathy, 2001). When considering the 
potential actions of stakeholders, these can only be understood in relation to what 
resources are at his or her disposal. I examine the effects that resources have on 
stakeholders’ perceived decision-making problem spaces, and their responses to 
this. In addition to the effects of resources in shaping or constraining potential 
behaviour by stakeholders, formal mechanisms, such as a potential stakeholder’s 
position in an existing organisation, also serve to shape the problem space per-
ceived by the stakeholder with regard to a commitment decision. ‘Habits’ of po-
tential and actual stakeholders are the primary concern of this study, by which I 
mean the historically and socially embedded higher order reasoning strategies 
and associated decision-making logics and heuristics that may be held by stake-
holders in considering whether or not to join an effectual network, and how they 
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will behave following a commitment. I classify habit sets in relation to ideal 
types of commitment rationales, and I consider reasoning based both on instru-
mental rationality as well as value rationality that includes, in part, a cognitive-
affective dimension. How I will do this, I discuss in the next two subchapters. 
To round off this section I will summarise a general theoretical framing of this 
study. As I have argued above, extant effectuation theory currently overlooks, or 
is underdeveloped in relation to three important elements: stakeholder commit-
ments, intersubjectivity, and habit. The framing I illustrate in Figure 2, below, 
shows how these elements will be approached in the following chapters. 
 
 
Figure 2 Theoretical framing of the study using a pragmatist theory of social 
mechanisms 
I investigate and theorise upon the stakeholder commitment process and its im-
plications for entrepreneurial processes of new market creation through effectua-
tion as two interlinked actor-problem-habit-response (A-P-H-R) chains – one 
subjective and one intersubjective. The subjective chain begins with a potential 
stakeholder. They are faced with the problem of whether or not to make a com-
mitment to an effectual network. The way they respond to this problem will be 
shaped by past experience and their social interactions. Following a positive 
commitment decision, the chain becomes intersubjective, and relates to the sub-
sequent actions of stakeholders interacting in their committed relationship to the 
focal effectual process. In this case, they are both enabled and constrained by the 
actions of one another, and the resources that they have contributed. Finally, the 
resulting actions of the stakeholders will influence subsequent interactions with 











Commitment forming and stakeholder 
action-theoretical process 
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2.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
Having discussed the philosophical background to this study, I can now move on 
to the more down to earth, practical matters concerning data collection and anal-
ysis, and the development and presentation of theory. The ‘data’ I collect and use 
in my analysis consists entirely of studies written on or in relation to effectuation 
and published in top tier academic journals. Despite this fact, this study is not 
merely a literature review, but it is an endeavour to conduct theory development 
through qualitative meta-analysis and conceptual methods. The methodological 
steps I have taken in this endeavour are summarised in Figure 3, below. 
 
 
Figure 3 Methodological steps of the study. 
My first step was to use systematically review all the relevant literature that has 
been written on or relating to the theory of effectuation since it was first intro-
duced to the wider academic community in 2001. In my second step, through a 
qualitative meta-analysis I reconceptualised what I could from the existing body 
of literature on effectuation to deductively postulate potential stakeholder com-
mitment ideal types. My third task was to broaden my focus to abductively ex-
amine other concepts and constructs from the wider entrepreneurship literature, 
and other literature on reasoning and decision-making under uncertainty, to more 
fully flesh out and describe the characteristics of the commitment ideal types out-
lined in my typology. Finally my fourth step was to recombine the typology I 
produced with the entrepreneurial opportunity creation process, to hypothesise 
Systematic Literature Review of  
Effectuation Theory 
Extract, evaluate, and order key concepts and 
constructs of effectuation 
Qualitative Meta-Analysis 
Reconceptualise concepts and constructs of effec-
tuation into a mid-range theory about the stake-
holders in effectual processes 
 
Typology Development 




Process Model Development 
Develop a process model of how commitments 







how commitments are forged along the way, and how each commitment may 
influence the manner in which the process unfolds. Steps one and two I expand 
upon in the current subchapter, while steps three and four I discuss in subchapter 
2.3. 
2.2.1 Systematic literature review of effectuation theory 
A systematic literature review is: “A review that strives to comprehensively iden-
tify, appraise, and synthesize all the relevant studies on a given topic” (Petticrew 
& Roberts, 2008). The analysis conducted in this study is primarily comprised of 
descriptions of the effectual constructs drawn from a systematic review of the 
most relevant effectuation literature written to date. The literature begins from 
Sarasvathy’s (2001) paper that introduced effectuation and the empirical research 
from which effectuation was induced.  
The literature review I conducted in this study was systematised in a manner 
loosely adapted from by Jones, Coviello, & Tang’s (2011, pp. 648–649) system-
atic literature review of international entrepreneurship research, notwithstanding 
the fact that Jones et al.’s review was of the entire ontological domain of interna-
tional entrepreneurship while this study is concentrated on the single thematic 
branch of entrepreneurship – effectuation. For this reason, the reviewing proce-
dure I employed is somewhat simpler. This methodological procedure for search, 
selection and exclusion is described below: 
1) Criteria for determining reliability of sources: 
a) Published works from the core effectuation theorists: Saras Sarasvathy, 
Nicholas Dew, Stuart Read, and Robert Wiltbank; 
b) Peer-reviewed journal articles only; 
c) Empirical AND theoretical (including reviews, commentaries, and editori-
als). 
2) Exclusion criteria by theoretical relevance: 
a) Studies in which the primary focus is not effectuation; 
b) Articles not listed in the Chartered Association of Business Schools 
(https://charteredabs.org/) Academic Journal Guide (AJG) (except in the 
case of articles written by the core theorists mentioned above); 
3) Search method and scope – Stage I: 
a) Search across academic articles using keyword search in respected data-
bases including, but not limited to, ProQuest, EBSCO; 
b) Focus on citation and abstract, and title; 
c) Keywords: entrepreneur* AND effectua*. 
4) Search method and scope – Stage II: 
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a) Search for key sources cited within the sources identified in Stage I; 
b) Automatic notifications from Mendeley (https://www.mendeley.com/) 
reference management software. 
I initially searched databases for articles which included the truncated keyword 
‘effectua*’ (so as to include effectuation and effectual) and entrepreneur* (to in-
clude all terms beginning with entrepreneur) in their title or abstract. For exam-
ple: 
1. ProQuest Search 
a. (entrepreneur OR entrepreneurship) AND (ab(Effectuation OR Effec-
tual) OR ti(Effectuation OR Effectual)) 
b. (entrepreneur*) AND (ab(Effectua*) OR ti(Effectua*)) 
2. EBESCO Search 
a. TX ( entrepreneur OR entrepreneurship ) AND ( AB ( Effectuation OR 
Effectual ) OR TI ( Effectuation OR Effectual ) ) 
b. TX ( entrepreneur* ) AND ( AB ( Effectua* ) OR TI ( Effectua* ) ) 
Of the articles procured through this initial search I was primarily interested in 
articles by those whom I call the ‘core effectuation theorists’ i.e. Saras Saras-
vathy and those who have co-authored articles with her (Nicholas Dew, Stuart 
Read, and Robert Wiltbank). Next, to ensure the quality of the sources, I selected 
only peer reviewed articles. Of the articles not written by the core effectuation 
theorists, as a rough and ready means of ensuring that they are key articles in the 
ongoing development of effectuation theory, I selected only articles that are 
listed in the Chartered Association of Business Schools (CABS) Academic Jour-
nal Guide 2015 (the guide, and the methodology for its creation, can be found on 
the CABS website: https://charteredabs.org/). This approach ensured that the ar-
ticles I included in my systematic literature review are those which are accepted 
by the academic community as being an accurate reflection of the extant effec-
tuation theory. Finally, I set aside any articles which were only peripherally re-
lated to effectuation, only mentioned it in passing, or applied effectual concepts 
and constructs without any additional contribution to effectuation theory2. A sec-
ond stage of searching involved identifying key works referenced within the arti-
cles already identified and also automated suggestions of related articles from the 
Mendeley reference management software I was using to organise the literature. 
The time period of my literature review spanned from 2001 (starting with Saras-
vathy [2001]) until the end of 20163. 
                                                 
2 For example Lusch & Nambisan (2015) who discuss effectual actors in service innovation but are pri-
marily concerned with service dominant logic (S-D logic) and do not contribute anything new theoretical-
ly to effectuation, and Sarasvathy et al. (2008) who only mention effectuation in passing in their argument 
that entrepreneurial success is different from firm success and that serial entrepreneurship involves a 
'contagion’ process. 
3 I began the review process in 2012 while researching my (unpublished) master’s dissertation. This study 
directly follows on from that research. 
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The final tally of articles I procured through the aforementioned procedure 
was 76. Of these, just under half (32) were conceptual articles (including concep-
tual articles, reviews, and commentaries), and the rest (44) were empirical. A 
breakdown of these articles is illustrated in Figure 4, below. 
 
Figure 4  Composition of reviewed literature 
Most of the direct theoretical development of effectuation was conducted across 
the 16 articles with first authorship by Sarasvathy, Dew, Read, or Wiltbank. Arti-
cles authored by other scholars included those applying their own concepts with 
effectuation in debates with the primary effectuation scholars (Chiles, Gupta, & 
Bluedorn, 2008; Goel & Karri, 2006; Karri & Goel, 2008); articles that applied 
and tested or observed effectuation principles in different contexts such as in 
corporate R&D (Blauth, Mauer, & Brettel, 2014; Brettel et al., 2012), SME and 
technological innovation (Berends et al., 2014; Coviello & Joseph, 2012; Dutta et 
al., 2015; Mthanti & Urban, 2014), family firms (Hayton, Chandler, & DeTienne, 
2011), international entrepreneurship and born globals (Harms & Schiele, 2012; 
Nummela et al., 2014), among others; reviews and validation studies (Chandler, 
DeTienne, McKelvie, & Mumford, 2011; Perry et al., 2012); and critiques of ef-
fectuation(Arend et al., 2015; Baron, 2009). A full list of the articles, their sub-
jects, and their relevant theoretical contributions, are provided in Annex A at the 
end of this work. 
I use the systematic literature review as a way of ‘knowing-what-we-know’. 
For the purpose of making a theoretical contribution, however, this is not enough. 
For a theoretical contribution to be made, this requires that I take the data gath-
ered through the systematic review and use it to generate novel theoretical in-
sights. To do this, I turn to a qualitative meta-analysis. A qualitative meta-
analysis “is a way of knowing-what-we-know and further extending findings” 
(Schreiber et al., 1997, p. 12). The details of such an approach I shall elaborate 

















2.2.2 Qualitative meta-analysis of the role of Stakeholders in Opportunity 
Creation 
According to Schreiber, Crooks, and Stern, (1997, p. 314) a qualitative meta-
analysis is the “aggregating of a group of studies for the purposes of discovering 
the essential elements and translating the results into an end product that trans-
forms the original results into a new conceptualization”. They explain that, un-
like quantitative meta-analysis which is well established as a legitimate method 
of pooling research finding, qualitative meta-analysis (at the time of writing) is 
relatively poorly developed. It seems that this remains the case, as my own at-
tempts to find literature on this methodological technique revealed no additional 
works of note written on the subject in the twenty years since. Most of the pub-
lished research explicitly using qualitative meta-analysis as methodology has 
been works relating to medical science and healthcare. Schreiber et al. (1997), on 
which I base the following discussion, itself is a chapter from a book, ‘Complet-
ing a Qualitative Project’ (Morse, 1997),  that, while generally is written for any-
one undertaking qualitative research, is authored primarily by scholars of nurs-
ing. Despite this, I find that qualitative meta-analysis suits the purpose and re-
search questions of my study well. I argue that this methodology holds great 
utility for international business research and organisational science and should 
be employed and developed further in this field. 
Schreiber et al. (1997, pp. 315–317) propose three models by which meta-
analytic techniques have been applied in scientific literature based upon the natu-
ralistic paradigm. These are for theory building, theory explication, and descrip-
tion. In a theory building oriented meta-analysis, the analyst uses data from stud-
ies of related concepts or phenomena in order to inductively build midrange or 
formal theory. Theory explication through meta-analysis examines studies relat-
ing to the same concept to deductively develop midrange or formal theory. De-
scriptive qualitative meta-analysis, on the other hand, can use any qualitative 
study and, through thick description, synthesise this data to form a comprehen-
sive interpretation or understanding of a phenomenon. Schreiber et al. note that 
these approaches are not necessarily exhaustive or mutually exclusive. While in 
the following chapters I oscillate between all three approaches at varying times, 
the main emphasis of my meta-analysis is on theory explication: I analyse studies 
all related by the same concept, effectuation, in order to deductively reconceptu-
alise and develop theory on stakeholder involvement, commitments, and partner-
ships in effectual processes.  
Schreiber et al. list a number of methodological issues and how they are ap-
proached by each of their proposed models of qualitative meta-analysis; their 
model of theory explication is reproduced in Table 3 below. 
53 
Table 3 A model of theory explication through qualitative meta-analysis 
(drawn from Schreiber et al., 1997, p. 317) 
Issues Theory Explication 
What is the purpose of this meta-
analysis? (or: What is my research 
question?) 
• to develop mid-range or formal the-
ory from a group of studies related 
by a single concept 
What are the assumptions underlying 
the question? 
• findings must be deconstructed 
What is the usefulness of the potential 
end product? 
• development of theory 
• generating research questions 
• identifying gaps in knowledge 
What are the boundaries of the study? • boundaries are predefined 
What are the assumptions underlying 
the methodology of the meta-analysis 
• deductive approach to theory build-
ing 
What constitutes my data? • studies of the same concept 
How will I analyse my data? • by deconstruction, reconstruction, 
and constant comparison 
What sampling procedure do I use? 
How do I know what to include? 
• must start with the most abstract 
concept and follow with related, 
less abstract concepts 
• studies related by a single concept 
How do I ensure the scientific rigor of 
the meta-analysis? 
• The methodology must have careful 
illumination. 
My research aims to fulfil the specifications of theory explication through quali-
tative meta-analysis as shown in Table 3. The purpose of the study is to develop 
mid-range theory concerning the roll of stakeholders in new market creation 
through effectuation. To do so, I use the meta-analysis to deconstruct the findings 
and theorising from previous studies all relating to the same core concept of ef-
fectuation, and then reconstruct and reconceptualise them in a way that makes the 
stakeholders and their commitments, rather than the entrepreneur, the main focus. 
The boundaries of the study are predefined by the search and selection criteria of 
the literature review I discussed in the previous section. I follow an approach that 
begins from a high level of abstraction and moves to a lower level of abstraction 
as I progress (which will become evident over Chapters 4 and 5). Where I differ 
slightly from the model described above is that I do not limit myself to a deduc-
tive approach to theory building and, as I will discuss later in this chapter, I apply 
abductive logic and broaden the scope of my analysis to include literature to that 
which relates to concepts other than effectuation, such as literature on cognition 
and decision-making under uncertainty.  
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2.3 Products of Theorising 
The overarching aim of my research is to make a theoretical contribution to the 
ongoing development of the theory of effectuation. As I argued at the beginning 
of this chapter, I believe there is scope for doing so conceptually with the exist-
ing conceptual materials that have thus far been produced by those researching 
effectuation in particular, and entrepreneurial phenomena in general. As such, 
this study is one of conceptual theory development rather than empirical inquiry. 
This involves the development and refinement of new and existing constructs, 
and generating novel theoretical propositions connecting them, as is illustrated in 
upper section in Figure 5, below. 
 
Figure 5 Components of a theory. Adapted from Bacharach (1989, 499) 
Towards these ends of theoretical development, from out of the data collection 
and analysis I described in the subchapter above, I produced three distinct but 
interlinked outputs which I call my ‘products of theorising’. These are a typolo-
gy, a process model, and a set of propositions. The typology is the primary prod-
uct of this study, and the ideal types specified by the typology serve as inputs to 
the additional theorising produced. Doty and Glick (1994) argue that when ty-
pologies are built properly, making explicit grand theoretical assertions, explicit 
assumptions about constructs, and ensuring ideal types are fully described using 
the same set of dimensions, then they can constitute complex theories that can be 
subjected to rigorous empirical testing. In this case typologies fulfil the criteria of 
being theoretical contributions asserted by theorists such as Bacharach (1989) 
and Whetten (1989).  
Whetten describes the building blocks of theory development as being What, 























considered in attempting to explain the phenomenon being investigated? How do 
these factors related to one another? And, why are they related? The What ques-
tion is the description, and requires a balance between comprehensiveness and 
parsimony. This is the utility of typologies as they allow complex phenomena to 
be described thoroughly and parsimoniously. The How and Why questions are the 
explanation. How explains the form and direction causality and Why explains 
how the underlying nature of the constructs, identified by the What question, is 
related to the causality explained by the How question. In a typology the Hows 
and Whys are explained through descriptions of, and interrelationships between, 
the constructs that make up each ideal type, and descriptions of the interrelation-
ship between each ideal type. In this study, I pursue theory building further than 
developing a mere classification scheme, by using the typology I create as an 
input to reconceptualise and extend the current model of the effectuation process. 
Bacharach (1989, p. 497) argues that typologies are more useful for descrip-
tion than as contributions to theory, by simply answering the descriptive What 
question rather than the more theoretical How, Why and When. I seek to answer 
the What?, by identifying and describing the ideal types of stakeholder commit-
ments to effectual networks in terms of the different reasoning strategies, deci-
sion logics, or behavioural heuristics they utilise in their decision to join these 
networks. Furthermore, I seek to answer the more theoretical Why? questions by 
exploring the relationship between the ideal types of commitment rationales and 
the uncertainties in the problem spaces faced by potential and actual stakehold-
ers. From this I draw my first set of propositions. I then seek to answer the How 
question, by integrating the What? and Why? back into an explanatory process 
model for how the stakeholder commitments necessary for opportunity creation 
are formed or secured within effectual networks, and how they affect network 
outcomes. From this I draw my second and third set of theoretical propositions. 
This combination of a typology and process model into an explanatory and pre-
dictive framework cements this study’s utility as a theoretical contribution 
(Bacharach, 1989; Whetten, 1989). The way in which my products of theorising 
seek to address the questions of what, how, and why, and the relationships be-
tween them with the aim of producing a theoretical contribution are summarised 
in Figure 6, below. 
56 
 
Figure 6 Intended theoretical contribution of this study  
The ideal types I describe through my typology are generic representations of 
actors who may share sets of common habits – or behavioural logics and heuris-
tics (sub-constructs to the multidimensional constructs representing the ideal 
types). The processes I describe are the relationships or connections between 
these ideal types and the various outcomes or responses they elicit in relation to a 
particular problem situation or perceived ‘problem space’, i.e. the decision on 
whether or not to make a commitment to an effectual process, and the decision 
on how to act following a new commitment (as it relates to both the new stake-
holder, as well as established stakeholders who were already part of the process). 
For both the typology and the process model, I use formal theoretical proposi-
tions to explain the general theoretical implications that can be drawn. 
2.3.1 Typology 
It is important to distinguish typologies from taxonomies. Typologies are derived 
from a priori knowledge and form a complete set of ideal types (Doty & Glick, 
1994). In organisational studies the types defined would generally be organisa-
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tional types. Taxonomies, on the other hand, are identified through empirical ob-
servation and are classification schemes forming exhaustive sets in which to cat-
egorise phenomena. These categories are mutually exclusive based on discrete 
decision rules. While empirical testing using taxonomy will allocate observed 
subjects to one category or another, a similar study using typology will compare 
subjects observed to the ideal types specified in order to see similarity and 
whether or not this similarity corresponds to the expected outcome. Doty and 
Glick provide a concise definition of typology, as opposed to taxonomy and clas-
sification, as follows: 
[Typology] refers to conceptually derived interrelated sets of ideal types. Unlike 
classification systems, typologies do not provide decision rules for classifying organiza-
tions. Instead, typologies identify multiple ideal types, each of which represents a 
unique combination of the organizational attributes that are believed to determine the 
relevant outcome(s). (Doty & Glick, 1994, p. 232) 
Rich (1992) provides an even more concise definition: 
…the word typology is used to describe the classification of data into types based on 
the theoretically derived, and more or less intuitively categorized, qualities of observed 
phenomena. 
The conceptualisation of the typology I use in this study diverges slightly from 
Doty and Glick’s definition. Doty and Glick’s description of “ideal types” of or-
ganisations suggest that the types identified are posited to predict a positive out-
come relating to some specified dependent variable, usually a desired organisa-
tional outcome. In this study my aim is to primarily identify ideal types of rea-
soning strategies or logics that may be used by stakeholders in their decision to 
commit (or not) to effectual processes, as well as in their post commitment be-
haviour. The purpose of this typology is not, therefore, to predict variance in 
some specified organisational outcome, but to predict process outcomes of effec-
tual network formation. Therefore, the definition of typology used in this study, 
that I derive from both Doty & Glick (1994) and Rich (1992), is one of an inter-
related set of ideal types (of stakeholder rationales) based on the categorised, 
conceptually derived, qualities of observed phenomena (behavioural logics and 
heuristics), that are believed to determine the relevant outcomes (stakeholder 
commitments and behaviour). 
One other utility to using typologies (and taxonomies) towards theory building 
is their usefulness in the construction of mid-range theories. Mid-range theories 
involve the clustering of like (e.g. organisational) phenomena together in order to 
predict and explain the underlying interrelationships between the constructs that 
are unique to that particular grouping. This is as opposed to general theories 
which seek to make predictions about all aspects of a particular general phenom-
enon (e.g. all organisations) as a whole. There can be several levels and branches 
58 
of mid-range theories, and syntheses of each lower level may lead to the genera-
tion of theories of higher generalisability until eventually a general theory is 
reached (Pinder & Moore, 1979). In typologies the configuration and interrela-
tionships between constructs within each ideal type and, the outcome that results, 
are not expected to be uniform across ideal types (Doty & Glick, 1994; Pinder & 
Moore, 1979). For instance, the outcome predicted from one ideal type may dif-
fer from that of another depending on the exogenous context and how it relates to 
the internal causal processes of each.  
Doty and Glick (1994) offer some guidelines to building typologies that fit the 
criteria of being theory. These are: the constructs, the relationships among the 
constructs, and falsifiability. The constructs in a typology come in two forms – 
the ideal types, that are complex, multidimensional constructs, and the sub-
constructs that form the dimensions of the ideal types, or ‘first-order’ constructs. 
Hypothesising the relationships among the constructs is aimed at explaining the 
internal consistencies between the first-order constructs within the ideal types 
and explaining why these patterns result in a particular outcome. Finally, the ty-
pology constructed must be modelled in such a way that it can be tested, and that 
the predictions the typology makes can be falsified. Falsification occurs when 
measuring a deviation between real phenomena and the ideal type and using this 
deviation to predict the same outcome. 
I began the construction of my typology by deducing potential ideal types 
through the careful deconstruction of the extant effectuation literature. I did not, 
however, rely entirely on deduction; I also used abductive reasoning. Abductive 
reasoning in the usual sense means moving backwards and forwards between 
induction and deduction; often meaning moving backwards and forwards be-
tween empirical observation and existing theory or between quantitative and 
qualitative data (Martela, 2015; Morgan, 2007). I use abduction in this study in 
the manner of pragmatist epistemology. According to Martela (2015, p. 549) 
“The abductive inference therefore means a continuous circular movement between 
one’s own pre-understanding, the provisional data one has gathered and existing theo-
ries to reach an understanding of the phenomenon under scrutiny that best serves the 
practical interests one has chosen to advance.”  
What this means is that, during my investigation, where I found that existing the-
ories outside of effectuation (based on my existing knowledge or knowledge I 
stumbled across as I progressed) helped expand the development of the stake-
holder commitment ideal types, I would iteratively incorporate them into my 
analysis. This brought insights from diverse theory such as that concerning dif-
ferent types of rationality (e.g. Weber, 1978), the role of affect in entrepreneur-
ship (e.g. Baron, 2008), and decision making under uncertainty (e.g. McMullen 
& Shepherd, 2006), among others. 
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Doty and Glick (1994) discuss three different methods for specifying ideal 
types; the first two are theoretical specification methods, while the third is empir-
ical. The first theoretical method is called theoretical specification and is the 
most logically consistent with typology methodology. This type of specification 
requires “expert raters”, or the original theorists, who are experts on the underly-
ing theory of the typology, to make judgements of the ideal types based on their 
interpretation of the theory. These experts rate values for the first-order con-
structs that form the ideal types and each ideal type is given the mean value of all 
the constructs relating to it. This mean value corresponds to the ideal profile of 
that particular ideal type. The Second method described by Doty and Glick 
(1994), should only be used when two ideal types form the end points of a con-
tinuum. In this case the ideal types at either end represent the minimum and max-
imum scores of the constructs that form them. The other ideal types are then po-
sitioned on the continuum relative to these extreme values. 
In this study, in specifying my ideal types, I use the extreme ends of two sepa-
rate dimensions to create a standard 2×2 matrix. In this case, my dimensions are 
of rationality; teleological versus non-teleological on one axis, and instrumental 
versus value on the other. I will make my reasoning for these choices clear in 
Chapter 4. This produces four distinct ideal types that will represent four extreme 
and distinct forms of reasoning that may be held by stakeholders who make their 
commitments to effectual processes. Although I do not empirically specify this 
typology in this study, I posit that all stakeholder commitments made in empiri-
cally observed effectuation processes will fall somewhere within these extremes; 
involving some combination of the forms of reasoning I will describe in detail. 
Doty and Glick (1994, 246-247) provide five final guidelines that should be fol-
lowed by typological theorists. These are as follows:  
1. Typological theorists should make explicit their grand theoretical asser-
tion(s). 
2. Typologies must define completely the set of ideal types.  
3. Typologies must provide complete descriptions of each ideal type using 
the same set of dimensions.  
4. Typological theories should explicitly state the assumptions about the the-
oretical importance of each construct used to describe the ideal types.  
5.  Typological theories must be tested with conceptual and analytical mod-
els that are consistent with the theory. 
I follow the first four of these guidelines in the construction of my typology in 
Chapter 4. I return to the fifth guideline in my final chapter when discussing my 
suggestions for future research and how the typology should be used or tested 
empirically. Cornelissen (2016) outlines a number of common problems identi-
fied by reviewers concerning theoretical works developing typologies. These in-
clude: typologies that offer only theoretical categorisation but with only limited 
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explanatory scope and power; typologies that are merely summative of existing 
literature do little to move theory forwards, and; typologies where the causal 
mechanisms are not clear and are circular and tautological. While I have kept 
these problems in mind when constructing the typology presented within this 
study, I have also sought to overcome them by combining the typology with the 
two other forms of theorising, process modelling and propositions, I discuss be-
low; something that the length constraints of an academic journal article would 
not normally allow.  
2.3.2 Process modelling 
Taking the ideal types I developed using the typology method I described above, 
I develop a process model to explain and explore the actor-problem-habit-
response cycles I described in Section 2.1.3 and illustrated in Figure 2, above. To 
do this I use a ‘narrative style’ (Cornelissen, 2016; Langley, 1999). According to 
Langley, a narrative strategy for modelling processes “involves construction of a 
detailed story from the raw data” (Langley, 1999, p. 695). Of course, my study 
does not contain ‘raw data’ but merely a set of stakeholder commitment ideal 
types. Therefore, I produce, through recourse to a thought experiment, ‘charac-
ters’ based upon the ideal types I created and imagine a plausible narrative 
around them in the context of new market creation through effectuation. Accord-
ing to Gendler (Gendler, 2004, p. 1155), the performance of thought experiments 
includes three common and crucial features: 
a. Thought-experimental reasoning involves reasoning about a particular set of 
circumstances (which may be specified in more or less detail), described at a 
greater level of specificity than that of the conclusion.  
(To perform a thought experiment is to reason about a scenario …) 
b. The reasoner’s mode of access to the scenario is via imagination rather than 
via observation.  
(… which is imaginary …) 
c. Contemplation of the scenario takes place with a specific purpose: the con-
firmation or disconfirmation of some hypothesis or theory.  
(… with the aim of confirming or disconfirming some hypothesis or theory …) 
As she is writing about ‘scientific thought experiments’, a fourth feature of such 
experiments is that they pertain to the physical world. As my thought experiment 
is conceptual and relates to social phenomena rather than natural phenomena, the 
fourth feature is, therefore: 
a. The hypothesis or theory in question concerns features of the [social] world.  
(… about the [social] world)(Gendler, 2004, p. 1155 - I have substituted for 
“physical”, in the original, for “social”) 
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Using a thought experiment has the effect of making the reader contemplate an 
imaginary scenario and, through this quasi-observational manipulation of the 
reader’s mental image, can enable the formation of new beliefs as to the features 
of the social world. I.e. using a thought experiment allows me to “plot alternative 
scenarios as a way of actively comparing different sets of theoretical assumptions 
and mechanisms and their resulting outcomes” (Cornelissen, 2016, p. 5).  
Cornelissen lists a number of common problems that reviewers find in relation 
to process theories in the narrative style. They can be: 
1. “too descriptive or not sufficiently specific in an explanatory sense”; 
2. “highly stylized and rather generalized … with a lack of detail on the exact 
causal mechanism or mechanisms that are at play and the described processes 
almost naturally determine a set of outcomes over and beyond alternative ex-
planations”;  
3. “too focussed on detailing and describing the different stages of a model ra-
ther than developing a set of well-argued explanations”; 
4. focused “too much on finding noun like outcomes or combining such words 
into compounds or sentences-based constructions” (Cornelissen, 2016, pp. 5–
6). 
Keeping these issues in mind, and the fact that the thought experiment I am using 
is conceptually based rather than empirically based, allows me to avoid the above 
problems. Specifically, I am able to isolate only the details I need to assist me in 
the explanation of the process I am proposing; while my process model may be 
rather stylised and generalised, my main focus is on the causal mechanism at 
play (i.e. the A-P-H-R chains of causality I described above in Section 2.1.3); my 
argumentation does not focus on descriptions of particular ‘stages’ but aims to 
elucidate the process of stakeholder involvement in opportunity creation as a 
whole, and; my explanation of process outcomes should be simple to understand, 
logical, and illuminating of the processual dynamics I am seeking to explain. 
2.3.3 Propositions 
Finally, and directly related to the previous two ‘products of theorising’ I have 
just described, are the two sets of propositions that summarise the theoretical 
contribution I make in this study. The first set of propositions relate to the most 
fundamental implications of my typology, while the second set of propositions 
summarise the fundamental process implications of the process model I describe. 
Each of my discussion chapters 4 and 5 ends with a summary of these proposi-
tions. 
The propositional style is a very common way of presenting theoretical ideas 
which is used by many conceptual studies. Propositions are generally formal 
statements about the cause and effect relationships between newly introduced 
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constructs (Cornelissen, 2016). Problems associated with this style (again, 
discussed by Cornelissen, 2016) are: they are too narrow in scope and summative 
of existing literature; they are modelled on hypothesis testing; they include mul-
tiple clauses, and; they lack detail on the causal agent. I believe that with my 
propositions I have avoided these problems. The first set includes detailed but 
parsimonious statements about the conditions of commitments being made to 
effectual processes given each of the four described commitment ideal types. I.e. 
they describe the initial, subjective As-Ps-Hs-Rs chain I discussed in section 2.1.3. 
The first set of propositions assumes a commitment has been made and can be 
summarised as: If the stakeholder As, perceives a commitment decision as prob-
lem space Ps, and they have the cognitive and behavioural tendencies of the ex-
treme ideal type Hs, then they will make a commitment Rs. The second set of 
propositions follows in the same manner as the first, but this time considers re-
sponses for different perceived problem spaces and suggests potential generic 
actions that can be taken to elicit a particular response. The third set of proposi-
tions relate to the second, intersubjective Ai-Pi-Hi-Ri chain. In this case I take the 
response from the end of the first, subjective chain Rs, and propose the effects 
this will have on the intersubjective problem space Pi (the aggregate perception 
of the intersubjective problem space of ‘what to do next?’), and how this will 
result in different responses Ri from the various other actors Ai connected to the 
effectuation process. 
Thus concludes the philosophical and methodological overview of this study. 
Now, in the following chapter, I address the problem of ‘knowing-what-we-
know’, by presenting my analysis of a systematic literature review to determine 
the state of the art of effectuation theory. 
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3 THE STATE OF THE ART OF EFFECTUATION 
THEORY 
In this chapter I trace the developments of effectuation theory over the past sev-
enteen years. I take the time to carefully delineate what ‘effectuation theory’ ac-
tually describes, breaking it down into its constituent concepts and constructs, 
and then reassembling them into a framework through which to better understand 
the role that stakeholders play in the theory as a whole. I discuss a number of 
assumptions present in current effectuation theory and identify its current limits, 
in particular in regard to the role of stakeholders.  
3.1 Opportunity Creation through Effectuation 
Taken as a whole, the theory of effectuation, in its current state, is primarily a 
theory of entrepreneurial opportunity creation, as opposed to other theories that 
describe entrepreneurial recognition and discovery  (Alvarez & Barney, 2007; 
Sarasvathy et al., 2010). Opportunity within entrepreneurship literature has been 
viewed from two main ontological perspectives: the first is the view that oppor-
tunities exist somewhere out there and are waiting to be discovered, while the 
second view is that opportunities are something that can be created as the product 
of an individual’s intellect (Alvarez & Barney, 2007). Proponents of the first 
view assume that the market is never in equilibrium and market opportunities 
exist as objective phenomena, waiting to be discovered by particularly alert indi-
viduals who identify where there are gaps between supply and demand, e.g. Kir-
zner’s Discovery Theory of entrepreneurship (Kirzner, 1973). On the other hand, 
the second view’s origins can be traced back the ideas of Schumpeter (1934), 
who proposed that opportunities are created by entrepreneurial individuals or 
firms who then must educate consumers to be interested in the purchase of the 
resultant new products or services. 
Sarasvathy, Dew, Velamuri and Venkataraman (2003) presented a simple ty-
pology of entrepreneurial opportunity which consisted of opportunity recogni-
tion, opportunity discovery, and opportunity creation. The first two types of op-
portunity, as per Kirzner’s (1973) view, are based on the assumption that oppor-
tunities pre-exist ‘somewhere out there’. Opportunity recognition is assumes that 
markets are allocative and that to recognise an opportunity it is simply a matter 
of matching known supply to known demand. Opportunity discovery, on the oth-
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er hand, is born of the view that informational imperfections exist in markets and 
that to discover an opportunity, an unknown supply or an unknown demand must 
be found for a known supply or demand. Firms may achieve realisation of such 
opportunities by following March’s (1991) strategies of either exploitation, for 
opportunity recognition, or exploration, for opportunity discovery. Finally, op-
portunity creation happens when neither supply nor demand are known. While 
the nature of decision making with regard to opportunity recognition and discov-
ery is characterised by risk, the nature of decision making for opportunity is 
characterised by ambiguity and uncertainty (Chandler, DeTienne, & Lyon, 2003). 
Overall, effectuation theory, as a theory of opportunity creation, helps to ex-
plain how, often, entrepreneurs, who may start out with very few tangible re-
sources or even clear ideas on what kind of product or service they want to pro-
vide, through the creation of networks of stakeholders, can create new and inno-
vative firms reasonably quickly that serve markets that, before their creation, 
would have been difficult, if not impossible to predict (Sarasvathy, 2001). How-
ever, on review of the extant literature, it soon becomes apparent that the term 
‘effectuation’ holds different meanings depending on the discussion. Effectuation 
can be used to describe three distinct but interconnected concepts that transverse 
different levels and units of analysis (Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7 The components of effectuation theory 
At the highest level of abstraction, effectuation describes a type of means-
oriented rationality, or effectual reasoning, which is argued to be the inverse of 
the type of reasoning assumed under the long established rational choice theory 
of neo-classical economics – or causal rationality (Read & Sarasvathy, 2005). At 
a lower level of abstraction, and taking the decision maker as the unit of analysis, 














haviour that can be observed to be used by actors following effectual reasoning, 
and which form the ‘principles of effectuation’ (Read, Song, et al., 2009; 
Sarasvathy, 2001). Somewhere in between effectuation as a form of reasoning 
and effectuation as behaviour in terms of level of abstraction, but generally tak-
ing the intersubjective as the unit of analysis, is effectuation as a process, which 
describes a process of opportunity (or new market) creation that is initiated by an 
individual using effectual reasoning (and, thus, behaviour), but that also involves 
the enlistment of multiple different actors, loosely referred to as stakeholders, 
into an ‘effectual network’ (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b).  
It is a useful exercise to separate effectuation theory out into its constituent 
parts as much of the development, or criticism, directed towards effectuation in 
the growing body of literature surrounding it is directed at one element or anoth-
er. However, before I embark on a detailed discussion on the different uses of the 
concept of effectuation in the literature, I would first like to discuss the condi-
tions under which effectuation is purported to take place, otherwise known as the 
‘market creation problem space’. 
3.2 The Market Creation Design Space 
The use of effectual reasoning, acting effectually, and the creation of effectual 
processes, is associated with a higher level of expertise in entrepreneurship and 
new venture/market opportunity creation (e.g. Dew, Read, Sarasvathy, & 
Wiltbank, 2009; Sarasvathy, 2001; Sarasvathy et al., 2008). It is argued that, by 
using effectual logic in such scenarios, entrepreneurs are able to overcome, miti-
gate, avoid, or even exploit the specific types of uncertainty that they are faced 
with in what has been labelled the ‘market creation problem space’ (Sarasvathy 
& Dew 2005) or the ‘entrepreneurial design space’ (Sarasvathy, Dew, Read & 
Wiltbank 2008). The three kinds of uncertainty that predominate this entrepre-
neurial design space are given as Knightian uncertainty, Marchian goal ambigui-
ty and, environmental isotropy: 
1. Knightian uncertainty: it is impossible to calculate probabilities for future 
consequences. 
2. Marchian Goal ambiguity: preferences are neither given nor well ordered. 
3. Environmental Isotropy: it is not clear what elements of the environment to 
pay attention to and what to ignore. (Sarasvathy et al. 2008, 337) 
It is these uncertainties the render actions guided by casual rationality ineffective 
at best and impossible at worst. 
Knightian uncertainty is the first element of Sarasvathy et al.’s (2008) ‘entre-
preneurial design space’. Knightian uncertainty, also sometimes referred to as 
ambiguity, is the situation in which the future is not only unknown, but funda-
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mentally unknowable. Knightian uncertainty occurs when the situation is so 
unique that there are no a priori predictions that can be made, either through cal-
culation or by reference to past experience. Knight contrasts this uncertainty with 
the concept of risk, in which distributions of outcomes are calculable a priori. 
The practical difference between the two categories, risk and uncertainty, is that in 
the former the distribution of the outcome in a group of instances is known (either 
through calculation a priori or from statistics of past experience), while in the case of 
uncertainty this is not true, the reason being in general that it is impossible to form a 
group of instances, because the situation dealt with is in a high degree unique. (Knight, 
1921) 
Throughout the effectuation literature, the metaphor of an urn containing col-
oured balls is often used to explain the Knightian distinction between risk and 
uncertainty. If an urn contains five green balls and five red balls, the probability 
of drawing a green ball from the urn can be calculated through statistical analy-
sis. This is what Knight calls risk – where the distribution is known but the draw 
is not. Where the colour and number of balls within the urn is unknown, a num-
ber of balls will need to be drawn before estimates of what the distribution of 
balls within the urn could be. The probabilities for what will be drawn next can 
then be calculated. This is what Knight calls uncertainty – where both distribu-
tion and draw are unknown. Finally, when it is not known what the urn even con-
tains, or whether there is an urn at all, this is Knightian uncertainty. In this situa-
tion the distribution does not exist or is unknowable. (Knight 1921; Dew et al. 
2008) 
The concept of Knightian uncertainty is inextricably related to entrepreneur-
ship due to the fact that innovation underlies entrepreneurial activity. Whatever 
the form this innovation takes, it creates an undetermined number of new re-
sources, both tangible and intangible (even invisible) that each generate ex ante 
uncertain returns (Amit, Glosten, & Muller 1993). Three types of these Knightian 
uncertainties are described by Amit, Glosten, and Muller (1993; 825): Technical 
uncertainty, demand uncertainty and, imitation and competing innovations. An 
example of demand uncertainty is the number of consumers that demand a new 
innovation and the price they are willing to pay for it. An example of technical 
uncertainty is that the production and cost functions may be unknown; how long 
the innovation takes to market, how much it will cost to produce, and will it even 
work. Finally, it is unknown whether or not competing or immitating innovations 
are on the horizon, and how long it will take for them to erode the network’s 
advantatge. 
Marchian goal ambiguity forms the second element of Sarasvathy et al.’s 
(2008) entrepreneurial design space, and the second construct of the market crea-
tion environment. Goal ambiguity poses a problem for rational choice for a num-
ber of reasons which are summarised by March (2006: 204): 
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Preferences, in the sense of the values, wants, or utilities that are served by action, 
are unclear and inconsistent. Their summary and combination appear to demand metrics 
and procedures that are elusive ... They change, partly endogenously ... Since conse-
quences unfold over time, intelligence requires intertemporal trade-offs that are neither 
trivially specified nor easily accomplished. 
Marchian goal ambiguity occurs when decision makers do not have predeter-
mined preferences or goals and, where they do exist, they are not clear or well 
ordered (Sarasvathy & Simon 2000; Sarasvathy et al. 2008). Marchian uncertain-
ty is derived from the influential work of March (1982) on the ‘technology of 
foolishness’. In his work, March makes a distinction between technologies of 
rationality, and technologies of foolishness. The former is built upon a consistent 
set of preferences and values that allow rational choice to be used in decision 
making, while the latter is built upon the absence of pre-existing goals, where 
experimentation or playfulness forms the basis of action.  
Isotropy is the third and final element of the problem space faced by those 
who would create new markets (Sarasvathy et al. 2008). In the earlier effectua-
tion literature, the third element of the problem space was generally more fo-
cused on the ideas of Weick (1979), where the environment “does not inde-
pendently influence outcomes or even rules of the game” (Sarasvathy & Simon 
2000, 5). This kind of ‘Weickian’ design space is based on Weick’s (1979) ar-
gument that the decision makers themselves, by acting on whatever idiosyncratic 
criteria they choose, shape the environment and, therefore, the decision making 
criteria: “Furthermore, decision makers in organizations intervene between the 
environment and its effects inside the organization, which means that selection 
criteria become lodged more in the decision makers than in the environment” 
(Weick, 1979, 125).  
Sarasvathy and Dew (2005) later introduced the concept of ‘isotropy’ which 
was the problem defined by philosophers such as Fodor4 (see Sarasvathy & Dew 
2005), as the situation in which it is not clear, ex-ante, which elements of the en-
vironment should be considered and which should be ignored when a decision 
needs to be made as to an action that needs to be taken (Sarasvathy & Dew 
2005). By the time of Sarasvathy et al.’s (2008) article on designing organisa-
tions that design environments, isotropy became the clear third element of the 
entrepreneurial design space, and Weick’s ideas remained as one of the founda-
tions for the control construct of effectuation – a possible response to, and possi-
ble cause of, the problem of isotropy. A high level of isotropy combined with 
Knightian uncertainties is a situation which has been described by some authors 
as unknown unknowns or “unk unks” – the particularly problematic situation for 
                                                 
4 Fodor J. A. (1987) Modules, frames, fridgeons, sleeping dogs, and the music of the spheres. In The 
robot’s dilemma: the frame problem in artificial intelligence, ed. by Z. W. Pylyshyn, 139-150. Ablex 
Publications, Norwood, NJ. 
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many new ventures where, not only are the probabilities for future consequences 
incalculable, but future consequences are also unforeseeable (Loch, Solt & 
Bailey 2008).  
3.3 Rationality and Effectuation as a Form of Reasoning 
When we talk about ‘rationality’ in the context of any discipline relating to eco-
nomics or organisational science, we generally mean the conception of the ra-
tionality employed by the model ‘economic man’, or homo economicus, of neo-
classical economic theory; a goal driven and predictive actor “who is balancing 
probable result against disutility of effort” (Brouwer, 2002, p. 100). As the con-
duct of entrepreneurs often did not fit into this mould of a means to ends connect-
ing, routine optimising economic man, Schumpeter believed entrepreneurial be-
haviour to be a deviation from this kind of ‘formal’ or ‘objective’ rationality 
(Brouwer, 2002; Endres & Woods, 2010). While Schumpeter considered entre-
preneurial behaviour to be non-rational or, rather, it holds to a different ‘subjec-
tive’ rationality, Sarasvathy, Dew, Read, & Wiltbank (2008, p. 50) instead argue 
that effectuation is "neither 'rational' in the traditional sense nor a 'deviation’ 
from rational behaviour". They consider the theory of effectuation to be a 
“straight inversion of rational choice theory” assumed under instrumental ration-
ality (Read & Sarasvathy, 2005, p. 50). In effect, effectuation theory can be ar-
gued to have defined a new sub-category of what Weber (1978) calls instrumen-
tal rationality (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8 Causal and effectual sub-categories of instrumental rationality 
I will enter into a more detailed discussion on the distinction between instrumen-
tal and subjective rationality later in Chapter 4, however, for now it is suffice to 
say that effectuation is instrumental in rationality (Weber, 1978) in that action 
taken under effectual reasoning is calculated and assumed to ultimately be con-
cerned with some form of success. However, effectual reasoning is described as 
being opposite to the traditional goal-oriented, predictive or ‘causal rationality’ 
Instrumental Rationality 





described by rational choice theory which has long dominated management and 
entrepreneurship literature (Read & Sarasvathy, 2005).  
Despite effectuation being set opposed to ‘causal rationality’, it seems that 
those who have published works on the subject of effectuation theory have been 
cautious not to label it as ‘effectual rationality’5, at least in peer reviewed journal 
articles, and have instead taken to using terms such as ‘effectual reasoning’- as 
first used in Sarasvathy (2001), or ‘effectual logic’ – a term first used in 
Sarasvathy & Dew (2005b). For example: Sarasvathy (2004, p. 256) explains: 
“…in my empirical investigations into the symbolic cognitive processes used by 
expert entrepreneurs in designing new firms, I discovered a set of principles and 
a logic of problem solving that I dubbed effectual reasoning”; while, according to 
Sarasvathy et al. (2008, p. 345): “Effectuation may be called a logic because it is 
a coherent system of principles that are inherently interrelated, internally 
consistent and collectively independent (i.e. do not rely on ad hoc outside 
assumptions)”. Without wanting to wade into the vast and age old philosophical 
discussion on the distinction between ‘reasoning’ and ‘logic’, based upon my 
reading of the effectuation literature, it is my interpretation that ‘effectual logic’ 
is a mid-range concept that occurs at the interface between effectual reasoning 
and effectual behaviour – i.e. it represents the decision rules of effectuation. It is 
therefore located at a lower level of abstraction than effectual reasoning but 
higher in abstraction than effectual behaviour (as shown in Figure 7). To 
summarise, for the purposes of this thesis, when I refer to effectual reasoning, I 
mean the more abstract, cognitive, and internal to the individual manifestation of 
a non-teleological rationality, while when I refer to effectual logic, I mean the 
more concrete decision making rules and choices that such a form of reasoning 
denotes. 
Instead of being a form of reasoning that follows neo-classical conceptions of 
rationality, effectual reasoning has been described as ‘pre-rational’ (Sarasvathy 
& Dew, 2005b) and ‘non-teleological’ (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b; Sarasvathy et 
al., 2008); its defining characteristic that sets it apart from rational choice theory 
being that it does not presuppose a concrete goal that guides action. Steyaert 
(2007, p. 466) believes that this “ability to account for the non-teleological aspect 
of entrepreneurial action”  is “the single most important aspect of effectuation”. 
There are others who have also touched upon this difference in rationality and 
reasoning between entrepreneurs and others, for instance, according to Schum-
peter (1934): “The manager chooses from the most advantageous among the 
                                                 
5 Only a limited number of works in my entire literature review, including Sharma and Salvato (2008) -  
in reference to Sarasvathy’s unpublished doctoral dissertation of 1998, Dew, Sarasvathy, Read, and 
Wiltbank (2010) , Sarasvathy and Berglund (Foss & Klein, 2017), have explicitly used the term ‘effectual 
rationality’. I believe this may be due to the considerable amount of theoretical justification that would be 
required to set up effectual rationality as being its own paradigm of rationality. 
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methods which have been empirically tested and become familiar at a certain 
point in time, whereas the entrepreneur looks for the best method possible at the 
times.” This phenomenon has similarly been described through the concept of 
‘entrepreneurial bricolage’ or making do with what is at hand (Baker & Nelson, 
2005; Fisher, 2012). As Stinchfield, Nelson, & Wood (2013, p. 890) note: “re-
searchers have recently catalogued entrepreneurial behaviors that do not appear 
to be driven purely by economics. One of the most salient examples of this is 
emergence of research documenting bricolage as a unique form of entrepreneuri-
al behavior". If we consider effectual reasoning to be a newly defined category of 
instrumental rationality, set inverse to causal reasoning, it enables the classifica-
tion of many of these entrepreneurial behaviours as being the non-teleological 
actions of rational actors where previously such behaviours might have been con-
sidered aberrations to instrumental rationality or, instead, follow some form of 
subjective rationality6.  
Despite the evident importance of the identification, at a higher level of ab-
straction, of this means driven sub-category of instrumental rationality, most of 
the extant discussion on effectuation theory is directed towards the effectual be-
haviour constructs that I will presently discuss in the following section. Very lit-
tle theorising has yet been dedicated to the broad ontological implications that 
the identification of effectual reasoning has for organisational science as a whole, 
and effectuation theory has only just recently begun to extend out of the domain 
of entrepreneurship studies. 
3.4 Effectuation as a form of Behaviour 
The vast majority of articles written on the subject of effectuation since it was 
first introduced by Sarasvathy (2001) have particularly focused on effectuation as 
behaviour, or how it constitutes a particular type of decision making strategy that 
can be used by an individual acting under uncertainty. There has been literature 
that has been dedicated to defining (Perry et al., 2012; Sarasvathy, 2001), valida-
ting (Chandler et al., 2011), comparing to other behavioural theories (Fisher, 
2012), and critiquing (Arend et al., 2015; Baron, 2009) effectuation as an indi-
vidual level behaviour, or collection of behaviours and heuristics. Behaviours 
and heuristics that account for the means-oriented, non-predictive logic and asso-
ciated actions that have been empirically observed as being employed by ‘expert 
entrepreneurs’  who subscribe to effectual reasoning (Dew et al., 2009).  
                                                 
6 See Endres & Woods (2010) for a conversation on how Schumpeter contrasts entrepreneurship to ra-
tional economic behaviour. 
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It is in this literature that the use of the term ‘effectuation’ refers to the effec-
tual behavioural construct that is comprised, generally, of five sub-constructs 
which have been variously been described, among other variations, as the ‘ prin-
ciples’(Sarasvathy, 2001), ‘behavioural principles’ (Perry et al., 2012), ‘logical 
frames’ (Dew et al., 2009), and decision-making ‘heuristics’ (Werhahn, Mauer, 
Flatten, & Brettel, 2015) of effectuation. As each particular term is used by dif-
ferent authors and publications to qualify the constructs in particular ways, I shall 
simply refer to them using the blanket term of ‘behavioural constructs’. These 
behavioural constructs, contrasted against their inverses in the predictive strate-
gies used by those following causal reasoning, are, at their most simple: a focus 
on means rather than goals; a focus on affordable loss, rather than expected re-
turns; a reliance on strategic alliances (or, more recently, partnership) rather than 
competitive analyses; the exploitation of contingencies rather than preexisting 
knowledge; and an emphasis on controlling an unpredictable future rather than 
predicting an uncertain one (Dew et al., 2009; Perry et al., 2012; Sarasvathy & 
Dew, 2005b). A summarisation of these behaviours and associated issues is pro-
vided in Table 4, below. 
Table 4 Differences between causal and effectual behaviours, adapted from 
Dew et al. (2009) 
Issue Behaviour under Effectual Logic Behaviour under Causal Logic 
View of the future Predict Control/Create 
Basis for taking 
action 
Focus on goals Focus on means 
Predisposition 
toward risk and 
resources 
Evaluate expected return Evaluate downside potential and 
determine affordable loss 
Attitude towards 
outsiders 
Engage in competitive analysis and 
avoid dilution of ownership 
Seek out and combine partnerships, 
particularly equity partnerships, 
shape the direction of the venture 




Contingencies should be avoided as 
they are seen as obstacles to careful 
prediction and planning 
Contingencies should be seized 
upon as opportunities for novelty 
and creation. 
In their validation study of causation and effectuation processes, Chandler et 
al. (2011) discovered strong empirical evidence showing that, while causation is 
a unidimentional reflective construct, effectuation is a multidimensional forma-
tive construct (Figure 9).  
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Figure 9 Causation and effectuation constructs. Based on Chandler et al. 
(2011)7 
By using factor analysis, Chandler et al. empirically tested the validity of both 
the constructs relating to effectuation and those relating to causation. The princi-
ples on which they based conceptualisation of the constructs were as follows: 
1. a focus on short-term experiments to identify business opportunities in an un-
predictable future (effectuation) versus prediction of an uncertain future by 
defining the final objective up front (causation); 
2. a focus on projects where the loss in a worst-case scenario is affordable (ef-
fectuation) versus maximization of expected returns (causation); 
3. an emphasis on pre-commitments and strategic alliances to control an unpre-
dictable future (effectuation) versus business planning and competitive anal-
yses to predict an uncertain future (causation), and; 
4. exploitation of environmental contingencies by remaining flexible (effectua-
tion) versus exploitation of pre-existing capabilities and resources (causa-
tion). (Chandler et al., 2011, p. 377) 
They found support for Sarasvathy’s (2001) assertions that causation and effec-
tuation should be treated as distinct constructs, however, while the sub-constructs 
that made up causation loaded together, the sub-constructs for effectuation did 
not. This supports the argument made by Perry, Chandler and Markova (2012) 
that the dimensions of effectuation are independent of one another. This also 
suggested to them that effectuation is a formative construct; a possibility that has 
important theoretical implications which are discussed in depth in the following 
paragraphs. 
                                                 
7 Whether or not effectuation is ‘truly’ a formative second order construct or whether it might be a reflec-
tive unidimensional construct, or whether it exists at all, may be debateable, and different empirical stud-
ies may treat it as one or the other, or neither. However, from my nominalist position, these questions are 
immaterial, all that matters is that I have chosen Chandler et al.’s conceptualisation as that which best fits 





      
























Constructs can be either reflective, or formative. Coltman, Devinney, Midgley 
and Venaik (2008) identify three theoretical considerations for a construct being 
either formative of reflective. They are: the nature of the construct, the direction 
of causality and, the characteristics of the indicators. The nature of the reflective 
construct is that it exists independently of its measures. Causality flows from the 
construct, down to the sub-constructs or indicators that describe it. In a reflective 
construct, any change in the sub-ordinate constructs or indicators must be pre-
ceded by a change in the main construct. A formative construct, on the other 
hand, does not exist independently from its measures; it exists as a composite of 
its elements. Causality flows to the construct from sub-constructs or indicators 
that define it. This means that the absence of one or more indicators or sub-
constructs may result in a significant change in the conceptual domain of the 
formative construct. While the indicators of the reflective construct should be 
highly correlated, those of the formative construct will be independent of one 
another (Coltman et al., 2008; Jarvis, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2003).  
The use effectual logic is based upon the pragmatic desire to limit the negative 
effects of decisions taken where the consequences are not knowable - when caus-
al reasoning is either impossible or the risk of using it is too great. This means 
that, rather than causation being the opposite of effectuation, I suggest that it may 
be useful to conceptualise causation as being the default decision making logic of 
any decision making actor, to which an absence of effectual rationale falls back 
to when it is not required or desired (if we assume that instrumental rationality 
underlies the decision). Causal logic is ever-present in an actor’s mind (as indi-
cated by its presentation empirically as a reflexive construct in Chandler et al., 
[2011], and as it is the default logic of novices [Dew et al., 2009; Read, Dew, 
Sarasvathy, Song, & Wiltbank, 2009]), however, the extent to which an actor 
behaves more causally or more effectually is determined by the number of, and 
extent to which, the actor emphasises effectual strategies over and above causal 
ones (as indicated by effectuation’s presentation empirically as a formative con-
struct. If we conceptualise effectuation as a formative construct, this implies that 
the absence of one or more of the effectuation first-order constructs of means 
focus, affordable loss logic, control orientation, contingency exploitation, and/or 
strategic alliance, will result in a construct that is not effectuation but something 
conceptually different. Causation, being reflective, reflects goal focus, expected 
return logic, prediction orientation, and knowledge exploitation but is not altered 
conceptually by one or more effectual first-order constructs being present. In 
other words, for an individual to be entirely effectual in behaviour, he or she will 
need to exercise all of the principles of means focus, affordable loss logic, con-
trol orientation, contingency exploitation, and willingness to engage in strategic 
alliances. Should the individual not exercise one or more of these principles, then 
he or she is no longer completely effectual in reasoning, but does exhibit some 
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level of effectual logic. One criticism weighed at effectuation by Arend, Sa-
rooghi, and Burkemper (2015) is that, as it represents an amalgam of a number of 
strategies rather than being a single unidimensional construct,  it lacks coherence 
in its logic as a theory. 
The argument that the effectuation construct is the inverse of causation con-
struct has also come under some scrutiny in the literature. Some have argued that 
effectuation and causation have been incorrectly treated as dichotomous (Dave 
Crick & Crick, 2016; Kraaijenbrink, 2008). Indeed, Read and Sarasvathy them-
selves state that: 
It is important to note that the extreme dichotomy described [between causation and 
effectuation] is meant to create a powerful theoretical separation between effectuation 
and rational choice. Empirically speaking, of course, both causal and effectual processes 
would be at work in reality. We would expect, therefore, that the data entrepreneurship 
scholars gather would contain decisions and actions that confound the two. (Read & 
Sarasvathy 2005, 17) 
This is evident when we consider that the behaviours implied by causation and 
effectuation given above do not preclude one another. One can be means focused 
but goal driven, be able make decisions based upon expected returns while also 
risking no more than they can afford, can conduct careful competitive analysis 
while at the same time being receptive to strategic alliance, etc. Instead, Perry, 
Chandler and Markova (2012, p. 855) argue that causation and effectuation 
should not be considered opposing constructs, but as orthogonal and “similar to 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction”. Furthermore, in a validation study of causation 
and effectuation processes, Chandler, DeTienne, McKelvie and Mumford (2011) 
found that the construct of strategic alliance and pre-commitment was one that is 
shared by both effectuation and causation. While it may be so, as Sarasvathy 
(2001) argues, that strategic alliance is an important dimension of effectuation, to 
exclude strategic alliance as part of traditional competitive (i.e. causally rational) 
strategies belies the vast body of literature on that subject. A causally rational 
actor will use strategic alliance as a means to an end, while an effectually rational 
actor will use strategic alliance as a means to new means and ends. 
Arend, Sarooghi, and Burkemper (2015, p. 642) argue that the specific context 
in which effectual logic occurs, i.e. in contexts of high uncertainties, make effec-
tuation theory “tautological by syllogism: the specific context of effectuation im-
plies particular rational responses that are embodied in specific units of effectua-
tion theory; thus, the context implies the depicted behaviour, giving no possibil-
ity of falsification”. This raises the interesting question of whether or not effectu-
al or means-oriented logic might be applied in contexts of low uncertainty, and if 
so, for what reason and to what effect? It certainly might seem to be irrational for 
one to use effectual logic in circumstances in which reasonable predictions can 
made but, as many can attest, human decision making need not always be ration-
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al. Drawing from my systematic review of the literature, I will take a more in 
depth look at the five behaviours outlined in Table 4 in the following subsec-
tions, and provide a brief overview of their treatment in the extant literature. 
3.4.1 Means orientation versus goal orientation 
The first and most important sub-construct of effectuation, and what arguably 
makes effectuation ‘effectual’, is an orientation towards means driven action ra-
ther than goal driven.  Means focus is different from the other constructs being 
examined in this study. Unlike the other four constructs, it is not a direct re-
sponse to the environment (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a). Rather, it is an individual 
decision making construct that sets the user of effectual logic (as I shall hence-
forth simply refer to as the effectuator) firmly apart from the user of causal logic 
(henceforth, the causator). It can be summed up simply as the difference between 
a causator’s rationale of “how can I get from point A to point B using my 
means?” versus the effectuators rationale of “what are the possible points B that I 
can image I can produce from my means at point A?” This focus on imagination 
and subjectivity, as opposed to the predominantly goal focused, or teleological, 
model of entrepreneurship is considered a particularly strong point of effectua-
tion in providing creative explanations for entrepreneurship. 
Sarasvathy (2001) identifies the initial three categories of means available to 
an entrepreneur in pursuit of new venture/market creation: 
Entrepreneurs begin with three categories of "means": they know who they are, what 
they know, and whom they know-their own traits, tastes, and abilities; the knowledge 
corridors they are in; and the social networks they are a part of. (Sarasvathy, 2001, p. 
250) 
In short, they refer to the entrepreneur’s “Identity; Knowledge; and Networks” 
(Wiltbank, Dew, Read, & Sarasvathy, 2006, p. 991). Raised to a higher level of 
analysis, Sarasvathy (2001) continues, on the level of the firm, these means are 
its resources – physical, human, and organisational, as per the resource-based 
view of the firm (Barney, 1991) and on the level of the economy, means are de-
mographics, technological trends, and socio-political institutions. Read and Sar-
asvathy (2005) argue that expert entrepreneurs are more likely to be means ori-
ented in decision making due to their more extensive knowledge assets and their 
ability to integrate, synthesise, and use that knowledge to solve novel problems. 
Because this type of expertise is not available to novices, novices are simply lim-
ited to using goals as the basis of their decision making actions. Strong empirical 
support for the hypothesis that expert entrepreneurs were more likely to draw on 
their personal experience in decision making was uncovered in studies examining 
the differences between experts and novices (Dew et al., 2009; Read, Dew, 
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Sarasvathy, Song, & Wiltbank, 2009). Empirical support for the importance of 
means focus in new venture performance was also found in a meta-study of en-
trepreneurial literature by Read, Song and Smit (2009). 
3.4.2 Affordable loss versus expected return 
The affordable loss principle is a response to environmental risk. While the 
causator focuses on maximizing potential returns through selection of optimal 
strategies, the effectuator’s aim is to experiment using as many different strate-
gies as possible, given his or her means, while investing only as much as he or 
she would be willing to lose (Sarasvathy, 2001). An effectuator will have a pref-
erence for actions that create more options in the future rather than greater re-
turns in the present (Sarasvathy 2001). The projects that will be focused on will 
be limited to ones in which the worst-case scenario is affordable (Chandler et al. 
2011).  
Although there is empirical support for the affordable loss principle as being 
part of the larger effectuation construct (Chandler et al., 2011), a meta-analysis of 
entrepreneurship literature did not find support for it being positively related to 
new venture performance (Read, Song, et al., 2009). As Perry et al. (2012) argue 
– affordable loss is not the opposite of expected return. For instance, an entrepre-
neur faced with a number of potential directions in which to take the effectual 
network may indeed choose one based on affordable loss, in the event that the 
path taken will end in the worst case scenario, however, where two paths present 
themselves that can be pursued based on the same affordable loss principle, the 
entrepreneur would likely choose the one with the probability of greatest return. 
This is empirically supported, with Ketolainen, Nummela, and Kalinic (2016), in 
interviews with the entrepreneurial managers of Finnish biotech firms, finding 
that while affordable loss was emphasised for short term operative decisions, for 
decisions with longer term strategic impact, these managers would use affordable 
loss and expected return estimations simultaneously and complementarily. 
3.4.3 Exploiting contingencies versus exploiting knowledge 
Leveraging contingencies rather than trying to avoid them while utilising preex-
isting knowledge is the construct least discussed in the literature. Sarasvathy’s 
(2001, p. 252) definition of this principle is simply: “When preexisting 
knowledge, such as expertise in a particular new technology, forms the source of 
competitive advantage, causation models might be preferable. Effectuation, how-
ever, would be better for exploiting contingencies that arose unexpectedly over 
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time”. By leveraging contingencies, effectuators are able to turn unexpected 
events from being risks that should be avoided, into opportunities that should be 
exploited (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a; Wiltbank et al., 2006).  
This is a construct in response to both environmental uncertainty and risk. It 
has been suggested that leveraging contingencies means to remain flexible 
(Chandler et al., 2011) or, as Wiltbank et al. (2005) describe it, keeping open 
room for surprises. This can manifest itself in a willingness to modify products 
and embrace customisation, and to possess the characteristics of openness, organ-
icity, and a transformational leadership style (Read, Song, et al., 2009). The ef-
fectual individual thrives on contingency, by transforming it into opportunity. 
The causator, on the other hand, treats contingencies as something unpleasant 
and risky, which should be avoided or neutralised (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a; 
Wiltbank et al., 2006).  
Read and Sarasvathy (2005) claim that experts are able to intuitively recognise 
from past experience where failure is possible. To mitigate against failure they 
actively build contingency into their strategies. Strategies include: Deferring the 
elimination of options; selecting paths that result in multiple positive outcomes 
and; selecting strategies that result in multiple paths contingent on intermediate 
options. The meta-analytic study of entrepreneurships literature by Read et al. 
(2009) found that ‘Leveraging Contingency’ was positively and significantly re-
lated to new venture performance. 
3.4.4 Control logic versus prediction logic 
The final behavioural construct that is unique to effectuation is control logic; a 
response to an uncertain environment. Sarasvathy summarises the effectual logic 
of control through the statement: “To the extent that we can control the future, 
we do not need to predict it”, as opposed to the causal logic of prediction, sum-
marised by the statement: “To the extent that we can predict the future, we can 
control it” (Sarasvathy, 2001, p. 252). A causator might use detailed market 
analysis to attempt to predict market trends and consumer behaviour in order to 
decide what strategic path to take that results in the largest market share. The ef-
fectuator, on the other hand, avoids prediction altogether. By controlling the ele-
ments of the environment which he or she has control over (Sarasvathy & Dew, 
2005b), the effectuator can guide the way in which the future unfolds. One way 
of doing this is by bringing potential stakeholders into the fold of the effectual 
network through strategic alliances and pre-commitments, so that their means 
and goals will together form both the product and the market. While control and 
prediction may not be opposites, an effectuator is distinguishable from a causator 
in that he or she is capable of employing control logic in an environment that 
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precludes prediction. A causator, on the other hand, is unlikely to choose a 
course of action that relies on control rather than prediction. 
Read and Sarasvathy (2005) claim that experts do not need to rely heavily on 
predictive information as they have amassed knowledge that allows them to 
make good decisions with limited information. They operate as filters, comparing 
their current environment against patterns from previous experience, and can ig-
nore predicative information that is based on elements of their environment 
which will change anyway, based on the actions that the entrepreneur will take. 
This allows expert entrepreneurs to take creative, and realistic, courses of action 
which are not contingent on external factors outside of their control. In their em-
pirical study of ‘angel investor’ behaviour, Wiltbank, Read, Dew, & Sarasvathy, 
(2009) found evidence for the argument that angel investors who exert control 
logic will experience fewer investment failures. However, there was no evidence 
for the argument that an emphasis on prediction would result in more frequent 
failures. Again, prediction and control are not opposites (Perry et al., 2012). In-
deed, in their taxonomy of strategies along the dimensions of prediction and con-
trol, Wiltbank et al. (2006) describe a ‘Visionary’ strategy, which has a strong 
emphasis on both.  
3.4.5 Strategic alliance versus competitive analysis 
A focus on strategic alliances and pre-commitments from stakeholders, such as 
customers and suppliers, is a construct in response to environmental uncertainty. 
Sarasvathy (2001) contrasts effectuation against causation models such as those 
espoused by strategists such as Porter (1980) which emphasize detailed competi-
tive analysis. Sarasvathy argues that effectuation emphasises strategic alliances, 
partnerships and pre-commitments as “a way to reduce and/or eliminate uncer-
tainty and to erect entry barriers” (Sarasvathy, 2001, p. 252). Such partnerships 
can be both exogenous (partnerships with other organisations, both public and 
private etc.) or endogenous (partnerships with employees, paid researchers, firm 
partners etc.)(Read, Song, et al., 2009). In effectual networks the transactions 
between partners are not arm’s length, and involve partners sharing both risk and 
gain. While effectuation emphasises that the stakeholders who commit to the ef-
fectual network determine the projects objectives, it is argued that in the causal 
model the project objectives determine who is to come on board. The causal 
model dictates that behaviour towards customers and suppliers is to limit task 
relationships with them to only those that are absolutely necessary, while the ef-
fectual attitude is to build your market with your customers, suppliers, and even 
possible competitors (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a). Empirical evidence from the 
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meta-analysis of entrepreneurship literature by Read et al. (2009) supports the 
hypothesis that partnership is positively related to new-venture performance.  
A final point to note from Chandler et al.’s (2011)validation study is that the 
construct of strategic alliance and pre-commitment was one that is shared by both 
effectuation and causation. While it may be so, as Sarasvathy (2001) argues, that 
strategic alliance is an important dimension of effectuation, to exclude strategic 
alliance as part traditional competitive (i.e. causal) strategies belies the vast body 
of literature on that subject8.  
3.5 Effectuation as a Process 
Effectuation as a process is model of how opportunities are created and how 
firms and markets come to be. In Sarasvathy’s (2001) original work, she conflat-
ed effectuation processes with the aforementioned effectual principles or behav-
iours. She describes effectuations processes succinctly, under what she entitled 
‘The Theory of Effectuation’ as follows:  
Effectuation begins with a given set of means and contingent human aspirations to 
select from a set of possible effects imagined by the effectuator(s). Both means and as-
pirations change over time. The particular effect selected is a function of the level of 
loss or risk acceptable to the effectuator(s), as well as the degree of control over the 
future that the effectuator(s) achieves through strategic partnerships along the way. 
(Sarasvathy, 2001, p. 253) 
This was in contrast to the typical kind of strategizing and decision-making ad-
vocated in economics and management (at the time) that she labelled as ‘causa-
tion’, for which she provided the following definition: “Causation processes take 
a particular effect as given and focus on selecting between means to create that 
effect” (Sarasvathy, 2001, p. 245). In later articles, a separate model for effectua-
tion as a transformative, dynamic, iterative, and interactive process, derived from 
effectuation principles, was introduced (Read & Sarasvathy, 2005; Sarasvathy & 
Dew, 2005a, 2005b; Wiltbank et al., 2006). This model is illustrated below in 
Figure 10. 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad (1989), Hamel (1991), Contractor & Lorange (1988) 
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Figure 10 A dynamic model of the effectual network and the new market as 
an effectual artefact (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b) 
The model describes how new markets can emerge as an outcome, rather than a 
goal, of a process based upon effectual logic and behaviour. A new market 
emerges endogenously through the expanding cycle of resources and converging 
cycle of constraints generated by a growing effectual network of stakeholder 
commitments. It should be noted, however, that Sarasvathy and Dew (2005b, p. 
542) state in their article that: 
 We are using a single instance (a thought experiment) of how the new market crea-
tion problem could be solved at the micro level to argue there exists a general theoreti-
cal solution. Actually proving that general solution itself is outside the scope of this 
article. 
That is to say, the process they present through their model (and explicated in a 
thought experiment that I shall discuss in the following section) is an idealised 
sequence of events that may lead to a new market being created, rather than be-
ing an empirical certainty. 
Market creation through effectuation is considered synonymous with oppor-
tunity creation because the end result is a new market that did not exist previous-
ly. However, rather than being a theory of how new markets are created from 
scratch, the effectuation does not treat markets as given and objective realities 
but, rather, as artefacts that can be created, destroyed, or transformed from being 
one form to being something entirely different through a form of evolutionary 
process (Dew et al., 2011; Sarasvathy, 2004; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b; 
Sarasvathy et al., 2008). In effect, effectuation describes how various actors or 
stakeholders, in a network revolving around, and guided by, an entrepreneur fol-
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lowing effectual reasoning, iteratively transform extant realities into something 
new:  
By continuously and iteratively negotiating with those stakeholders who actually 
commit to particular elements of the design process, we make both new means and new 
goals possible and reshape reality as we go. Reality, in this worldview, is nothing but a 
negotiated set of constraints on our actions. We do not mold reality into some disem-
bodied vision that we aspire to, but rather concurrently transform both constraint and 
aspiration by actively reimagining the possible through the actual (Sarasvathy, 2004, p. 
525) 
The result of the effectuation process is a new market that did not previously ex-
ist and, presumably, a new firm that serves that market, however, the result is 
neither predicted nor planed ex ante, but is contingent on the stakeholders who 
contributed to the process, their actions and goals (Read & Sarasvathy, 2005, p. 
53).  
Stakeholders are said to ‘self-select’ into the network in their initial commit-
ments. Sarasvathy and Dew (2005b) reason that, as stakeholders self-select into 
the process without consideration of a particular goal or expected return, and on-
ly invest what they can afford to lose; there arise no issues of opportunism or 
opportunity cost on the part of the entrepreneur. I.e. the entrepreneur does not 
need to choose who their stakeholders should be, because all that matters is that 
the stakeholder wants to be part of the process, thus eliminating the opportunity 
cost of the possibility that there are other potential customers out there that they 
will ignore, and; because these self-selected stakeholders have to make actual 
commitments to, and be actively engaged in, a process leading to uncertain ends, 
the process itself selects out opportunists in favour of ‘intelligent altruists’. As 
the network grows larger and the pool of means increases, constraints also in-
crease and the form that will eventually be taken by the final artefact becomes 
clearer. Later members to the network are less able to negotiate the final form of 
artefact that the network will ultimately produce. The network becomes gradually 
less and less effectual until it eventually coalesces into a new market, at which 
point the firm will continue to operate and grow through a more causal approach 
(Read & Sarasvathy, 2005; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b). 
The process described above by which the effectual network grows makes 
several key assumptions. These assumptions are: the process precludes assess-
ment by members of expected return; the process ignores opportunity costs and; 
the process avoids opportunism (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b, 2008a). Further, for 
this to occur, they make it clear that the chain of commitments that form the ef-
fectual network are all assumed to be between stakeholders who share the same 
effectual logic to the exclusion of causal rationales (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b; 
Wiltbank et al., 2006). As I have already mentioned, opportunity cost is avoided 
because an effectual commitment does not require the entrepreneur to seek out 
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all other potential customers before negotiating a commitment with the original 
potential customer. Note, however, that this assumption does not consider an op-
portunity cost on the part of the external party making the commitment – it as-
sumes stakeholders who are concerned with opportunity cost are simply selected 
out. In fact, Sarasvathy and Dew mostly avoid questions of stakeholders’ motiva-
tions. They make the rather tautological argument that the stakeholders who join 
the network do so effectually, thus identifying them as true customers (or suppli-
ers or investors), while those who are causal self-select out. However, if we want 
to know how these different stakeholders may impact or affect the unfolding of 
this process, how they interact with the entrepreneur and one another, and how 
exactly the expanding cycles or resources and converging cycles of goals of the 
network emerge, this explanation remains unsatisfactory. I will expand on why I 
believe this is so in the following section by taking a closer look at what has been 
said about stakeholders and their commitments thus far in the literature. 
3.5.1 Effectual stakeholder commitments 
The role of the actors broadly referred to as ‘effectual stakeholders’ or simply 
‘stakeholders’ in the theory of effectuation is a fundamental one, with the trans-
formational effectuation process even being labelled ‘stakeholder-dependent’ 
(Dew et al., 2011; Dew & Sarasvathy, 2007; Read, Dew, et al., 2009). However, 
the role of stakeholders in this process remains fairly superficially understood 
and ill-defined. As stated above, the effectuation process model relies on these 
stakeholders to provide it with new means/resources, and new goals/constraints 
through their commitments. So, who are these stakeholders and what are their 
reasons for making commitments? 
According to the literature, the only criterion for becoming an effectual stake-
holder is that the individual in question has to ‘buy into’ the network with an ac-
tual commitment (Sarasvathy, 2001; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b). Other than that, 
potential stakeholders can be anyone, as (Wiltbank et al., 2009, p. 117) argue: 
“[Effectual entrepreneurs] work with any and all interested people – usually start-
ing very close to home, inside their immediate social network – and work out-
ward to expand the stakeholder network through a process of self-selection”. Ini-
tially, pre-firm, an effectual entrepreneur’s potential stakeholders may include 
“friends and family, or random people they meet in the routines of their lives” 
(Wiltbank et al., 2006, pp. 991–992), and later, as a new firm emerges, potential 
stakeholders could include other firms, including “customers, suppliers and even 
prospective competitors” (Read & Sarasvathy, 2005, p. 52), or internal stake-
holders, such as employees (Read, Song, et al., 2009). On the subject of why a 
stakeholder may make a commitment to an unfolding effectuation process, 
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Sarasvathy and Dew (2005b, p. 554) state, vaguely, that: “Reasons for making 
commitments may range from pre-existent preferences to docility, passions and 
convictions to self-interest and fun, reformatory zeal to indifference”. For the 
extant effectuation literature, questions of who stakeholders are and why they 
choose to make their commitments are immaterial; what is important is the fact 
that they self-select by making an actual commitment (through the provision of 
new resources to be mobilised to new actions), and that the commitment is gov-
erned by effectual reasoning, i.e. it is an effectual commitment that is made. 
“What counts is the willingness of stakeholders to commit to the construction 
process; and not their fit with or alignment to some pre-conceived vision or op-
portunity” (Wiltbank et al., 2006, p. 992). So what is an effectual commitment? 
An effectual commitment derives from the effectual principle of strategic alli-
ance or partnership which I discussed in brief in Section 3.4.3. In effect, an effec-
tual commitment is what cements an effectual partnership, regarding which 
Read, Song, and Smit (2009, p. 574) state: “an entrepreneur or a venture may 
build many relationships, but only those in which both parties share the risk of 
the venture and benefit from the success of the venture constitute effectual part-
nerships”. The first detailed elaboration on what exactly an ‘effectual commit-
ment’ constitutes is outlined by Sarasvathy and Dew (2005b). They illustrate 
through a thought experiment how the initial commitments of an effectual net-
work likely eventuate. In the thought experiment outlined in Figure 11 (over the 
page), an entrepreneur approaches a customer with a product. The customer 
would like to purchase the product from the entrepreneur but with a specification 
to which modification of the product will cost the entrepreneur a significant 
amount of money. Three solutions are given; the first two of which keep the cus-
tomer at arm’s length, and a third, entirely effectual solution, which invites the 
customer to invest in the modification. While the arm’s length transactions sug-
gested in the first two solutions are described as being unlikely to succeed, the 
effectual solution is described as being mutually beneficial and eliminates uncer-
tainty as it confirms the potential customer as a genuine customer. It is this kind 
of initial commitment between the entrepreneur and stakeholder to share in the 
future risk and reward of the forming network that I referred to, henceforth, as 




Figure 11 Effectuation vs. Causation in forming initial commitments. Based 
on Sarasvathy and Dew (2005) 
Sarasvathy and Dew (2005b) offer three possible ways for how members of the 
effectual network can respond to interactions that do not become embodied in ac-
tual commitments - they can ignore them, they can begin exploring alternatives to 
growing the network effectually or, they declare the effectual transformation com-
plete and begin competing with alternative markets. The second possibility, ex-
ploring alternatives to growing the network effectually, hints that there is the pos-
sibility that effectual commitments alone may not always be sufficient for a new 
market to emerge from an effectual network, but this subject is not explored. Karri 
and Goel (2008) disagree with the assumption that all parties, to a transaction lead-
ing to actual commitments to an effectual network adopt effectual logic (c.f. Dew 
& Sarasvathy, 2007). They argue that such an assumption places an unnecessary 
restriction on effectuation. Instead they claim that “a more defensible position is 
that effectuation allows entrepreneurs to bring several parties into their fold regard-
Problem 
- E wants to sell green X to C 
- C wants X to be blue 
- To make X blue will cost $10k 
Solution 1: Causal 
- Find D 
- If no D, get C to sign contract 
confirming commitment to buy 
blue X 
 
Solution 2: Weakly  
Effectual 
- With no contract raise $10k 
to make blue X 
- Use affordable loss principle 
and imagine other possibili-
ties for blue X if not sold to C 
  
Solution 3: Effectual 
- Ask C to commit $10k up-
front for modification of X in 
return for discount on per unit 
price of X 
- C makes counter offer, 
providing $10k investment 
for equity in X thereby form-
ing an effectual commitment 
  
Outcome 1 
- Contract unlikely in the ab-
sence in an ongoing relation-
ship of trust between E and C 
- E many lack competence to 
create blue X 
 - Specification of X may not 
be clear in advance leading to 
incomplete contract 
Outcome 2  
- Same for solution 1 
- Small possibility to benefit 
from exaptation, i.e. using a 
feature of technology for 
something other than its orig-
inal purpose (Dew et al. 2004) 
  
Outcome 3 
- Confirms C as an actual 
customer 
- Creates an ongoing partner-
ship 
- The specification of X is 
only preliminary and open for 
renegotiation 
  
E = Entrepreneur  
X = Widget 
C = Potential Customer  
D = Alternative customer  
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less of the motives or reasoning process of other parties as long as they can poten-
tially contribute to the evolving vision of the entrepreneur” (2008, p. 742). 
Aside from the very initial partnerships between the focal entrepreneur and his 
or her co-founders, such as those that led to the commercialisation of the internet 
as described in Sarasvathy and Dew (2005b), most of the other partnerships de-
scribed in the effectuation literature are between the entrepreneur’s nascent firm 
and other external stakeholders such as customer firms (as in the thought experi-
ment above) or investors such as venture capitalists and angel investors 
(Wiltbank et al., 2009). It would be uncontroversial to assume that these stake-
holders are likely to have their own, perhaps more pressing, interests outside the 
focal effectuation process (i.e. other investments in their portfolio; their own 
businesses, etc.). Because of this it is unlikely that most will be willing or able to 
choose to make a commitment of their own resources based purely on effectual 
logic alone, eschewing any predictive rationales. Indeed, even in the most effec-
tual Solution 3 in the thought experiment in Figure 11 above, the customer C is 
making the commitment with the understanding that the outcome of the com-
mitment will be access to a supply of a discounted widget X – suggesting a clear 
goal orientation. Furthermore, a potential stakeholder may choose to make a 
commitment in order to recognize and exploit causally deduced opportunities, 
e.g. a stakeholder may recognize that the development of the effectual artefact 
that is emerging is a potential new market for their existing products or services. 
What, then, determines how and why a potential stakeholder ultimately makes 
the decision to commit resources to the effectual cycle unfolding before them 
will be the potential opportunity they perceive it to represent, and the acceptable 
level of uncertainty they perceive in what can be called their commitment deci-
sion space at the time of commitment. Furthermore, what is the role and reason-
ing of those potential stakeholders who may not be instrumentally rational (nei-
ther causally nor effectually) but, instead, are subjectively or affectually rational 
in their decision making? What are the implications to effectuation processes of 
commitments coming from such individuals?  
I would like to echo the argument made by Karri and Goel (2008) that it is un-
likely that every stakeholder who makes any form of commitment towards an ef-
fectuation process will be him or herself an effectuator. On the contrary, effectua-
tors, by definition, tend to be resource poor, and if one of the main purposes of 
stakeholder commitments is to provide resources to the effectual network then it 
seems more likely that those who have the resources will be more causally minded. 
Indeed, Read & Sarasvathy (2005) even propose that resources have a moderating 
effect on reasoning strategy, with more resources at hand corresponding to an in-
creased likelihood that an individual will use causal logic, particularly if they have 
little entrepreneurial experience. If we are to assume that stakeholders within the 
effectual network can be both effectual stakeholders as well as causal stakeholders, 
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we must return to the issue of uncertainty pertaining to the creation of new mar-
kets. Causal decision makers, by definition, base their decision making criteria on 
expected return (Sarasvathy 2001). How, then, can they make a commitment to the 
effectual network when, as Wiltbank, Dew, Read, and Sarasvathy (2006, p. 993) 
argue, “it is not clear at the early stages of the effectuation process what the pie 
will be, let alone how much each piece will be worth down the road, stakeholders 
cannot effectively use expected return as their immediate criterion for selecting 
resource investments”? Is it possible to believe that the effectual networks that cre-
ate new markets are entirely made up of stakeholders who share the same effectual 
rationale? Are all dealings between the effectual network and external causally 
minded firms or individuals done at arm’s length?  
3.6 Limits of Current Theory – Stakeholder Involvement 
As should be clear from the previous section, I believe that our understanding of 
effectuation as a process model for new market/new venture creation could bene-
fit a great deal from further theoretical development, particularly with a focus on 
understanding stakeholder commitments.  





soning and will behave 
effectually 
 
Limits potential stakeholders to only a narrow group of 
individuals who have the expertise or willingness to act 
effectually. Ignores the possibility that effectual com-
mitments may be made by actors using causal, or some 
other form of reasoning. 
Stakeholders self-
select 
Underemphasises the role of the entrepreneur in seek-
ing out and selecting certain possible stakeholders for 
their fit with the emerging effectual artefact. Underem-
phasises the importance of knowing the motivations for 
why stakeholders make the decision to commit and the 
implications this has for the shape and trajectory of the 
emerging effectual network. 
Effectuation processes 
negate issues of oppor-
tunism and opportunity 
cost 
Maybe true for the very initial commitments, but once 
clearer goals emerge and constraints are established, 
opportunity costs and opportunism may arise in relation 
to existing stakeholders or potential new ones. 
Effectuation processes 
become less effectual 
over time through the 
converging cycle of 
constraints 
Theory relating to this proposition is underdeveloped. 
How do effectual processes make the transition to more 
causal processes? 
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In the following chapter I will draw upon the core concepts and constructs out-
lined above as the raw material from which to deduct a theoretical tool, a typolo-
gy, which can be used to analyse and predict the kinds of commitment that we 
could expect to see contributing to an effectual process of opportunity creation. 
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4 TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY OF STAKEHOLDER 
COMMITMENTS 
Following the review presented in the previous chapter, what does the literature 
tell us with regard to my central research question: How are stakeholder com-
mitments engaged towards the process of opportunity creation through effectua-
tion? We know that the process begins with a central figure, the effectual entre-
preneur, who does not possess clear goals or a plan of how to achieve them, but 
may have a generalised aspiration to create a new venture or may simply be 
stimulated to create a new venture through random circumstances, such as being 
fed up with hearing members of the community complaining about garbage (as 
was the case of Tom Fatjo from Sarasvathy, 2001). In the next step, the entrepre-
neur approaches other members of his or her social network and negotiates with 
them an effectual commitment, one in which, going forward, both entrepreneur 
and stakeholder will share the risks and rewards of the emergent effectual net-
work and the artefact at its heart.  
It is assumed that stakeholders will self-select, or buy-in with their commit-
ments, and that this self-selection process sifts out non-like-minded stakeholders 
(Sarasvathy & Dew, 2008b), and selects in stakeholders who will follow the 
same tenants of effectuation – means driven action, a focus on affordable loss 
rather than expected return, and the leveraging of contingencies (Wiltbank et al., 
2006). However, what this fails to answer, or at least does not do enough to an-
swer, is why these stakeholders would make such a commitment? Returning to 
the thought experiment of Sarasvathy and Dew (2005b) which describes three 
potential commitments – causal, weakly effectual, and effectual – why would the 
customer, who has an established business and is merely in search of a particular 
supply of widgets, invest ten thousand dollars to become part of a process, along 
with an entrepreneur, to produce a widget that does not yet exist? Furthermore, if 
we assume that, out of a number cold-calls and chance encounters, the entrepre-
neur does find a stakeholder who is willing to make a commitment of ten thou-
sand dollars, what is to guarantee that this stakeholder, who has a clear goal of 
wanting a particular type of widget X, will share the entrepreneur’s proclivity 
towards effectual behaviour?   
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4.1 Treatment of Stakeholder Commitments in the Extant Effectu-
ation Literature 
Examples of effectual stakeholder commitments, whether real or hypothetical, 
are few and far between in the core effectuation literature. Furthermore, descrip-
tions of these commitments, except in the case of the thought experiment of Sar-
asvathy and Dew (2005b), are fairly limited, and often do not resemble this ar-
chetypal example. Let us review the few examples that exist, summarised in the 
table below. 
Table 6 Examples of effectual stakeholder commitments in the effectuation 
literature 
Example Summary of Case and Relevant Stakeholder Commitments 




- An entrepreneur brings food for her colleagues to taste – they be-
come her first customers. 
- The entrepreneur may develop her business in different directions 




- An entrepreneur (Shoen) and his wife identify a need for “do-it- 
yourself moving equipment on a one-way, nation-wide basis”. 
- At the wife’s family ranch and with the family’s help, beginning 
with $5000, they make use of the automobile garage to manufac-
ture their first trailers. 
- He convinces family and friends to make down payments on 
trucks, and then borrows those trucks. 
- He contracts with service station outlets to merchandise trailer 
rentals. 
- He offers early customers discounts on trailer rentals if they es-
tablish a rental agent at their destination 
RFID Industry (Real) 
(Sarasvathy & Dew, 
2005a) 
 
- Two MIT researchers (Brock and Sarma) become colleagues be-
cause they get along and worked together on developing RFID 
technology 
- A chance meeting between Sarma and a manager for P&G (Ash-
ton) connected the researchers to Ashton’s commercial and per-
sonal network. 
- A second chance meeting between the Ashton and a “champion of 
industry standards” (barcodes), named Haberman, eventually lead 
the four individuals to create a new organisation in MIT called the 
Auto ID Center 
- Ashton and Haberman persuade their respective organisations to 




thought experiment  
(Hypothetical) 
(Sarasvathy & Dew, 
2005b) 
- An entrepreneur secures an equity investment from a customer in 
exchange for “voice” in the co-development of a new prod-
uct/service that will ultimately benefit the customer.  
Mosaic (Real) 
(Sarasvathy & Dew, 
2005b) 
- An entrepreneur (Clark) is introduced to a new piece of software 
(Mosiac) by his assistant (Foss) and, on Foss’s recommendation, 
contacts the software’s designer (Andreessen). 
- Dissatisfied with his employer (NCSA), Andreessen departs the 
company and with Clark they form the Mosaic Communications 
Corporation – recruiting Andreessen’s colleagues from NCSA 
KEEP180  
(Hypothetical) 
(Wiltbank et al., 2006) 
 
- A radio station (KEEP180), when planning “what to do next” can 
pursue a transformative (effectual) strategy by securing stake-
holder commitments. 
- Stakeholders imagine possible courses of action based on their 
means at hand. 
- They engage others “whose strategies are driven by other types of 
identity, knowledge, and networks” 
- New combinations are intersubjectively discovered to which 
stakeholders contribute those means that they possess which assist 
the process 
The Simplot Case 
(Real) 
(Sarasvathy & Dew, 
2008a) 
- An entrepreneur (Simplot) began by collecting hogs during a pork 
surplus and sold them when the surplus was over, making a profit. 
- Using the profit he buys a potato sorter and began sorting and 
storing potatoes for other farmers, making a profit and expanding 
his potato and onion business during the great depression. 
- In a chance encounter with an onion powder and flakes trader 
(Sokol), he agrees to process onion powder and flakes and Sokol 
becomes a customer. 
Starbucks  (Real) 
(Sarasvathy et al., 
2008) 
- An entrepreneur (Schultz) opens a coffee bar (Il Giornale) to pro-
vide authentic, high quality coffee 
- He listened to his customers and staff and makes a number of 
changes to please them while not compromising on certain as-
pects that he held to be important. 
- The original founders of Starbucks (which at the time only sold 
quality roasted coffee beans along with tea and spices) did not 
agree to form it into and Italian-style coffee bar business but did 
provide advice and seed capital to Schultz to start Il Giornale 
- Schultz approached 242 men and women for funding. 217 did not 
provide funding but did purchase equity. 
- In 1987 Schultz acquired Starbucks for US $4 million. 
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“MetalWorking” 
(Real and Empirical) 
(Kalinic et al., 2014) 
 
- An entrepreneur of an Italian machine producer (“MetalWork-
ing”) is introduced to a decades old Slovakian company by one of 
his managers. 
- He initiates a long term relationship with the company for semi-
manufactured products, replacing a number of small subcontrac-
tors. 
- The Slovakian company goes bankrupt and is acquired by Met-
alWorking. 
“AirPress” 
(Real and Empirical) 
(Kalinic et al., 2014) 
- An entrepreneur of a firm (AirPress) visits Serbia on a business 
mission organised by the Chamber of Commerce to find a poten-
tial distributor. 
- The entrepreneur meets a Bosnian seller of compressors with 
whom he soon establishes a joint venture. 
“Plastikona” 
(Real and Empirical) 
(Kalinic et al., 2014) 
- An Italian firm (Plastikona) establishes a green field operation in 
Serbia with the intent to produce there and sell abroad 
- The Serbian subsidiary gradually became more independent in its 
operations 
- Local firms began to contact the subsidiary, resulting in it acquir-
ing raw materials and selling locally 
- After four years, one of the subsidiary’s employees started his 
own firm in the same sector, which Plastikona supported by 
providing him with small presses. 
- Supporting the former employee’s firm enabled the entrepreneur 
to establish a local network of subcontractors 
Table 6 presents a broad range of different stakeholders, from other entrepre-
neurs, to friends and family, to customers and investors. How do they compare to 
the theoretical model for effectual stakeholder commitments postulated by the 
literature? To summarise, the following is the anatomy of a commitment, recon-
ceptualised to the perspective of a stakeholder: 
1) Effectual commitment forming process 
a) The stakeholder is either contacted by an effectual entrepreneur, comes in-
to contact with him or her in the process of everyday life, or meets him or 
her in a serendipitous encounter. 
b) The entrepreneur, driven by a generalised aspiration, imagines a possible 
future in which his or her means are combined with those of the potential 
stakeholder, benefiting both parties. 
c) The entrepreneur opens up a negotiation or series of negotiations with the 
potential stakeholder during which the details of a potential commitment 
are clarified. 
d) Upon conclusion of the negotiation process, the stakeholder ‘self-selects’ 
into a commitment with the entrepreneur, and the greater effectual net-
work, whereby the stakeholder will stake relevant means to the effectual 
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process in return for say in how the process shall proceed – thus sharing in 
the risk and reward of the venture. 
2) The commitment is guided by the effectual principles: 
a) It is means-driven, rather than goal oriented 
b) It is based on affordable loss, rather than expected return 
c) It leverages contingency and control, rather than prediction and avoidance 
Taking the above as the template, let us re-examine the examples described in 
Table 6, examples that are put forward explicitly as effectual commitments, or 
stakeholder commitments, by effectuation scholars. 
Examining the examples provided in Table 6, we can separate the types of 
stakeholders described into three broad categories: collaborators, investors, and 
customers. Of these three groups, the one that mostly resembles the archetypical 
‘effectual stakeholder’ are the collaborators. We have the RFID Industry case in 
Sarasvathy and Dew (2005a), with each of the stakeholders – the two research-
ers, Brock and Sarma, the P&G manager, Ashton, and the founder and honorary 
director of a standards organisation, Haberman – meeting at different points of 
time by virtue of common network affiliations. They all buy into a processes 
heading towards a generalised aspiration (i.e. the development of an ‘internet of 
things’) committing certain means (mostly their personal time and effort), and, 
from what is described, more or less following effectual principles rather than 
causal planning. The same can be seen in the relationship between the entrepre-
neur, Clark, and the software developer Andreessen in the case of Mosiac 
(Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b). Lastly, is the “AirPress” case, in which an interna-
tionalising entrepreneur forms a joint venture with a Bosnian seller after a chance 
encounter through a Chamber of Commerce event. In each of these cases, the 
actors involved ended up founding new firms together as partners. However, 
there are a number of stakeholders briefly mentioned in these cases whom do not 
fit to the typical effectual stakeholder mould while not necessarily being merely 
causal actors connected to the process at arm’s length – i.e. they likewise share a 
stake in the risk and return of the venture. 
In the RFID case, it is mentioned that Ashton and Haberman negotiate invest-
ments of $300,000 each from their respective organisations. This is clearly a 
commitment of vital means that inextricably ties the economic fate of these two 
organisations to that of the new venture, however, was the reasoning behind 
these commitments effectual in nature? I.e. what logic did the decision maker (or 
makers) who signed off on the investments base the decision on? Did they base 
the decision on the downside consideration of affordable loss, or did make calcu-
lations of expected return? Did they believe that they would be able to exert con-
trol over the new venture in order to respond to any contingencies, or was their 
expected role more passive in nature? Without knowing the details of the negoti-
ation, we cannot know for sure. Furthermore, in the Mosaic case, we have An-
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dreessen’s colleagues from the NCSA. What motivated their decision to commit 
to the new enterprise proposed by Andreessen and Clark (leaving their secure 
employment at the NCSA)? These stakeholders were also collaborators in the 
new venture created, but was their role an effectual one, or was it something 
else? 
A number of the examples mention customers. Sarasvathy’s “Curry in a Hur-
ry” (2001) example has an entrepreneur bringing food to her colleagues, with 
those colleagues becoming her first customers from whom she gathers important 
information on preferences that will guide her actions going forward. In the same 
article, Sarasvathy notes that in the case of U-Haul, early customers were offered 
discounts on trailer rentals in return for establishing rental agents at their loca-
tions. Sarasvathy & Dew (2008a) describe the case of Sokol, an onion flake deal-
er who agrees to purchase onion flakes from an entrepreneur named Simplot, and 
in the Starbucks case described by Sarasvathy et al. (2008), the founder of Star-
bucks, Schultz, makes many changes early on in the firm’s history by listening to 
the demands of customers. In each of these cases, these customers are indicated 
to be stakeholders important to the effectual process; however, they do not fit the 
conceptual mould of the effectual stakeholder. For instance, the initial customers 
of Curry in a Hurry are merely paying for a service which is rendered to them. 
Their relationship to the entrepreneur is a transactional one, and their commit-
ment amounts to no more than what they pay for the food they receive. Likewise 
is the case of the initial customers of the coffee bar, Il Giornale, which would 
eventually become Starbucks. Sarasvathy & Dew (2008a) argue, in their debate 
with Goel and Karri (2006), that the onion flake dealer Sokol’s willingness to 
wait for an absent supplier confirmed his commitment as a prospective customer 
to an entrepreneur, leading the entrepreneur to go into the onion flake business. 
However, it cannot be argued that Sokol’s commitment to buy onion flakes was 
one based on effectual logic. He was a man who had a specific goal, to acquire 
onion flakes, and was willing to pay market value for them. Similarly, in the 
cause of U-Haul, these customers were clearly teleological. They were willing to 
establish local rental agents in exchange for a discount on rentals. In all of these 
cases, the most effectual action on the part of the customer may be a calculation 
of affordable loss with respect to the time and energy they expend to be at a cer-
tain place at a certain time with the expectation they will receive a certain service 
promised to them by an entrepreneur, perhaps under a certain measure of uncer-
tainty. Beyond this, they are a lot more resembling of a causal, if not purely 
transactional form of stakeholder.  
Finally, we have investors mentioned in the examples. In the U-Haul case 
these are the friends and family members whom the entrepreneur convinces to 
make down payments on trucks, which he will then borrow; they are the 217 men 
and women who purchased equity in the coffee bar that would eventually be-
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come Starbucks; and they are the aforementioned anonymous individuals who 
signed off on the $300,000 investments on behalf of P&G and the UCC to estab-
lish the Auto ID Center. In none of these cases is it suggested that these investors 
subsequently took an active role in decision making for the new ventures to 
which they were committed. If their roles were more passive in nature, how then 
are the hands on effectual logics of control and contingency exploitation exer-
cised by these individuals? If they do not seek to actively drive the process 
through the voice bestowed upon them by their resource commitments, or if their 
voice is exercised through the commitment itself, by defining explicit goals as 
the basis for the investment made, does this not suggest more of a teleological, 
goal orientation on their part? 
Other stakeholders mentioned in the literature, but that do not fall into any of 
the three broad categories I mentioned above include the internal stakeholders, 
such as the employees of the Slovakian firm acquired by the Italian firm “Met-
alWorking”, or the former employee who’s new firm was supported by “Air-
Press” in the cases described by Kalinic et al. (2014), and aforementioned former 
employees of the NCSA who defected to the Mosaic Communications Corpora-
tion (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b). These stakeholders beg the question, can an 
employer/employee relationship be an effectual commitment? Can the decision 
to accept or remain in employment be based upon effectual reasoning? 
The purpose of this extended preamble to this chapter was not to try and de-
duce and categorise the entire range of potential stakeholders to effectual pro-
cesses from examples in the extant literature, nor was it a critique of the theoreti-
cal effectuation process itself. I am merely trying to show that not all, or even 
most, of the important stakeholder commitments that contribute to the process 
fall neatly into the effectual stakeholder commitment as described conceptually 
in the literature. What this indicates is that it is clear we need to develop a more 
nuanced model for understanding stakeholder commitments and what role they 
play in the effectuation process. 
4.2 Elements of a Commitment Decision 
While, thus far, most of the discussions concerning the stakeholder commitment 
decision only consider the entrepreneur’s point of view, in my discussion below I 
turn this around and reconceptualise the commitment decision, and related uncer-
tainties in the decision space, to the potential stakeholder’s perspective. As I will 
argue, an effectual stakeholder commitment is a form of entrepreneurial action, 
action taken under uncertainty in relation to the prospect of future profit 
(McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). It is also a form of social action. Social action is 
defined by (Weber, 1978) as follows: 
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Social action, which includes both failure to act and passive acquiescence, may, be 
oriented to the past, present, or expected future behavior of others. …The "others" may 
be individual persons, and may be known to the actor as such, or may constitute an in-
definite plurality and may be entirely unknown as individuals. …The economic activity 
of an individual is social only if it takes account of the behavior of someone else. Thus 
very generally it becomes social insofar as the actor assumes that others will respect his 
actual control over economic goods. Concretely it is social, for instance, if in relation to 
the actor's own consumption the future wants of others are taken into account and this 
becomes one consideration affecting the actor's own saving. Or, in another connexion, 
production may be oriented to the future wants of other people (Weber, 1978, p. 22). 
Therefore, to know why any one of the myriad of potential stakeholders to effec-
tuation processes might chose to make a commitment, how such commitments 
are secured by the effectually rational entrepreneur, and what the implications are 
for the effectuation process of each type of commitment, we must consider three 
things. Firstly, we must consider how they perceive uncertainty in their decision 
space regarding a potential commitment; secondly, we must consider the reason-
ing that guides their decision as a form of social action (i.e. it must be understood 
within the actor’s social situation); and, finally, we must understand their motiva-
tion for ultimately making a commitment. If we are to understand these three el-
ements, we will be able to predict why a stakeholder would make such a com-
mitment, how a stakeholder would make such a commitment, and what kind of 
behaviour to expect from stakeholder in relation to other members of the network 
and the process going forward.  
In the following sections, I examine each of these three elements of a potential 
stakeholder commitment in turn. From my analysis, I seek to derive a typology 
which will be useful for classifying different stakeholder commitments in a 
meaningful way.  
4.2.1 Uncertainty perceived in the commitment decision space 
Uncertainty is in the eye of the beholder and how it is perceived depends on the 
individual doing the perceiving, i.e. it is comprised of both subjective, objective, 
and, as I will argue below, intersubjective elements. Effectuation is a model for 
how entrepreneurs make decisions when facing uncertainty and, as such, it falls 
under the description of being a model for entrepreneurial action. Entrepreneuri-
al action is defined by McMullen and Shepherd (2006, p. 134) as “behavior in 
response to a judgmental decision under uncertainty about a possible opportunity 
for profit”. As discussed in detail in the preceding chapter, new market creation 
through effectuation is dependent on stakeholders providing the necessary re-
sources and direction for the process to proceed through what is called ‘effectual 
commitments’ (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b); these are commitments made by 
stakeholders which enable them share in the potentially lucrative rewards of the 
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process but, at the same time, also taking on the burden of risk should the process 
turn out unfavourable. This is what separates ‘effectual stakeholders’ from those 
stakeholders who are only connected to the process through arm’s length transac-
tions. What this essentially means is that effectual stakeholders are also taking 
entrepreneurial action when they choose to make such commitments. They are 
making a judgement, under uncertainty, that there is a possible opportunity for 
profit (although profit may not be the primary motivating factor behind the deci-
sion – as I shall discuss below). While they are not necessarily entrepreneurs 
themselves, they must have made the decision that the focal effectuation process 
that they chose to commit to represents a real opportunity for them in some shape 
or form.  
For a potential stakeholder, a commitment decision represents an entrepre-
neurial opportunity. Whether the opportunity presented is one to be recognized, 
discovered, or created by the potential stakeholder9 depends on the individual and 
the knowledge and resources that are available to them. Whether they perceive 
the potential opportunity as one they can create, or one that objectively exists 
waiting to be recognized or discovered, will depend on their own unique ration-
ales and motivations10. This will also influence the logic by which they make the 
decision, whether it be predictively rational (causal), non-predictively rational 
(effectual), or perhaps the commitment decision is not rational at all (at least not 
instrumentally so, as we discuss in the following section). 
Just as effectual entrepreneurs face Knightian uncertainty, Marchian goal am-
biguity and, environmental isotropy in their entrepreneurial design space or the 
market creation design space (as I have discussed in chapter 3.2), potential stake-
holders face much the same uncertainties in their decision on whether or not to 
make the transition from being simply at arm’s length, to committing to a more 
effectual relationship with the entrepreneur and the existing committed stake-
holders, albeit from a different frame of reference. This could be considered the 
potential stakeholder’s commitment decision space. 
                                                 
9 See Sarasvathy, Dew, Velamuri and Venkataraman (2010) for a simple typology of entrepreneurial 
opportunity. 
10 In a forthcoming dialogue in the Academy of Management Review, Foss and Klein (2017, p. 735) in a 
critique of the delineation of entrepreneurial opportunity in the extant literature into separate phases of 
discovery evaluation, and exploitation, argue that: “Rather, “opportunity” is a metaphor, a shorthand for 
the entrepreneur’s beliefs, or judgments, about the uncertain future.” They make the argument that “op-
portunity” is not a useful construct when it judged independently of the entrepreneur’s beliefs and actions 
and, instead, suggest that entrepreneurial phenomena are sufficiently explained by analysing entrepre-
neur’s beliefs, actions, results, and adjustments. I agree with Foss and Klein, but go one step further and 
argue that it is not only the beliefs, actions, results, and adjustments of entrepreneurs that deserve atten-
tion, but those of all stakeholders in the entrepreneurial value creation process. 
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Figure 12 Uncertainty, ambiguity, and equivocality in the commitment 
decision space 
Figure 12 combines the type of uncertainty of the market creation design space 
with notable typologies of uncertainty by Knight (1921) and Milliken (1987) and 
the concept of equivocality from Weick (1979). Milliken (1987) separates uncer-
tainty into state, effect, and response uncertainty. State uncertainty is the recogni-
tion that the environment is unpredictable; effect uncertainty is the recognition 
that there is an inability to predict what kinds of impact the future environment or 
environmental change will have, and; response uncertainty is a lack of knowled-
ge of what to do, or what the consequences of action will be (Milliken, 1987, p. 
137). Although different authors use words such as uncertainty, ambiguity, and 
equivocality in different, sometimes contradictory ways11, for the sake of this 
discussion, I define them simply as follows: uncertainty relates to things we do 
not know, ambiguity relates to what we cannot decide (i.e. there is more than one 
possible course of action between which we cannot chose one or the other), and 
equivocality relates to raw information we perceive but to which we have not yet 
had the opportunity to assign meaning, in the manner of Weick (1979). 
Included under uncertainties are: Knightian, or true uncertainty, where both 
state and effect of any given situation, event, or environment is fundamentally 
unknowable; normal uncertainty, where both the state and effect of any given 
situation are unknowable, but ultimately discoverable; and risk, in which one the 
state of a situation is known, but it is effect is not (Knight, 1921; Milliken, 1987). 
Uncertainty, in the above framework, feeds into ambiguity in that a response to 
                                                 
11 For instance Bennett and Lemoine (2014) define ambiguity as “unknown unknowns”, or what is here 
referred to as Knightian uncertainty 
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an uncertain situation may be ambiguous for two reasons – first, the decision 
maker does not know how to respond to the situation (Milliken’s response uncer-
tainty) and, second, the decision maker does not know how he or she wants to 
respond to an uncertain situation, or what outcome he or she would prefer (Mar-
chian goal ambiguity). While Uncertainty in this framework is objective – it ex-
ists apart from the decision maker, ambiguity is subjective (it purely constructed 
by the decision maker’s own mind). Isotropy, or “the fact that in decisions and 
actions involving uncertain future consequences it is not always clear ex ante 
which pieces of information are worth paying attention to and which not” 
(Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b, p. 539), on the other hand, is both objective and sub-
jective – the determination of whether or not a piece of information is worth pay-
ing attention to is determined both by what one does not objectively know, and 
what one cannot subjectively decide. Finally, there is equivocality. Equivocality, 
in the Weickian sense, is intersubjective (i.e. it is produced through the interac-
tions between people), raw information is only assigned meaning through sense-
making discourse between actors, or as Weick (1979, p. 133) states: “How can I 
know what I think until I see what I say?” 
To sum up uncertainty and ambiguity in the commitment decision space, when 
a stakeholder is faced with the choice to commit, or not to commit to an effectual 
process, he or she has a number of things to consider. McMullen and Shepherd 
(2006, p. 135) simplify Milliken’s three types of uncertainty to questions a poten-
tial actor asks him or herself with regard to his or her relationship to the envi-
ronment, questions which are very applicable to a potential effectual stakeholder 
when deliberating the commitment decision: (1) What’s happening out there? 
(State uncertainty), (2) How will it impact me? (Effect uncertainty), and (3) what 
am I going to do about it? (Response uncertainty). These are the questions that a 
potential stakeholder likely considers, whether consciously or subconsciously, 
when making a decision on whether or not to make a commitment to an effectual 
network. We must remember that how he or she responds, or what he or she de-
cides, according to effectuation theory, begins as a function of his or her identity, 
knowledge, and networks (Wiltbank et al., 2006). One stakeholder might experi-
ence very few uncertainties regarding a commitment because of specific insight 
and knowledge or ‘What I know’. Another may have very clear goals that he or 
she wishes to fulfil through a commitment due to ‘Who I am’. Another, still, may 
make a commitment by virtue of being part of a network inexorably caught up in 
the effectual process, or ‘Who I know’. Uncertainties and ambiguities (i.e. re-
sponse uncertainties) will be experienced by different stakeholders to different 
extents, and different stakeholders will also have different tolerances or ‘willing-
ness to bear’ uncertainties (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006).  The next step of the 
effectuation process is to ask one’s self “what can I do?” The answer to this ques-
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tion will be a determined by both the stakeholder’s reasoning, and motivation – 
which is what I shall discuss next. 
4.2.2 Reasoning that guides stakeholder decisions 
In the previous section I discussed how a stakeholder, when faced with the deci-
sion on whether or not to make a commitment to an effectual process underway, 
will be faced with a range of uncertainties and ambiguity. However, how that 
stakeholder will perceive those uncertainties, their form and intensity, and how 
he or she will respond will be determined through the stakeholder’s internal rea-
soning strategy – which, in turn, is guided by that stakeholder’s rational orienta-
tion. Entrepreneurship literature has discussed different forms of rationality at 
length, from the utility maximising conceptions of rationality of classical eco-
nomics, the satisficing of bounded rationality of Simon (1955), the post-hoc ra-
tionalisation of sense-making described by Weick (1979), to the non-teleological 
creative rationality of effectuation (see a brief review of rationality as it applies 
to entrepreneurial decision-making in Sarasvathy & Berglund [2010]). Notwith-
standing this, however, for the sake of parsimony, and for the purpose of defining 
a categorisation of rational orientation useful for understanding stakeholder 
commitments, I will draw from the classical works of Schumpeter and Weber. In 
these works, rational orientation, as I will argue presently, will either be instru-
mental in nature, measured through cold, dispassionate logic; will reflect the 
stakeholder’s personal values, his or her subjective sense of what is right and de-
sirable; or, more likely, will be some combination of both instrumentality and 
values. 
As was discussed in Chapter 3.3, Sarasvathy et al. (2008) explain that effectu-
ation is "neither 'rational' in the traditional sense nor a 'deviation from rational 
behaviour". This is because effectual reasoning can simply be understood as the 
reasoning a rational actor employs when the environment inhibits the use or utili-
ty of causal rationality. Rationality, in the sense of causation, refers to what 
Schumpeter distinguishes as formal rationality: “Formal rationality applies, if 
costs and benefits can be calculated accurately; a means-end relationship” 
(Brouwer, 2002, p. 91). Non-teleological effectual reasoning substitutes for caus-
al rationality in cases in which uncertainty prevents costs and benefits from being 
calculated reliably – i.e. situations where telos cannot be rationally ascertained. 
However, by classifying commitment decisions as being either causal or effectu-
al, we fall into the trap of unrealistically characterising these acts; as Weber dis-
cusses: “The ideal types of social action which for instance are used in economic 
theory are thus unrealistic or abstract in that they always ask what course of ac-
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tion would take place if it were purely rational and oriented to economic ends 
alone” (Weber, 1978, p. 21). 
When we discuss rational orientation and its relationship to action, we cannot 
assume that all action will be based on causal or effectual rationality. To help in 
this exposition, I will turn to a classic classification of types of social action and 
their guiding rationales described by Weber (1978). Both causal and effectual 
rationality can also be described as forms of instrumental rationality, which 
forms the first of four types of rational orientation in social action described by 
Weber (1978, p. 24): 
1. instrumentally rational (zweckrational), that is, determined by expecta-
tions as to the behavior of objects in the environment and of other hu-
man beings; these expectations are used as "conditions" or "means" for 
the attainment of the actor's own rationally pursued and calculated 
ends[.] 
In a discussion on potential stakeholders to effectuation processes, on the other 
hand, it is often stated that stakeholders can be anyone. They can be individuals 
possessing varying degrees of business acumen, and they can be driven by any 
number of motivations and ideologies. Therefore, the assumption of instrumental 
rationality being exercised in the commitment decision is not a given. In that 
case, we must consider the other types of rationality as described by Weber 
(1978, pp. 24–25): 
2. value-rational (wertrational), that is, determined by a conscious belief in the 
value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of 
behavior, independently of its prospects of success;  
3. affectual (especially emotional), that is, determined by the actor's specific af-
fects and feeling states;  
4. traditional, that is, determined by ingrained habituation. 
Types 3 and 4, according to Weber, are generally unconscious or uncontrolled 
responses; traditional behaviour often being an automatic response to routine ex-
periences, while affectual behaviour may be an uncontrolled emotional response 
to some event. Both traditional and affectual behaviour, as they become more 
self-conscious, are not readily separable from value-rational behaviour, as the 
main distinguishing factor of value-rational action being that it is more self-
conscious in its formulation. As such, consciously traditional, affectual, and val-
ue-rational behaviour all fall under what Schumpeter refers to as subjective ra-
tionality: “Subjective rationality refers to the achievement of absolute values ir-
respective of costs” (Brouwer, 2002, p. 91).  
If we are to assume that stakeholders to effectuation process can be anyone, 
not just those seeking material gain (or even success), we must consider not only 
instrumentally rational reasoning, but value and affectual reasoning, or subjective 
rationality, as well. That is to say, while decision making can be either goal ori-
101 
ented or means oriented, with causal logic being the instrumentally rational deci-
sion making strategy for the former, and effectual logic being the instrumentally 
rational decision making strategy for the latter, there may be scenarios in which 
means oriented or goal oriented logics are employed by stakeholders in their re-
source commitments that do not fall within the bounds of what would be consid-
ered ‘rational behaviour’, but rather fall into the bounds of subjective rationality.  
Sarasvathy and Dew’s (2005b) thought experiment regarding stakeholder 
commitments clearly illustrates how a commitment may look, and differ, accord-
ing to whether or not the actor making the commitment has a more causal or 
more effectual orientation. Simply put, a causal actor will make a commitment 
where the expected return of the commitment can be calculated, estimated, or 
predicted within bounds of that actor’s risk tolerance. This means that a com-
mitment is only likely if the commitment decision space is one of normal uncer-
tainty or risk, and that ambiguity is low. On the other hand, an effectual actor 
will make a commitment based on the understanding that, even though the goals 
at this point in time are not necessarily well defined, it will allow him or her to 
become a member of a creative process that he or she will be able to exert some 
control over in order to shape a desirable future. This allows for a commitment 
being made in the face of true or Knightian uncertainty, and where ambiguity is 
something useful rather than being something to be avoided. This all brings me 
to the question of commitment decisions under subjective rationality, as defined 
above as rationality that does not account for any calculation of costs, affordable 
or otherwise, and a commitment taken irrespective of its prospect for success. 
Firstly, can such commitments be imagined? And, secondly, can such commit-
ments, like those under instrumental rationality, be either teleological, emphasis-
ing ends, or non-teleological, emphasising means? 
In Figure 13, below, I introduce two new types of reasoning in addition to 
causal and effectual reasoning which I have labelled faith reasoning and self-
belief reasoning, to postulate what commitments may look like if they are made 
under teleological and non-teleological subjective rationality. As suggested by 
this naming, faith reasoning refers to the logic of a subjectively rational actor 
who puts their faith in some external ends, irrespective of the cost or likelihood 
of success, because those ends are somehow right in themselves, while self-belief 
reasoning refers to the logic of a subjectively rational actor who has an innate 
belief in their means (embodied within the actor) and is, again, willing to act on 
this basis irrespective of the cost or likelihood of success. 
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Figure 13 Four categories of reasoning guiding a commitment decision to an 
effectual network 
To explicate further on why any potential stakeholder might use any one of the 
four reasoning types illustrated in Figure 13, I will turn my attention to their mo-
tivation for making a commitment. 
4.2.3 On motivation 
The extant effectuation literature does not explore the motivations behind stake-
holder commitments in any particular depth; in fact, the core effectuation theo-
rists argue that attempting to understand motivations is both impractical and not 
useful. Returning to Sarasvathy and Dew (2005b, p. 557): 
Both the volume of theorizing and the weight of empirical evidence suggest that it 
might be fruitful to move away from strong behavioral assumptions of either opportun-
ism or trust-based ties toward a more realistic starting point – namely, that in most cases 
at the beginning of the formation of a network, actors simply cannot predict the motives 
of those they interact with nor can they always predict their own motivations. That is 
why it makes sense for effectuators to rely on actual commitments rather than on predic-
tions based on past behavior, or promises endorsed by third parties. 
So, while it may not be important for the entrepreneur to predict the motivations 
of the world of potential stakeholders that may be out there, as all that matters 
are those who make actual commitments, I would argue that to understand why 
























how future commitments might be made, but also elucidate how the present 
commitment may affect the intersubjective network behaviour going forwards – 
i.e. the new goals the commitment brings, as well as the new restraints. Take, for 
example, the effectual commitment described in Sarasvathy and Dew’s thought 
experiment (which I discussed in section 3.5.1) – the entrepreneur would have 
needed at least a slight understanding of the customer’s preferences in order to 
negotiate the win-win effectual commitment. Going forwards, the customer and 
the entrepreneur have committed to working together to create a collectively im-
agined future, but what does that mean for the other, previous commitments that 
the entrepreneur may have made that form the effectual network? 
We can only answer why a potential stakeholder might make a commitment to 
an effectuation process, and what effect such a commitment will have, by explor-
ing the stakeholder’s individual motivation for making the commitment in the 
first place. While, certainly, we cannot possibly account for every motivation a 
stakeholder might have for agreeing to a commitment negotiated by an effectual 
entrepreneur, it may be possible, at least, to categorise motivations in a general, 
theoretical way that will be useful to us. While in practice motivations for mak-
ing commitments will be innumerable, a large body of research in psychology 
broadly classifies motivation as being either intrinsic or extrinsic: “The most 
basic distinction is between intrinsic motivation, which refers to doing something 
because it is inherently interesting or enjoyable, and extrinsic motivation, which 
refers to doing something because it leads to a separable outcome” (Ryan & 
Deci, 2000a, p. 55). While, in organizational science, these definitions are usual-
ly applied to situations involving employee tasks and rewards within firms 
(Amabile, 1993, 1997), a situation which is not completely analogous to a stake-
holder making a commitment, they still lend some explanatory power for helping 
us understand the commitment decisions. If a potential stakeholder is extrinsic in 
their motivation to make a commitment to an effectuation process, it means they 
are basing their decision on some perceived outcome which is separable from the 
process itself. On the other hand, if a potential stakeholder is intrinsic in their 
motivation to commit to the effectuation process, it is because being part of the 
effectuation process is the very reason for making the commitment. 
If we take commitment decisions to be either intrinsic or extrinsic, these types 
of commitment are likely to look vastly different from one another, both in per-
formance and in outcome. Intrinsic motivation is strongly linked to ‘practiced 
creativity’ and innovation while extrinsic motivation has been shown to have the 
opposite effect (Amabile, 1993, 1997; Sternberg, 1999). Furthermore, recent em-
pirical research has shown that effectual logic positively impacts practiced crea-
tivity while causal logic inhibits it (Blauth et al., 2014). As such, it can be as-
sumed that extrinsically motivated commitments will likely be more arms-length 
and material in nature, with a stakeholder merely making a commitment towards 
104 
a particular outcome – being involved in the effectuation process only as much as 
necessary so as to attain that desired outcome. Due to the inherent ends orienta-
tion of an extrinsically motivated stakeholder, it is more likely they will either 
follow causal reasoning (e.g. a representative of an established firm commission-
ing an effectual entrepreneur to solve some problem for them) or faith reasoning 
(e.g. a philanthropic individual who provides funds to an effectual entrepreneur 
who is trying to establish a business that addresses some societal need). An in-
trinsically motivated commitment will be much more active, with the stakehold-
er’s whole purpose being to actively involve him or herself in the creative effec-
tuation process. Intrinsically motivated stakeholders will be more means oriented 
and, as such, will be more likely to follow effectual reasoning, self-belief reason-
ing, or some combination of the two.  
4.3 The Typology 
From the review of the extant effectuation literature and my discussion above, we 
now have the building blocks from which we can build a predictive model of the 
different types of stakeholder commitment that will prevail under different cir-
cumstances depending on the amount of uncertainty the stakeholder perceives in 
the commitment decision space and their underlying motivation for making the 
commitment. This model I have illustrated in Figure 14, on the following page. It 
is unlikely that pure effectuation and pure causation exist in reality; human action 
will always be coloured by subjective values, affect, and other non-economic 
rationales.  In the model illustrated in Figure 14, I propose that, while an actor 
may simultaneously hold all four forms of reasoning I described in section 4.2.2 
to varying degrees at any one time, commitments based on instrumental rationali-
ty will follow predominantly more causal logic the lower the uncertainty the 
stakeholder perceives in relation to the commitment decision space, and predom-
inantly more effectual logic the greater the level of uncertainty they perceive in 
relation to the commitment decision space. However, in some circumstances, the 
strength of a particular stakeholder’s motivations, either extrinsic or intrinsic, 
may push them to make a commitment to an effectuation process that is less in-
strumentally rational, and more subjectively rational; they may make a commit-
ment based on their faith in an imagined but uncertain future coming to be or in 
the character and abilities of others who are already part of the process, or they 
may make a commitment based on the self-belief that they can influence a pro-




Figure 14 Four types of commitment decision to an effectual network 
Below, I explicate these different types of commitment. I briefly compare each 
type to different conceptualizations of entrepreneurship and opportunity from the 
literature to describe their underlying motivation; I identify the committing ac-
tor’s perception of uncertainty; and I discuss the form of reasoning denoted by 
each type of commitment. 
4.4 Commitment Decisions Based on Instrumental Rationality 
Commitment decisions predominantly based on instrumental rationality are dis-
tinguished from those based on subjective rationality by the fact that they are 
primarily economically motivated and involve some form of calculation on the 
part of the decision maker. It has been thoroughly established by effectuation 
literature that effectual logic is suited to situations characterised by true uncer-
tainty and ambiguity, while causal logic is better suited to situations of normal 
uncertainty or risk. Given an instrumentally rational actor, whether a commit-
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egies or effectual decision making strategies will be dependent on the level of 
uncertainty perceived by the stakeholder in relation to their commitment decision 
space. Where uncertainty is low and calculation of risk and return is possible, an 
instrumentally rational actor will emphasise causal decision making reasoning, 
while high uncertainty dictates that effectual decision making reasoning will take 
over where their causal logic falls short, and calculation will turn to the downside 
potential with commitment relying on the potential loss being affordable. Under 
moderate uncertainty, some combination of the two decision making strategies is 
required i.e. prediction where prediction is possible, control and contingency ex-
ploitation where it is not. 
4.4.1 Type 1: Causal commitments 
A causal commitment to an effectuation process is simply one made by a stake-
holder who sees the commitment as being the key to achieving some future end 
or goal, and this end or goal has been rationally calculated. In other words, the 
commitment is teleological. From an opportunity perspective, in this type of 
stakeholder’s perception, a commitment to the effectual network represents op-
portunity recognition or discovery in the Kirznerian sense (Kirzner, 1997; 
Sarasvathy et al., 2010). As I previously noted, under opportunity recognition 
markets are allocative and to recognise an opportunity is simply a matter of 
matching known supply to known demand. In such a case, the potential stake-
holder, due to his or her ‘alertness’ (Kirzner, 1973, 1997), is in possession of, or 
believes him or herself to be in possession of some known supply or some known 
demand, and for them the effectuation process to which they make the commit-
ment represents the novel resource combination which will be the conduit 
through which they will satisfy that supply or demand – this is the goal or telos 
of the commitment. 
A simple example of a commitment to an effectual process based upon causal 
logic would be one where the emerging artefact is some kind of technology that 
could potentially be merged, without much alteration, with a stakeholder’s exist-
ing product or products which would result in financial gain – either increased 
profits or reduced costs. In such a case, with the artefact in its present state, and 
within the stakeholder’s means and capabilities, it may be possible to make ade-
quate calculations of expected returns and to conduct competitive analysis within 
a decision space characterised by normal uncertainty and risk, and with little am-
biguity. The commitment, in the form of an equity investment, still represents 
one to share in the risk and return of the venture, however, it is clearly teleologi-
cal. This may offer a suggestion as to why the unnamed decision maker or deci-
sion makers within P&G signed off on the commitment of $300,000 to found the 
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Auto ID Center in the RFID industry case described by Sarasvathy and Dew 
(2005a). While $300,000 is not a lot of money for a large corporation such as 
P&G, and a calculation of affordable loss may have registered strongly in the 
commitment decision, the decision may have still been predominantly causal in 
nature, based on the calculations of how much could be saved by utilising the 
emerging technology. According to a Forbes article from 2002 discussing the 
benefits of RFID technology: 
The benefits to manufacturers include far fewer wasteful inventory glitches; to retail-
ers, lower losses to shoplifters. Procter & Gamble’s goal is to use the intelligence pro-
vided by the tags to cut its inventory by 40%, some $1.5 billion. P&G’s preliminary 
analysis is that they could lop 4 cents off the dollar per transaction (Schoenberger & 
Upbin, 2002).  
While this article was written three years after the founding of the Auto ID Cen-
ter, it is not hard to imagine that similar calculations would have been made in 
the decision to commit the initial $300,000. 
Returning to McMullen and Shepherd’s (2006) three questions concerning 
state, effect, and response uncertainty I introduced in Section 4.2.1, the answers 
this particular category of stakeholders are likely to give are along the lines of: 
1. What’s happening out there? The decision space surrounding my poten-
tial commitment is relatively unambiguous and predictable. 
2. How will it impact me? If things go as I predict, my commitment will 
result in an increase in utility or a decrease in disutility for myself or 
my firm. 
3. What am I going to do about it? I shall make a commitment based on 
my assessment of calculated risk and expected return. 
A stakeholder who makes a causal commitment will, in the commitment, be em-
phasizing the causal reasoning constructs of goal focus, calculation of expected 
returns, reliance on preexisting knowledge, and the use of prediction.  Where 
there is more uncertainty in the commitment decision space than warrants causal 
logic, the stakeholder may need to emphasize more of the effectual constructs to 
protect him or herself from potential downside effects; for example, where the 
future is not as readily predictable, the stakeholder may need to emphasize more 
affordable loss and control logic – thus making their overall rationale increasing-
ly more effectual. However, a predominantly causal commitment requires, at a 
minimum, the stakeholder to emphasise a goal focus. 
Proposition 1: Given a commitment decision space that, when judged through 
the lens of instrumental rationality, would be deemed to be characterised by nor-
mal uncertainty and risk – if a commitment is made by an instrumentally rational 
stakeholder with a teleological orientation, it will be based upon causal reason-
ing. 
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4.4.2 Type 2: Effectual commitments 
In this second scenario, a stakeholder is presented with the opportunity to make a 
commitment to an effectual process, but his or her commitment decision space, 
how his or her means might contribute to the process in a profitable way, is per-
ceived to be characterised by Knightian uncertainty and ambiguity. Reiterating 
effectuation theory, in such situations causal reasoning is not useful. Instead, the 
stakeholder might choose to make a commitment based upon effectual reasoning. 
This stakeholder may still have particular goals or aspirations in mind when mak-
ing the commitment, but the probabilities and outcomes of the commitment are 
not guaranteed, and are not predictable. Instead, the stakeholder commits means 
on the basis that, by doing so, he or she will become part of the process as a part-
ner and co-creator, and will be able to exert his or her control and preferences 
over it in a way that will ultimately, but not predictably, result in some benefit in 
the form of increased profit, or reduced costs.  
With regard to opportunity, such a stakeholder resembles a Schumpeterian en-
trepreneur, who views opportunities as something that can be created as the 
product of an individual’s intellect (Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Chandler et al., 
2003; Sarasvathy et al., 2010). This stakeholder will engage with the effectual 
network to produce novel and unexpected resource combinations (Schumpeter, 
1934). A clear example of this kind of commitment is the one described by Sar-
asvathy and Dew (2005b) that was formed between the entrepreneur Clarke and 
the software designer Andreessen who would go on to found the Mosaic Com-
munications Corporation. 
Stakeholders committing to an effectual process using this reasoning would 
answer McMullen and Shepherd’s (2006) questions as follows: 
1. What’s happening out there? It is not clear how I might combine my 
means with those of others through a commitment, but I can imagine 
different ways in which mutually beneficial combinations might be 
possible. 
2. How will it impact me? Although I cannot accurately predict what will 
happen following my commitment I am confident in my ability to con-
trol the future situation through my preferences in a way that will ulti-
mately increase my utility or decrease my disutility. 
3. What am I going to do about it? I will commit based on the understand-
ing that by doing so I buy into a process that will allow me to use my 
identity, knowledge, and networks to successfully control the future in 
a way that will benefit me. 
An effectual commitment is one in which a stakeholder chooses to make a pre-
commitment to an effectual network despite a high level of perceived uncertainty 
in the commitment decision space. These individuals are willing to bear the risks 
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associated with the uncertainty because they are able to rely on their effectual 
reasoning (an emphasis on the effectual decision making constructs over causal 
ones) to be able to mitigate them. The greater the uncertainty a stakeholder per-
ceives, the more effectual decision making constructs they will promote over 
causal ones in order to limit the potential harm that may be caused by unexpected 
and unknown consequences resulting from their decision to commit. Effectual 
logic fills the gaps created by an absence of workable information that prevents 
the ability to make rational decisions based upon causal logic. 
Proposition 2: Given a commitment decision space that, when judged through 
the lens of instrumental rationality, would be deemed to be characterised by true 
uncertainty and ambiguity – if a commitment is made by an instrumentally ra-
tional stakeholder with a non-teleological orientation, it will be based upon effec-
tual reasoning. 
4.5 Commitment Decisions based on Subjective Rationality 
The commitments undertaken under instrumental rationality described in the pre-
vious section are nothing new or controversial. They are to be expected based on 
what we know from effectuation theory. Unlike these kinds of commitments, 
however, commitments under subjective rationality are not motivated by the like-
lihood for, or pursuit of success, but are instead based upon the pursuit of subjec-
tive values irrespective of cost. That is not to say that a commitment cannot be 
both instrumentally rational and subjectively rational in equal measure. I can im-
agine, for instance, that an individual could make a causally or effectually ration-
al commitment to a venture based on the belief that that venture has some greater 
value over and above mere economic value. There are plenty of examples of 
wealthy entrepreneurs committing to philanthropic pursuits. Where instrumental 
rationality and subjective rationality begin to diverge in commitment decisions, 
however, concerns how much emphasis the individual places on uncertainty and 
ambiguity in the commitment decision space, and the decision maker’s view of 
telos. Returning to Figure 14, what happens if we try to imagine a teleological 
commitment made under true uncertainty? How can you make an ends-oriented 
commitment when ends are impossible to predict? In such a case, action under 
instrumental rationality is impossible. On the other hand, non-teleological effec-
tual commitments only make instrumentally rational sense where there is ambi-
guity about how the process is unfolding. If we imagine there is a mature process 
which has already produced a tangible artefact and is now proceeding down a 
course of strong path dependence, how would a stakeholder make a commitment 
that ignores the clear and present telos? The answers to these questions lie in sub-
jective rationality. 
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There is a growing body of empirical research showing that the stakeholders to 
entrepreneurial and opportunity creating processes are not always instrumentally 
rational in their decision-making; affect/emotion can play an important role in 
entrepreneurial action (Baron, 2008; Cardon, Foo, Shepherd, & Wiklund, 2012; 
Cardon, Wincent, Singh, & Drnovsek, 2009; Foo, Uy, & Baron, 2009; Welpe, 
Spörrle, Grichnik, Michl, & Audretsch, 2012). It is not unimaginable that com-
mitments by stakeholders to effectuation processes may sometimes be based up-
on subjectively rational criteria to a greater or lesser extent. If this was not the 
case, we would not have the old cliché of entrepreneurs seeking investment from 
the ‘Three Fs’, friends, family, and fools, all of whom are likely be the sort of 
stakeholders who would make subjectively rational commitments. Subjectively 
rational commitment decisions may include gambling, overconfidence, familial 
trust, gut feeling, etc. Strong extrinsic motivation may lead to an individual pre-
dicting (or hoping for) a future that is far from predictable; or strong intrinsic 
motivation may lead an individual to think that a commitment represents an op-
portunity for them to achieve creative self-actualisation, despite strong path de-
pendence belying the fact. 
4.5.1 Type 3: Faith based commitments 
These are the commitments made by stakeholders who do not wish to take an 
active role in the opportunity creation process any more than contributing re-
sources or goals that the process requires; i.e. they exercise the more passive (fol-
lowing commitment), predictive, ends-oriented reasoning strategies based upon a 
strong extrinsic motivation – they have a strong belief in, and desire for an out-
come separable from the process itself. However, unlike instrumentally rational 
stakeholders, they do so in a commitment decision space where they perceive (or, 
should I say, an instrumentally rational actor would perceive) a high level of un-
certainty that does not rationally justify the use or utility of causal logic. Instead, 
they are acting on faith that the venture will be successful or that commitment is 
somehow ‘right’ on an ideological level. A strong extrinsic motivation drives the 
decision maker to make a commitment while ignoring uncertainty or the necessi-
ty for any sort of logical calculation. Reasons for such commitments may be that 
the stakeholder has some form of close relationship with the entrepreneur (such 
as family members or romantic partners) and may believe, or wish, that he or she 
will be successful; they may be inspired by what the venture represents (in the 
case that it is addressing a perceived social need); they may have a tendency to 
gamble and anticipate lucrative returns based on some kind of gut instinct. Baron 
(2008) discusses the role of affect in acquiring such financial and human re-
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sources for new ventures and the role of an entrepreneur’s capacity to inspire 
such contributions through persuasiveness.  
A number of the examples from the literature provided at the beginning of this 
chapter resemble this kind of faith based commitment. In the U-Haul case from 
Sarasvathy (2001) there is the wife’s family committing the use of the family 
ranch, as well as the friends and family who made the down payments on the 
trucks that were then lent to the entrepreneur, Shoen, so that he could grow his 
venture. These commitments were to the individuals, the entrepreneur and his 
wife, rather than the process. These commitments were likely to have been made 
based upon a certain type of self-determined extrinsic motivation, what Ryan and 
Deci call regulation through identification: “Identification reflects a conscious 
valuing of a behavioral goal or regulation, such that the action is accepted or 
owned as personally important” (Ryan & Deci, 2000b, p. 72). In other words, the 
end to which the stakeholders were making the commitment was to support their 
family member’s venture as it was important for them to do so. In the Starbucks 
case from Sarasvathy et al. (2008) there were the 217 investors who purchased 
equity in Il Giornale. While we can imagine there was a certain element of af-
fordable loss involved in the decision, it is unlikely that there would have been a 
more effectual reasoning used for the commitment to a process that they would 
have been fairly removed from in terms of control. Instead, they may have been 
inspired by Schultz the entrepreneur himself, especially if he came across as a 
‘Charismatic Leader’ (Brouwer, 2002), or they may have had confidence (or 
overconfidence [Baron, 2000; Griffin & Varey, 1996]) in the concept of the cof-
fee bar, or simply based their investment on an uncalculated gamble that it would 
make them wealthy. 
Such stakeholders would answer the following questions like so: 
1. What’s happening out there? I do not have clear knowledge of, or under-
stand well, the circumstances under which I will make a commitment.  
2. How will it impact me? I do not know if my commitment will result in 
any material gain for myself.  
3. What am I going to do about it? I shall make a commitment based upon 
my faith in the individual, venture, cause, or outcome that I am supporting 
as this is acceptable to me regardless of the chances of success and/or on 
an ideological level. 
While the basic causally rational impetus of goal focus remains intact (i.e. the 
commitment is teleological in nature), for faith-based commitments to be made, 
this implies the stakeholder is acting upon reasoning strategies based on subjec-
tive rationality that supersede the causal decision making constructs. Such non-
rational cognitive and behavioural constructs identified in the literature include, 
but are unlikely to be limited to: predictive ‘overconfidence’ (Baron, 2000; 
Griffin & Varey, 1996); various forms of trust, from the moderately subjectively 
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rational ‘over-trust’ (Goel, Bell, & Pierce, 2005; Goel & Karri, 2006; Karri & 
Goel, 2008) and ‘reflective trust’ (Adler, 2001), to completely irrational ‘blind 
trust’, and; analogical reasoning or associative thinking, and heuristic reasoning12 
(Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Cornelissen & Clarke, 2010; Gavetti, 2012; Jones & 
Casulli, 2014).  The effect of these decision making constructs being emphasised 
is that the holder of such logic eschews the need for calculating risk (or makes 
baseless estimations of expected return) without turning to more effectual strate-
gies for avoiding the downside effects of failure – the potential for which is ig-
nored.  
Proposition 3: Given a commitment decision space that, when judged through 
the lens of instrumental rationality, would be deemed to be characterised by true 
uncertainty and ambiguity – a commitment may still be possible if the stakehold-
er is sufficiently extrinsically motivated, and that commitment will be subjective-
ly rational and based upon faith, with the stakeholder having a teleological orien-
tation. 
4.5.2 Type 4: Self-belief based commitments 
Commitments of this nature are made by arguably the most conceptually intri-
guing stakeholders. Stakeholders driven by self-belief are those who wish to di-
rectly influence the activities of the effectual network despite there being little 
ambiguity with regard to how the opportunity creation process is unfolding, e.g. 
the artefact, product, service that has emerged from the process is already fairly 
clear and path dependent, and/or there being little possibility that they would be 
able to personally exert much influences over the process themselves.  
This type of stakeholder makes a commitment to the effectual network with 
the expectation that he or she will be able to exercise active, means oriented rea-
soning strategies such as control logic. They may be motivated by an intrinsic 
entrepreneurial passion (Cardon et al., 2009), and the belief that the effectual 
network represents opportunities that are not apparent to those already committed 
to it. Conceptually, this type of stakeholder resembles a Lachmannian entrepre-
neur; one intrinsically motivated to exercise ‘creative imagination’ and wishes to 
incite disequilibrating change (Chiles, Bluedorn, & Gupta, 2007; Chiles et al., 
2008), or someone driven simply by the ‘joy of creating’ (Schumpeter, 1934, p. 
93). In this case, these stakeholders may be either or both non-teleological in ori-
                                                 
12 Jones and Casulli (2014) Distinguish analogical reasoning from heuristic reasoning as two separate 
types of comparative reasoning based upon intuition developed through experience. They argue that heu-
ristic reasoning is deductive and goal oriented while analogical reasoning is more inductive and non-
teleological (therefore more in line with effectual reasoning). 
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entation, or autotelic: they simply want to be part of an effectual process as, for 
them, this kind of creative action is a reward in itself (Csikszentmihalyi, 2014). 
We can imagine that this type of stakeholder may face some initial resistance 
from the extant effectual network. A commitment from such a stakeholder may 
not be perceived to be required by network members if the process has already 
reached a point of low uncertainty and high path dependency; other stakeholders 
may be unwilling to welcome in a new member who is disruptive to the net-
work’s now well defined goals; and, there may not be any possibility for a com-
mitment to be received at all (the process is closed to outsiders beyond arm’s 
length transactions). However, such stakeholders, who are likely to be serial or 
expert entrepreneurs, may also be important instigators of renewal, who restart 
(or simply start) effectuation processes from the beginning once a stable artefact 
has already emerged. 
This category of stakeholders may answer the following questions as follows: 
1. What’s happening out there? The process towards which I am making a 
commitment has well defined goals, actors, and structure. 
2. How will it impact me? Although I have a clear understanding of what 
kind of network/venture my commitment is contributing to, my inter-
ests lie elsewhere. 
3. What am I going to do about it? I shall make a commitment to get a 
foothold in this network/venture in the self-belief that once I have done 
so, I will be able to use my influence to direct it towards a new course 
of my choosing. 
As was the case with faith-based commitments, there must be other decision 
making strategies at play that allow for the stakeholder to exercise means orient-
ed action despite the conditions not being favourable for such, i.e. strong path 
dependence, lack of ambiguity, limiting the potential to exercise control logic. 
These stakeholders will be driven by inward looking, intrinsically motivated rea-
soning, guided by a strong internal locus of control. In such a case, overconfi-
dence may play a part once again, however, this time it is ‘personal overconfi-
dence’ rather than ‘predictive confidence’ (Griffin & Varey, 1996; Sarasvathy, 
Menon, & Kuechle, 2013). Personal overconfidence is the “overestimation of 
one’s knowledge (more generally, the overestimation of the validity of one’s 
judgment) when there is no personally favored hypothesis or outcome” (Griffin 
& Varey, 1996, p. 228). Personal overconfidence may lead particular individuals 
to overestimate their ability to overcome the path dependence of a maturing ef-
fectuation process, and form a commitment to the network in the belief that they 
will somehow be able to exert control over it in a means rather than goal oriented 
fashion. Analogical reasoning may again also play a role, but will be in relation 
to action rather than prediction.  
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Proposition 4: Given a commitment decision space that, when judged through 
the lens of instrumental rationality, would be deemed to be characterised by path 
dependency and low ambiguity – a commitment may still be possible if the 
stakeholder is sufficiently intrinsically motivated, and that commitment will be 
subjectively rational and based upon self-belief, with the stakeholder having a 
non-teleological or autotelic orientation 
4.6 Summary of Propositions 
In this chapter I have attempted to answer the first of my research sub-questions: 
Why would stakeholders make commitments to effectual processes? The answer 
is, simply, that it depends on the individual, whether the individual is calculative 
and instrumentally rational, with success or survival being one of their primary 
motivating factors, or maybe they are subjectively rational, relying on personal 
feelings or emotion to guide their decisions. Motivation is a clear missing link 
when it comes to the black box of effectual stakeholder commitments. Here, I 
have attempted to show that motivation, whether it be intrinsic or extrinsic, will 
play an important role in not only determining how the stakeholder perceives the 
commitment decision space, but also what the purpose of the commitment means 
to them;  whether it is a means to an end, or an end in itself. I summarise the four 
ideal types of stakeholder commitment I have deduced in the Table 7 below. 




Orientation to  
Telos 






Teleological Instrumental Causal 
True Uncertainty/ 
Ambiguity 
Non-Teleological Instrumental Effectual 
True Uncertainty/ 
Ambiguity 
Teleological Subjective Faith 





What I would like to reiterate here is that the ideal types shown in Table 7 are 
just that; empirically, a stakeholder commitment will based on a confluence of 
reasoning and logic that will contain elements of all four types. Commitment log-
ic will also be dynamic and open to post-hoc rationalisation. Furthermore, be-
cause uncertainty in the commitment decision space is subjectively perceived, the 
causal link I have sought to draw between this and the commitment logic is a 
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tenuous one, and something I believe to be fundamentally unmeasurable by any 
quantitative means.  
The purpose I envisage for this typology is not one of a measurement tool, but 
more as useful conceptual device for generalising and grouping broad categories 
of stakeholders in a way that we might be able to distinguish and predict their 
present and future behaviours from one another in a meaningful way. My de-
scriptions of these stakeholders thus far have been superficial. In the following 
chapter I will continue my reconceptualisation of causal and effectual behaviours 
to the perspective of the stakeholder, and I will also extend my theorising to the 
greater entrepreneurship literature in order to further inductively flesh out the 
vignettes of faith and self-belief based commitments I have introduced. Follow-
ing on from this, I will theorise about what the effectual entrepreneur can do to 
secure commitments from these stakeholders, and what effect these commitments 
will have on the effectual process going forwards. 
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5 STAKEHOLDER COMMITMENTS IN 
OPPORTUNITY CREATION - A PROCESS 
MODEL 
Effectuation theorists argue that pre-existent goals are not part of the rationale for 
self-selecting into the network by potential stakeholders. However, what stake-
holders negotiate in terms of what kind of artefact they want to create is integral 
to the final artefact that is produced (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b). Stakeholders 
bring new means to the network, their identity, knowledge, and networks, as well 
as tangible resources such as access to capital, equipment, and real estate. How-
ever, with those new means come constraints on what can be created, imposed by 
the new stakeholder’s values and beliefs, i.e. the “strings attached”. The negotia-
tion process occurs when stakeholders imagine the possible courses of action for 
the effectual network that become available when their own means are factored 
into the collective pool. When new, and possibly unexpected, synergies between 
the means of the network and the stakeholder become apparent, that stakeholder 
will then commit those elements of their means, and only those, which contribute 
to the new combination in a valuable way (Wiltbank et al., 2006).  
The causation and effectuation decision making principles are not illogical or 
irrational. Both groupings of behaviour are utilised as responses to manage per-
ceived uncertainty. While causation seeks to minimise uncertainty and optimise 
performance, effectuation seeks to embrace uncertainty, and set courses of action 
that trigger unanticipated contingencies that can be seized, adapted, or exapted13 
as the basis for further action. However, in the previous chapter I made the ar-
gument that causation and effectuation as reasoning strategies do not cover the 
full gamut of action under uncertainty. When a potential stakeholder’s under-
standing or belief regarding the level of uncertainty they perceive with respect to 
the action they wish to take (i.e. the commitment decision) is incongruous with 
behaviour rooted in instrumental rationality, behaviours based on subjective ra-
tionality may serve as a stand in. Instrumentally rational risk calculation or af-
fordable loss calculation may be replaced by subjectively rational biases and heu-
ristics including, but not limited to, different forms and levels of trust, analogical 
reasoning, overconfidence, and altruistic desires.  
                                                 
13 Exaption is a “feature co-opted for its present role from some other origin” (Dew, Sarasvathy, & 
Venkataraman, 2004, p. 69) 
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In this chapter I begin by taking the four ideal types of reasoning from the ty-
pology I established in chapter 4 – causal and effectual reasoning which have 
already been well defined in existing literature, and the two additional forms of 
faith and self-belief reasoning based on subjective rationality I have newly de-
fined – and I translate them into different logical frames and associated behav-
iours that are likely to be exhibited by individuals guided by such reasoning. Fol-
lowing this, in the second half of the chapter, I return to a discussion on effectua-
tion as a process. Updating Sarasvathy et al.’s ‘dynamic model of the effectual 
network’ to bring stakeholder commitments to the forefront, I theorise on how 
commitments from stakeholders following different reasoning strategies may 
influence how the process unfolds in different ways.  
5.1 Pre-commitment Logic from the Stakeholders’ Perspectives 
In this subchapter, I will use a thought experiment akin to those used by Saras-
vathy (2001) and Sarasvathy et al. (2008) to elaborate on stakeholder commit-
ments, but I will extend it to include the faith based commitments and self-belief 
based commitments I introduced in the previous chapter. We begin with an effec-
tual entrepreneur who has a generalised aspiration; in this case I will call the en-
trepreneur “Pat”. Pat’s generalised aspiration could be something to do with capi-
talising on a love of making Indian food as was the example used by Sarasvathy 
(2001), or it could be something more topical, such as creating some kind of mo-
bile app based business – “Pat’s Apps”. Pat is at the beginning of his entrepre-
neurial journey, with a decade of programming experience in industry under his 
belt, and a modest €10,000 in savings. He either seeks out, or meets serendipi-
tously, someone who he considers to be a potential stakeholder. Someone who 
may be able to help him in his endeavour by bringing to the process new means, 
financial or otherwise, and new goals. While Pat’s problem space, his entrepre-
neurial design space, is characterised by Knightian uncertainty, Marchian goal 
ambiguity, and environmental isotropy, the potential stakeholder has his or her 
own problem space, the commitment decision space. In this commitment deci-
sion space the stakeholder has two sets of considerations. First are the means cur-
rently available to Pat, his identity, knowledge, and networks, as well as his stat-
ed aspiration. Second is the stakeholder’s own identity, knowledge, and net-
works, and goals, preferences, and aspirations. Evaluating these considerations 
together, what does the stakeholder decide? Does the stakeholder commit and, if 
so, how will he or she behave following the act of commitment? 
As I discussed in Chapter 2, Dew et al. (2009) argue that entrepreneurial ex-
perts and novices frame their problems differently from one another, and suggest 
that expert entrepreneurs, using effectual frames, and novices, who have a ten-
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dency towards using causal frames, will perceive and approach issues in different 
ways. They summarise five of these key issues as the decision maker’s: 1) view 
of the future; 2) basis for taking action; 3) predisposition towards risk and re-
sources; 4) attitude towards outsiders; and, 5) attitude towards unexpected con-
tingencies. Generally, in effectuation literature, these issues are discussed from 
the entrepreneur’s perspective, and where the self-selecting stakeholder to the 
effectual process is concerned they are generally assumed to share the entrepre-
neur’s effectual orientation. In the following sections, I will return to these five 
issues, however, this time I will discuss them from the perspective of a stake-
holder who is approached by the entrepreneur, Pat, about a possible commitment 
(in this scenario the commitment will be the possibility for an equity investment). 
I will explore alternative possibilities of how, given the same commitment deci-
sion, different stakeholders will frame their act to commit to the nascent effectual 
process represented by Pat, both before and after the commitment is made, in 
different ways. Furthermore, I will not assume the stakeholders will invariably be 
guided by effectual logic, but will explore the potential behaviours of stakehold-
ers who may make commitments based on either effectual and causal reasoning, 
as well as the two new types of subjectively rational actor I introduced in the 
previous chapter, who make commitments based on faith or self-belief. 
5.1.1 View of the future 
An actor following causal logic is said to behave in a way that utilises their pre-
existing knowledge in order to make reasonable predictions about future, while 
an actor using effectual logic will instead seek to shape an unpredictable future 
through the exertion of control (Sarasvathy, 2001). For the potential stakeholder 
into the effectual network, as they are looking in from the outside before making 
a decision to select into the process, they may be well positioned to make their 
own analysis of predictive information before taking the plunge. This may be 
true even if the entrepreneur him or herself is faced with significant uncertainty 
(i.e. while the effectual network’s own design space may be characterised by true 
uncertainty, ambiguity, and isotropy, the stakeholder’s comment decision space, 
separately, may be characterised by normal uncertainty and risk). For instance, if 
we imagine that the stakeholder approached by the entrepreneur for a commit-
ment represents a mature firm serving existing markets, that stakeholder may rely 
on his or her firm’s existing market intelligence. In such a case, a commitment 
may be negotiated whereby the emerging artefact of the effectual network is 
combined with firm specific resources of the stakeholder to modify or enhance 
an existing product or service serving an existing market. For example, consider-
ing Pat’s aspiration is to create an app based service, perhaps the stakeholder, I 
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will call her “Kim”, will make a commitment in the form of an 50,000 euro equi-
ty investment of start-up capital so that Pat will develop an app based business 
that will provide services that Kim’s firm offers. Essentially the commitment will 
be one to outsource research and development and exploit a previously unknown 
opportunity. In this case, a commitment under instrumentally rational predictive 
logic would be possible – a future can be reasonably predicted where Pat creates 
an app based platform as a new channel to distribute the stakeholder’s products 
or services to an existing market. For Kim the commitment, and Pat himself, is a 
known quantity or state, from which an effect, though not necessarily known, is 
predictable within normal uncertainty. However, though her main focus is pre-
diction, this does not mean she will eschew control logic to steer the action of the 
effectual process towards her future goal. 
If the stakeholder considering a commitment is more partial to control logic 
(i.e. if they possess entrepreneurial expertise) then, as argued by Read and Saras-
vathy (2005), prediction and predictive information may not be important in their 
decision on whether or not to make a commitment. Such a stakeholder will be 
more amenable to open discussion with the entrepreneur and existing network 
members about different possible futures towards which collaboration could pos-
sibly aspire. This is Sarasvathy and Dew’s (2005b, p. 550) archetypical effectual 
stakeholder commitment where: “It focuses on what is controllable about the fu-
ture and about the external environment, irrespective of their predictability; it 
also explicitly eschews predictive information that cannot be encapsulated into 
controllable events”. The stakeholder approached by Pat might be an experienced 
entrepreneur, “Nick”, who wishes to branch out into new ventures. Having 
walked the entrepreneurial path before, Nick is an expert entrepreneur who 
frames issues effectually. His area of expertise is in fish farming. He doesn’t 
know how fish farming and mobile apps go together per se, but he can imagine a 
number of potential possibilities. He is not concerned by the uncertainty in this 
commitment decision space as he has experienced this kind of thing before. He 
invests €50,000 for an even stake in the venture, understanding that by having 
this stake, he will be able to control events as they unfold. 
A stakeholder who makes a commitment as a matter of faith may exhibit one 
or both of two potential views of the future: they may submit to the view of the 
future as presented to them by the entrepreneur to whom they are making the 
commitment, as their commitment is based on faith in that person, or; they make 
a commitment in the belief or simple hope that the future they predict or envisage 
will come to pass. Both cases are subjectively rational. The former, which I call a 
Type A faith based commitment, is based upon the subjectively rational, heuristic 
of ‘personal trust’ which is noncalculative (or nearly noncalculative) 
(Williamson, 1993) while the second, which I call a Type B faith based commit-
ment, is based upon a subjectively rational belief in an imagined future outcome 
120 
which, unlike prediction under causal reasoning, is likewise noncalculative and 
may be based on one or a combination of ‘non-rational’ heuristics or biases such 
as ‘predictive overconfidence’ (Sarasvathy et al., 2013), ‘analogical reasoning’ 
(Gavetti, Levinthal, & Rivkin, 2005), or ‘associative thinking’ (Cornelissen & 
Clarke, 2010). 
Williamson  (2000, p. 73) makes a distinction between two broad types of 
trust, ‘calculative trust’ and ‘personal trust’ which correspond, respectively, to 
Dunn’s (2000, p. 73) treatment of trust as either being a ‘modality of human ac-
tion’ versus a ‘human passion’. Calculative trust is the trust utilised by an in-
strumentally rational actor in decision-making, e.g. an individual making a con-
scious calculation, under bounded rationality, about the likelihood that another 
actor will fulfil their contractual obligations. Personal trust, on the other hand, is 
‘nearly noncalculative’14. It is characterised by “(1) the absence of monitoring, 
(2) favorable or forgiving predilections, and (3) discreteness” ” (Williamson, 
1993, pp. 483–484). As such, he argues, it is a “very special” form of trust and is 
“reserved for very special relations between family, friends, and lovers” 
(Williamson, 1993, p. 484). Take, for example, Pete is Pat’s father. Pat tells Pete 
about his plan to start a new venture developing a new app. As Pat is Pete’s son, 
he has faith in him and faith that he will be successful i.e. Pete, as a father, has 
personal trust in his son. He has no problem providing a 10,000 euro investment 
for a small amount of equity in Pat’s venture15. 
Type B commitments are based upon the decision maker’s subjective belief 
(or hope) that an imagined future outcome will eventuate. Unlike an actor using 
causal reasoning, there is no objective reason for believing that the future will 
unfold as predicted (no calculations have been made as to the likelihood of future 
events occurring). The stakeholder making the commitment may be doing so due 
to personal ‘overconfidence’: “Overconfidence exists when decision makers are 
overly optimistic in their initial assessment of a situation, and then are slow to 
incorporate additional information about a situation into their assessment because 
of their initial overconfidence" (Busenitz & Barney, 1997, p. 15). Griffin & 
Varey (1996, p. 228) argue that it is likely that overconfidence is manifested in 
two distinct forms, with the most dramatic being ‘optimistic overconfidence’ or 
the “the tendency to overestimate the likelihood that one’s favored outcome will 
occur”. The second type of overconfidence is the “overestimation of one’s 
knowledge (more generally, the overestimation of the validity of one’s judgment) 
when there is no personally favored hypothesis or outcome” (Griffin & Varey, 
1996, p. 228). Sarasvathy, Menon, and Kuechle (2013) relabel these two types of 
overconfidence, I believe appropriately,  as ‘predictive overconfidence’ and ‘per-
                                                 
14 Williamson (1993, p. 479) asserts that it is ”mind-boggling” to imagine purely noncalculative trust, but 
gives “noncontingently selfless behaviour of a Good Samaritan kind” as an example. 
15 Alternatively, Pete may simply provide Pat with an unsecured personal loan. 
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sonal overconfidence’. It is predictive overconfidence which relates more to 
commitments made as a matter of faith while, as I will argue below, personal 
overconfidence is more likely to be involved in commitments made on the basis 
of self-belief.  
Predictive overconfidence itself may be a result of analogical or associative 
thinking; where the decision maker is consciously or unconsciously comparing 
the current situation to situations experienced previously, and predicts that events 
will therefore unfold in the same or a similar manner (Cornelissen & Clarke, 
2010; Gavetti, 2012). Alternatively, predictive overconfidence may simply be 
predicated on a strong personal desire for, or normative belief in, a particular 
outcome, such as in the case of philanthropic investment. “Phoebe”, for instance, 
is one of a number of individuals in Pat’s extended network from his previous 
life working in industry whom he approaches for financing. As a distant ac-
quaintance, she has no motivation to finance Pat on a personal level like Pete 
does. However, when Pat tells her his aspiration is to develop a firm that ad-
dresses a social need, such as an app platform for connecting lonely pensioners, 
she is motivated to make a small equity investment towards this vision of the fu-
ture, as it is a cause that is close to her heart16. 
A stakeholder who makes a commitment based on self-belief may not really 
be concerned with any clear predictions about what the future will look like, but 
neither may they fall back on control logic. Their only concern is that they see an 
opportunity to be part of a process that is exciting or appealing to them. As these 
stakeholders, by the definition I have drawn above, are subjectively rational and 
non-predictive, the heuristics they employ reflect this fact. Instead of the personal 
trust utilised by faith reasoning stakeholders, they instead may rely on, or be sus-
ceptible to, ‘over-trust’ as described in relation to effectual processes by Goel 
and Karri (Goel & Karri, 2006; Karri & Goel, 2008), and instead of being predic-
tively overconfident, they may be more prone to the overconfidence in their per-
sonal abilities that has been described by Griffin & Varey (1996) and Sarasvathy, 
Menon, and Kuechle (2013). 
Unlike personal trust, over-trust does not hinge upon there being some kind of 
special personal relationship between the trustor and the trustee. According to 
Goel, Bell, and Pierce (2005): “Over-trust reflects a condition where one choos-
es, either consciously or habitually, to trust another more than is warranted by an 
objective assessment of the situation”. According to Goel and Karri, in the con-
text of entrepreneurship: 
                                                 
16 I use an altruistic example here, however, a commitment of this nature might just as well be based upon 
selfish desires. E.g. a person making an investment in a company seeking to develop flying cars might 
invest simply because he wants to own one one day. 
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We observe that some people can trust in contexts where others may urge caution 
and seek cautionary safeguards. In this respect, over-trust can be viewed as instrumental 
in making deals under the assumption that the other parties will keep their end of the 
bargain. … [O]ver-trust suggests either an unwillingness to predict the future by taking 
into account the potential risk involved in the relationship or an inability to assess the 
intentions of the other party and the nature of the relationship. From a rational perspec-
tive, such a situation may be labeled as a case of willful negligence of risk resulting 
from overconfidence or naivety. We propose that entrepreneurs choose not to predict 
the future. They are often confronted with situations where they are not in a position to 
make any objective assessments of the risk involved, thereby denying them the ability 
to predict the future. 
Sarasvathy and Dew (2008a) make the argument that the concept of over-trust is 
unnecessary in effectuation. While this may be true for understanding effectua-
tion as a form of behaviour, over-trust may be an important concept for under-
standing how certain individuals, novices in entrepreneurship, who have not de-
veloped the effectual reasoning of Sarasvathy et al.’s ‘expert entrepreneurs’ still 
may make commitments to, or induce, effectual processes under the uncertainty 
conditions of the entrepreneurial design space.  
For example, “Boris” is a business student. His driving passion is to become 
an entrepreneur. Although he believes he has got what it takes to be an entrepre-
neur, he does not really know what sort of venture he would like to form. In a 
chance encounter with Pat at a start-up event, he hears about Pat’s intention to 
start an app based business. He convinces Pat, who likes his ideas and attitude, to 
bring him on board to be one of the founders. At the same time, he places over-
trust in Pat. He has no way to evaluate what outcome their relationship will have, 
or even if it will be a positive one. Despite this, he makes a commitment simply 
to see what the future will bring. Boris doesn’t really know what the future holds 
for the venture and, as he is not an expert entrepreneur, he has not developed the 
expertise associated with effectual reasoning and control logic. He believes in 
what he has learned in business school, business model canvasses, business 
plans, and competitive analysis.  
5.1.2 Basis for taking action 
As was mentioned in the review in Chapter 2 and the introduction to this sub-
chapter,  according to Dew, Read, Sarasvathy, and Wiltbank (2009), action by 
those who exhibit causal reasoning, or a ‘predictive frame’, is determined by 
goals (i.e. it is teleological), while those with an ‘effectual frame’ will act on the 
basis of imagining what they can do with their given means (i.e. it is not teleolog-
ical). What this means for the commitment decision problem is that, if the stake-
holder possesses a means focus, the stakeholder has compared his or her own 
means or resources against those already available to the entrepreneur and nas-
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cent effectual network, and has been able to envisage (though not necessarily 
very clearly) how these means combined may lead to a number of appealing pos-
sibilities. Nick, the former fish farming mogul, as a seasoned effectuator, has a 
strong means orientation. He can already imagine a number of ways in which 
Pat’s experience as an app developer can be combined with elements he can draw 
from his current identity, knowledge, and networks. He is ready to make some 
calls and send some e-mails to people he knows to get things rolling and to see 
where they take him.  
If the stakeholder does not possess a means focus, but still makes a commit-
ment, this means that he or she has a particular goal in mind, and believes that 
this goal can be achieved through a pooling of resources. Kim has been on the 
lookout; alert for any new ways that her firm, which sells high-end pet supplies 
and accessories, can extend its market share. Upon talking with Pat during a trade 
show (Pat owns a couple of designer dogs – Chihuahuadoodles), she has the idea 
that using a mobile app is the perfect way to achieve her goal of connecting her 
firm’s customers and marketing their products.  
Just as in the case of an individual utilising causal logic, a decision maker us-
ing faith reasoning is similarly teleological – their action is determined by goals. 
As I suggested in the previous section, these individuals can be broadly classified 
into two groups, those who are committing on a personal level to those who they 
have faith in, and those who are committing to a future outcome they have faith 
in. The goal or telos of the first group is to support individuals within the effectu-
al network – the telos is satisfied by the commitment itself. Beyond that, they are 
passive or naïve to the goals or aspirations of the entrepreneur and other previ-
ously committed stakeholders and do not anticipate the need to act or exert any 
form of control. Pete’s goal, for example, is simply to help his son realise his as-
piration of starting a new venture. Beyond investing the initial €10,000, and of-
fering moral support from time to time, he has no further intention of being ac-
tively involved in the process. He trusts in Pat’s, and his other collaborators, 
judgement. The second group take the stated generalised aspirations of the entre-
preneur and effectual network as a concrete goal, or have their own imagined 
goal which they believe a commitment is the key to achieving. Phoebe made the 
commitment towards the goal of addressing a social need, connecting lonely pen-
sioners. Aside from her initial commitment, however, she takes a passive back 
seat to the process in the faith that the goal will eventually be fulfilled.  
If the stakeholder who is approached by the entrepreneur decides to make the 
commitment on the basis of self-belief, the motivation for the commitment itself 
can be considered teleological, but action by the stakeholder subsequent to the 
commitment being made will have a non-teleleological or autotelic basis. The 
stakeholder’s goal or telos is to be committed to a non-teleological creative pro-
cess as he or she has a sense of subjective intrinsic reward by doing so. The 
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stakeholder’s goal, in this case, is to be in the position of being creative with his 
or her means and engaging with others, and their means, to create novel and un-
anticipated artefacts, products, services, markets, or other business model innova-
tions. Boris’s initial telos is satisfied once Pat accepts him on board as a collabo-
rator. While, initially, as he remains a novice entrepreneur he may resort to care-
fully drafting business plans and other causal, goal oriented behaviours, he will 
soon learn that those behaviours are ineffective given the entrepreneurial design 
space. As he gains experience he gradually becomes more effectual and develops 
an orientation of choosing what to do with the means available to him. 
5.1.3 Predisposition toward risk and resources 
According to Dew et al. (2009, p. 290), a causally logical decision maker “frames 
the new venture creation problem as one of pursuing the (risk-adjusted) maxi-
mum opportunity and raising required resources to do so”, i.e. they focus on the 
upside potential. On the other hand, an actor using effectual logic “frames the 
problem as one of pursuing adequately satisfactory opportunities without invest-
ing more resources than stakeholders can afford to lose”, i.e. they focus on the 
downside potential. This suggests that in the case of a stakeholder deciding 
whether or not to make a commitment to an effectual network, if he or she is uses 
causal logic, he or she will make the commitment based upon an evaluation of 
the upside potential of being part of the effectual process, and will mobilise re-
sources to ensure that the upside is realised. On the other hand, a stakeholder us-
ing effectual logic will simply assess that the commitment does represent an op-
portunity or opportunities and, in the worst case, if the commitment falls through 
or leads ultimately to failure, that the failure was affordable and the loss can be 
absorbed. 
While empirical research, such as the ‘think aloud’ experiments conducted by 
Dew et al. (2009) and Read, et al. (2009), indicated that expert entrepreneurs 
tended to focus on affordable loss more than MBA students and managers, who 
tended to focus more on earning potential, in reality, when it comes to a com-
mitment decision, it is hard to imagine that the decision maker would not consid-
er both expected return and affordable loss. Kim, the causal stakeholder in my 
narrative, may be able to use her firm’s resources and knowledge to make some 
predictions about the return they could expect from the partnership she has made 
a commitment to. These calculations may be an important, if not the most im-
portant, consideration behind her commitment. However, it would be entirely 
irrational to invest the 50,000 euro commitment if those €50,000 are not, in the 
worst case, affordable. After this commitment has been made, however, Kim’s 
focus and influence over the process would certainly be to direct resources to-
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wards achieving maximal returns. On the other hand, for Nick, the expert entre-
preneur, any calculations of expected return are likely to be inaccurate if not im-
possible because, for him, it is remains unclear what the end artefact, product and 
market, will be. A focus on affordable loss will certainly be the most logical 
choice for him, as both a basis for his commitment, as well as directing his post 
commitment behaviour. 
For a stakeholder who chooses to make a commitment on the basis of faith, 
considerations of affordable loss or expected return are irrelevant, at least to post 
commitment behaviour. The reason for making the commitment may be based on 
either or both logics, however, as these stakeholders take no active role in post 
commitment decision making, they do not influence the entrepreneur’s, or net-
work’s, focus on the upside or downside potential. Pete’s decision to provide 
€10,000 of capital to Pat may certainly be based upon his own calculation or sub-
jective attitude towards what he considers to be affordable. Phoebe’s investment 
is likewise based on the fact that even if she receives no return on it, it will not 
adversely affect her life beyond what she has deemed to be acceptable to her. On 
the other hand, in a possibly rare but not unimaginable scenario, an individual 
who, perhaps under the influence of Pat’s boundless charisma, might invest his 
entire life’s savings on the gamble that he will make it back tenfold (an irrational 
commitment).  
A self-belief reasoning individual will not make the decision to commit based 
on expected return because, as discussed above, his or her commitment is non-
predictive. However, it is not necessary that he or she have an affordable loss 
focus either. To illustrate the difference between causal and effectual logic in 
relation to affordable loss and expected return, Dew et al. (2009, p. 293) give the 
following example: “One example of this is the entrepreneur who refuses to 
leave a well-paying job until he finds an opportunity that he predicts will pay 
more (causal) versus one who decides to invest a small portion of her savings and 
two years of her life on a project that she believes is worth that amount of time 
and money—irrespective of whether it will pay more than what she currently 
earns (effectual)”. A subjectively rational individual exhibiting high intrinsic mo-
tivation to involve him or herself in the creative effectual process may make a 
commitment to the network without considering whether or not the commitment 
is expected to result in a greater earning potential or is affordable. In the case of 
Boris, he may not incrementally invest in the venture, but he may still quit his 
current job and throw himself headfirst into the unknown without a parachute. 
One could argue, however, that he has still made his commitment based upon 
affordable loss, but his subjective determination of what is affordable or not is 
much higher than someone who does not share his strong intrinsic motivation.  
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5.1.4 Attitude towards outsiders 
Causal actors are argued to favour competitive analysis in their altitude towards 
outsiders, while effectual actors are said to favour partnerships. Obviously, if a 
stakeholder makes a commitment to an effectual process, this indicates that the 
individual must have at least a minimal predisposition towards partnership, oth-
erwise a commitment greater than an arm’s length transaction would not even be 
considered. For a causal actor, however, a commitment represents just another 
means to a predicted and planned end. Their behaviour following commitment 
will likely be oriented towards competitive analysis. For example, Kim, having 
made a significant investment of her firm’s resources into the partnership with 
Pat to develop an app platform for her firm’s products, will not likely be agreea-
ble to including competitors into the venture as she would not want them diluting 
her firm’s ownership and threatening her perceived version of the future. Nick, 
on the other hand, following his effectual reasoning, will not only be open to any 
additional partnerships to contribute new means and new goals to the process, but 
he will be actively on the lookout for them.  
The first type of faith reasoning stakeholder is not concerned with either com-
petitive analysis or partnership. Beyond his or her initial commitment, he or she 
is happy to ‘go with the flow’ on who later joins the process, and is not protective 
over the investment – letting the entrepreneur and the more active members of 
the effectual network decide who to bring on board, or who to compete against. 
Pete, for example, does not mind if Pat forms a partnership with Kim, or with 
Nick, he trusts in Pat’s judgement to make the right choices. A faith based stake-
holder who made a commitment based on a particular view of the future, howev-
er, may be antagonistic towards the inclusion of partners who may be opposed to, 
or may threaten that stakeholder’s view.  For instance, the socially conscious 
Phoebe who has made a commitment based on her principles, in this case her 
desire to improve the lives of the elderly, will no doubt be strongly be opposed to 
the venture forming a partnership with a firm known to exploit the elderly. 
As I discussed in section 5.1.1, a self-belief reasoning stakeholder will have 
the tendency to over-trust. As such, this type of stakeholder will have a naturally 
more collaborative attitude towards outsiders than a stakeholder following causal 
reasoning, at least in their initial commitment. However, there is a possibility that 
given a self-belief driven individual is a novice entrepreneur, immediately fol-
lowing commitment they may tend towards the more causal reasoning of compet-
itive analysis. This is more likely the greater their access to resources (Read & 
Sarasvathy, 2005). However, as they increase in entrepreneurial expertise, they 
will gradually become more effectual in reasoning and, as such, more open to 
collaboration. For example, Boris is over-trusting in his initial commitment, and 
may be open to other collaborators in the pre-firm stage, however once the 
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startup is established, he may revert to his business school knowledge of market 
research, positioning, and competitive analysis, particularly if he has control over 
a large number of tangible resources. However, he will quickly begin to convert 
to a more effectual form of reasoning once experience shows him that those 
strategies are prohibited by the uncertain and ambiguous market creation design 
space, and he will once again be oriented towards collaboration. 
5.1.5 Attitude towards unexpected contingencies 
The final issue identified by Dew et al. (2009) to be framed differently by those 
using causal logic compared to those using effectual logic is their attitude to-
wards unexpected contingencies. Causal actors try to avoid contingencies be-
cause they interfere with the careful planning they rely on to drive them towards 
their clearly predicted future goal. Effectual actors with their open view of the 
future see contingencies as opportunities for being creative and novel, and seek 
to leverage them in a productive way. From a stakeholder perspective, Kim will 
want to avoid any contingencies that throw the effectual process off course from 
her primary goal of developing an app platform to advertise and sell her firm’s 
products. Her actions as a committed member of the effectual process will be to 
try her best to shut down unpleasant surprises before they occur. Nick, on the 
other hand, can be expected to readily seize upon contingencies that come the 
way of the effectual process. If his and Pat’s initial idea was to develop apps to 
help fish farmers monitor their fishes’ health and wellbeing, but the fish farmers 
pull out because of an unfavourable economic climate, they might instead team 
up with other stakeholders they met while working with the fish farmers to de-
velop apps that integrate their water analysis devices for use in other industries 
such as waste water treatment.  
As I previously discussed, in relation to their view of outsiders, we can expect 
that stakeholders who have made faith rational commitments to individuals with-
in the effectual process will be ambivalent to contingencies as they are not neces-
sarily concerned about the success of the process, or if they are, they do not have 
the knowledge, means, or desire to have any effect over how the process unfolds. 
Pat may tell Pete that the fish farmers pulled out of the process, and this may 
concern Pete, but he is not equipped, or at least he does not believe he is 
equipped, to offer any practical advice on what to do next. The same applies to 
those who have made a faith based commitment to a particular view of the future. 
After trialling a beta version of his pensioner social network app, Pat might find 
that usage and ownership among pensioners of mobile devices is not at a level 
high enough to sustain the enterprise. When he informs Phoebe of this, she may 
express some concern, but she is unable to help as she does not have the time in 
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addition to her full time job and family obligations. Pat will have to find his own 
way to leverage this contingency, but if he does find a solution, he would need to 
ensure that it remains in line with the view of the future imagined by Phoebe, or 
she may resist any diverging actions (or simply divest herself of the nascent 
firm). 
If the stakeholder has made a commitment based on self-belief, as he or she 
does not have a concrete vision of the future, there is no basis, at least early on in 
the process, for avoiding contingencies as everything at that point is a contingen-
cy. As goals become clearer, perhaps in discussions with the entrepreneur, how 
the self-belief stakeholder views contingencies may be depend on his or her en-
trepreneurial experience, or the amount of resources at hand. As Dew et al. 
(2009) and Read, et al. (2009) found, novices tended to rely on planning and 
avoiding contingencies while expert entrepreneurs tended to view them as oppor-
tunities, while Read and Sarasvathy (2005) propose that the more resources are 
available to a novice, the more causal they are likely to be, i.e. the less likely they 
will seek to leverage contingencies. Boris, in discussion with Pat, might initially 
come up with a detailed business plan, relying on guesswork and instinct to fill in 
the blanks where their combined knowledge is insufficient. However, he might 
soon discover that such careful planning in useless given the entrepreneurial de-
sign space of true uncertainty, goal ambiguity, and isotropy, and, as he gains ex-
perience, he will begin to use the effectual logic of leveraging contingencies – as 
proposed by Read and Sarasvathy (2005).  
5.2 Implied Post-commitment Stakeholder Behaviour 
A summary of the frames, interests and behaviours of the different types of 
stakeholders addressed above is provided in Table 8 on the following page. At 
the risk of being somewhat repetitive, to put the discussion from the preceding 
chapter and the paragraphs above most simply, teleological vis-à-vis non-
teleological stakeholders are distinguished from one another by whether or not 
they possess a clear goal, while instrumentally rational vis-à-vis subjectively ra-
tional stakeholders are distinguished from one another by whether or not they are 
(borrowing Williamson’s [1993] term) “calculative” in their decision making. 
Although, if the conditions are right (as I discuss in the following section), any of 
these different types of stakeholders may make a commitment to an effectual 
network at any point in time, because the basis for making their respective com-
mitments are different, their post commitment behaviours may also be radically 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A causal stakeholder’s basis for making a commitment is, at its heart, predicated 
upon calculatedly achieving a clear desired end. As such, it can be expected that 
such a stakeholder’s post-commitment behaviour will be characterised by a 
strong will to direct the subsequent actions of the effectual process, and the net-
work of actors that embodies, it towards that end. Here I return to the notion of 
‘voice’ as mentioned by Sarasvathy and Dew (2005a, 2008a): 
… effectual negotiations are about what the pie could, should, and would be rather than 
about how large it will be or how to divide it among the stakeholders. Therefore, each 
effectual commitment involvees both the recognition (1) that the pie does not exist and 
all investments are merely tickets to buy “voice” in shaping what that pie might eventu-
ally turn out to be and (2) that there will be several more negotiations and transfor-
mations as new stakeholders self-select into the process. (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2008a, p. 
729) 
The causal stakeholder knows exactly what they want “the pie” to be, and they 
will purchase and exercise their voice through their commitments to regulate or 
coerce the entrepreneur and other stakeholders to take actions that will lead to 
their calculated goal.  
An effectual stakeholder’s purpose is to engage in productive and mutually 
beneficial collaboration towards unknown ends. As effectual behaviour, like 
causal behaviour, is nevertheless routed in instrumental rationality, it can be as-
sumed that effectual stakeholders will still be calculative in their actions. How-
ever, as clear goals cannot be ascertained right away, there is no benefit in coerc-
ing existing actors towards predefined ends. While the causal stakeholder’s rea-
sons for commitment, and post-commitment behaviour, are likely to be opportun-
istic and coercive, the effectual stakeholder is more likely to engage in what is 
described by Simon (1993) as ‘intelligent altruism’. That is, behaviour based up-
on reciprocity. As argued by (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2008a):  
… effectuation does not assume intelligent altruism. It simply makes intelligent al-
truism a rational criterion for action in the face of Knightian uncertainty and goal ambi-
guity—not only for entrepreneurs but also for all their early stakeholders.  
Of course, although Sarasvathy and Dew make the assumption that intellegent 
altruism is a rational criterion for all early stakeholders, that is contingent on 
them being faced with Knightian uncertainty and goal ambiguity – which is not 
necessarily the case for the causal stakeholders, as I explained above. To summa-
rise the likely post-commitment behaviour of stakeholders whose commitments 
are founded upon instrumentally rational criteria, the causal stakeholder is likely 
to set clear goals and demands and do everything they can to direct the future 
actions of those already within the effectual network towards those ends, while 
the effectual stakeholder is more likely to engage in open negotiation and discus-
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sion with the entrepreneur and other existing actors to begin to generate mutually 
beneficial ideas about what to do next. 
For the subjectively rational, faith reasoning stakeholder, a naïve goal focus 
takes the place of the causator’s calculative goal focus. It can be expected that 
this type of stakeholder, including both sub-types, will be the least actively en-
gaged in post commitment decision making within the effectual network. This is 
because, for Type I, their goal was fulfilled by the commitment itself, while for 
Type II, the decision to commit was based upon the expectation that their goal 
will be fulfilled regardless of their own input to the process. As such both these 
sub-types of stakeholder will merely be a passive, background presence within 
the effectual network whose support (provision of means) is guaranteed for as 
long as their trust is not betrayed or their predictions seem to be on track. 
For the stakeholder who has made a commitment on the basis of self-belief, as 
the commitment itself was made for the purpose of buying into and becoming 
part of the process (for the sake of being part of the process), it can be assumed 
that these types of stakeholders’ post-commitment behaviour would be to active-
ly engage in and/or attempt to influence decision making. If these stakeholders 
appear towards the latter stages of an effectual process (at a point where strong 
path dependencies are already present for the extant members of the effectual 
network) they may act as disruptive change agents, and may not be welcomed 
with open arms. Their ability to influence the effectual network will depend on 
the amount of voice they purchased through their commitment. Ultimately, if 
they are able to influence the network in such a way that stimulates additional 
transformation, and as they gain entrepreneurial expertise, their behaviour will 
become indistinguishable from those who made their initial commitments based 
upon effectual logic. 
5.3 Negotiating Commitments 
Connecting causal and effectual reasoning to firm lifecycle, Read and Sarasvathy 
(2005) propose that: “Successful firms are more likely to have begun through 
effectual action and grown through causal action as they expand and endure over 
time”. The logic behind this is that, as firms grow, they accumulate greater re-
sources and form clearer goals (by securing stakeholder commitments) – attrib-
utes which are more commensurate with causal rationality.  
If we assume that uncertainty, ambiguity, and environmental isotropy are all at 
their highest in the beginning of an effectuation process, this begs the question: 
will commitments invariably be impossible between an entrepreneur, guided by 
effectual reasoning, and potential stakeholders who do not share that same rea-
soning? Not at all. Taking a generic potential stakeholder we may assume that 
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they are neither an expert entrepreneur, emotionally invested in the stated aspira-
tions of the entrepreneur, nor do they have a pre-existing personal relationship 
with anyone already involved in the current effectual process. In this case, as I 
discussed in chapter 3, they will invariably begin from the default causal in their 
reasoning that most human beings prefer. In such a case, the actor within the ex-
tant effectual network (usually the focal entrepreneur, but not exclusively so) 
seeking to negotiating a new valuable commitment from the potential stakeholder 
must turn to one or a combination of three different recourses. They can either: 1) 
reduce the uncertainty perceived by the stakeholder, 2) induce effectual reason-
ing, or 3) increase the stakeholder’s willingness to bear uncertainty. I shall dis-
cuss these different recourses in the figures illustrated below. 
5.3.1 Failure to secure commitment 
As I mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 4, a commitment decision constitutes 
an entrepreneurial action on the part of the stakeholder, defined by McMullen 
and Shepherd (2006) as “behavior in response to a judgmental decision under 
uncertainty about a possible opportunity for profit”.  
 
 
Figure 15 Scenario 1 – No commitment 
As such, there are two important elements of the decision, uncertainty perceived 
by the stakeholder, and the willingness of the stakeholder to bear uncertainty 






































greater than what he or she is willing to bear, a commitment is impossible. Such 
a situation is illustrated in Scenario 1 in Figure 15, above. In this scenario, an 
entrepreneur approaches a potential stakeholder with the possibility for a mutual-
ly beneficial commitment to be formed. The entrepreneur recognises the uncer-
tainty inherent in the commitment decision space, however, his or her ability to 
rely on effectual courses of action ensures that he or she will be able to mitigate 
the uncertainty in the future or even exploit it. The stakeholder in this case, how-
ever, is not an ‘expert entrepreneur’ and is therefore less likely to be able or will-
ing to employ effectual reasoning (Baron, 2009; Dew et al., 2009). As such, the 
uncertainty is above the tolerable limit below which the stakeholder would be 
willing to make a commitment based on predictive logic, and the calculated risk 
is either too high or the expect return is not evident enough to make the commit-
ment worthwhile. A commitment is not made. 
Proposition 5: Where a causally rational actor perceives a high level of uncer-
tainty in a potential commitment decision to an effectuation process they will not 
form a commitment due to their low willingness to bear uncertainty. 
5.3.2 Reducing uncertainty to secure commitment 
In Scenario 2, illustrated below in Figure 16, if the initial request for a commit-
ment is rejected by the stakeholder, the entrepreneur has the option to reduce the 
uncertainty perceived by the potential stakeholder. This could mean limiting the 
extent of the commitment, e.g. having the stakeholder simply make a commit-
ment to a small element of the overall effectual process, the outcome of which is 
relatively predictable and calculable (or, at least, the cost of which is readily af-
fordable), allowing the stakeholder to exercise causal logic. This is a common 
way of securing many small stakeholder commitments through crowdfunding 
sites such as Kickstarter.com. Alternatively, if the stakeholder is large and pow-
erful, it may mean shaping the effectual process more towards the stakeholder’s 
goals, but without the stakeholder taking an active effectual engagement in the 
co-creation process. The danger of this approach is that, firstly, the entrepreneur 
is submitting the effectual network to resource dependence on a single powerful 
stakeholder (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1981), which may alienate previously commit-
ted stakeholders within the network and lead to failure if the stakeholder chooses, 
in the future, to dissolve the commitment and; secondly, as the stakeholder has 
not actively engaged in the effectuation process, the end artefact may not be what 




Figure 16 Scenario 2 – Reduce uncertainty 
Such circumstances were common to failures in major innovations by young 
technology firms investigated by Coviello and Joseph (2012). 
Proposition 6a: A causally rational actor may be prompted to make a com-
mitment to an effectuation process if the commitment is minor in nature. 
Proposition 6b: A causally rational actor may make a significant commitment 
to an effectuation process if the effectual network acquiesces to the stakeholder’s 
goals; however, such a commitment comes with substantial risk to the effectual 
network. 
5.3.3 Promoting effectual reasoning to secure commitment 
If the entrepreneur is unable to reduce the level of uncertainty that the instrumen-
tally rational stakeholder perceives, Scenario 3 in Figure 17 suggests that he or 
she could attempt to bring the potential stakeholder around to a more effectual 
way of reasoning. This would be a matter of prompting the stakeholder to pro-
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Figure 17 Scenario 3 – Promote effectual reasoning 
This may be a hard sell for a firmly causally rational actor, and may take interac-
tion between the entrepreneur and stakeholder over a long period of time (per-
haps while their business relationship remains at arms-length) during which the 
potential stakeholder becomes familiarized with the benefits of non-predictive 
action. Read and Sarasvathy (2005) suggest that entrepreneurial novices will 
gradually transition to be increasingly effectually rational as they gain entrepre-
neurial expertise. If this is successful, the potential stakeholder’s increased ability 
or willingness to act effectually will allow him or her to bear additional uncer-
tainty while still being within the realms of instrumental rationality. The stake-
holder makes an effectual commitment. 
Proposition 7: Through an ongoing but arms-length relationship between en-
trepreneur and causally rational stakeholder, the stakeholder may be prompted to 
gradually become more effectually rational, ultimately leading to a commitment 
being made. 
5.3.4 Influencing affect and extrinsic motivation to secure commitment 
The fourth and final option available to an entrepreneur seeking a commitment 
from a hesitant potential stakeholder is that he or she could try and increase the 
potential stakeholder’s willingness to bear the uncertainty beyond what would be 
instrumentally rational by adopting an affectual approach, as shown in Scenario 
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Figure 18 Scenario 4 – Increase willingness to bear uncertainty 
This could be done through affective means, by appealing to the individual’s 
emotions; by generating feelings of trust or love, or convincing the individual of 
the social value of the enterprise. Baron (2008, p. 334) proposes that “Positive 
affect may enhance entrepreneurs' capacity for acquiring essential financial and 
human resources by contributing to their persuasiveness and by increasing the 
breadth of their social networks”. Through ‘persuasiveness’ (Baron, 2000, 2008), 
an entrepreneur may be able to persuade a potential stakeholder to promote more 
subjectively rational decision making criteria, such as reflective trust or over-
trust, over the calculative and predictive criteria of causal rationality. There is no 
shortage of anecdotes in which certain individuals have managed to drain the 
bank accounts of others who they have seduced using their charm, or televange-
lists who have bought private aircraft using donations from their audiences. The 
contagious nature of the enthusiasm of the entrepreneur (and others already part 
of the effectual network) may also stimulate potential stakeholders to make a 
wertrational commitment towards an effectual process, as Weber says, “inde-
pendently of its prospects of success” (Weber, 1978, p. 25). It may simply be a 
matter of convincing the potential stakeholder of the value of the cause to which 
the new venture aspires (e.g. the effectuation process is directed towards address-
ing a social need), or the personal capability of the entrepreneur him or herself. If 
such actions result in a commitment, that commitment will be a faith based one, 
more reliant on subjective rationality than instrumental rationality. 
Proposition 8: A member of an effectual network may use affective means to 
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tal rationality in their commitment decision, enabling a commitment to be made 
to an effectual process irrespective of the likelihood of this resulting in a positive 
outcome for the stakeholder. 
5.4 The Accumulation of Stakeholders in the Opportunity Creation 
Process 
Thus far I have only been discussing stakeholders and their commitments on an 
individual basis. Now I would like to turn my attention to the way in which 
stakeholders interact with one another on an intersubjective level, and how this 
affects the effectual process of opportunity creation as it unfolds. In the following 
discussion I will attempt to shed some light on how commitments from different 
stakeholders following different forms of reasoning may influence the effectual 
network’s general progression from uncertainty and ambiguity towards goal clar-
ity and path dependence in different ways, and not necessarily in a linear fashion. 
Commitments from some stakeholders may reduce uncertainty and ambiguity 
more rapidly, while others may in fact increase the uncertainty and ambiguity 
perceived by others involved in the effectual process, at least temporarily. 
The accumulation of stakeholders into an effectual network from which a new 
firm eventually emerges is an example the concept of collective structure. As 
such, Weick’s (1979) work on ‘The Social Psychology of Organising’, particu-
larly his discussion on interlocking behaviours and organising in Chapter 4 of his 
book, provides an ideal starting point around which to structure this discussion. 
Each stakeholder commitment is a commitment to engage in an ongoing set of 
interlocking behaviours with the focal entrepreneur and other members of the 
extant network. The process of effectuation is the organising of these interlock-
ing behaviours into a collective structure, the effectual network, from which a 
novel organisational form emerges, the new firm serving a new market. 
Drawing from Allport’s concept, Weick (1979) states that collective structure 
can be understood as what we mean by the word group when used in a sentence 
such as “the group imposes norms on its members”. He points out that the se-
quence described by the sentence, a group exist then its members converge to-
wards its set of norms, in reality is more likely to be the opposite. The conver-
gence precedes and is necessary for the emergence of groups; i.e. when individu-
als meet who could possibly be of benefit to one another, and have a similar un-
derstanding of how this could be so, they then enter into a repeated series of in-
terlocking behaviour from which a collective structure is formed. In other words, 
individuals converge on means first and, from this, through a series of interac-
tions, their behaviours narrow and a group forms after. This precisely describes 
the dynamic model of the effectuation process illustrated by Sarasvathy and Dew 
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(2005b) in Figure 10, that I previously presented in Chapter 3, by which stake-
holders, their individual means, and their diverse goals, are brought into the fold 
of the effectual network.  
Weick uses a simple model to illustrate the process of group development 
(Figure 19, below). 
 
Figure 19 A model of group development (Weick 1979, 91) 
In this four stage model of Figure 20, people first exchange means towards ac-
complishing their own diverse goals before proceeding to exchange ends towards 
which a common group goal is formed. This runs against the grain of common 
theorising (at the time of Weick’s writing) that groups form around common 
goals and instead suggests that they form around common means. In the early 
stages, individuals pursuing diverse ends are brought together in an interdepend-
ence through which they converge towards common means. This emphasises the 
point that “people create social structure” (Weick 1979, 92). Following the con-
vergence on interlocked behaviours to utilise common means, Weick states that 
there is a subtle shift away from diverse to common ends. This is not to say that 
the original diverse ends no longer exist; they simply become subordinate to an 
emerging set of shared ends. This leads to one of the key ideas that Weick es-
pouses: that meaning is often applied retrospectively to organising by groups, or 
the concept of sensemaking;  i.e. the meaning a person retrospectively attaches to 
a group’s past behaviour may assume the existence of common goals all along, 
when in fact common ends merely emerge to preserve a collective structure and 
that they then make sensible all the collective behaviours made by the group im-
mediately prior (Weick, 1979, 1995).  
Diverse means may follow common ends primarily because, at this stage, a 
durable collective structure has formed. The durable collective structure allows 
members of the group to explore other, perhaps more effective, ways of fulfilling 
their roles (division of labour) within the group towards its achievement of 
shared goals. Two further reasons why diverse means follow common ends are 
that: (1) the stability imposed by the collective structure makes the rest if the 
world more ambiguous in contrast (within individuals’ perceptions), thereby 
leading to a higher level of idiosyncratic behaviour exhibited by individuals in 
response; and, (2) as a reaction to the pressures towards convergence, conces-
sions and compromise, there is an opposite pressure towards re-establishing and 
(1) Diverse ends (2) Common means 
(4) Diverse means (3) Common ends 
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asserting uniqueness among the members so they can hedge the costs of interde-
pendence. This shift towards diverse means completes the model in Figure 19, as 
it entails, and results in, new diverse goals. 
Adapting Weick’s model of group development to effectual networks and their 
stakeholders produces the sequence illustrated in Figure 20, below. 
 
Figure 20 Effectual network development (Based on Weick 1979, 91) 
Following a successful negotiation, the entrepreneur and target stakeholder iden-
tify a mutually beneficial arrangement, the commitment, which allows them to 
pursue their respective desired ends. For the causal stakeholder, this end is a par-
ticular outcome they wish to achieve, for the effectual stakeholder it is the oppor-
tunity to pursue a their aspirations, for the faith-based stakeholder it is the oppor-
tunity to contribute to an imagined desirable future, and to the self-belief driven 
stakeholder it is the opportunity to exercise their entrepreneurial passion. They 
pay for this opportunity by purchasing voice; buying their way into the group, the 
effectual network, by contributing their valuable means to the group’s common 
pool. At this stage, it is in everyone’s interest that they converge towards com-
mon ends – in this case, it is the development of the effectual artefact; the new 
market that emerges from the network’s interactions. Once a durable collective 
structure has been established, the new organisation that serves the new market 
(i.e. the effectual artefact), the stakeholders are once again free to focus their at-
tention back on their diverse means.  
A final important implication from Weick’s discussion on collective structure 
is the concept of partial inclusion. This is the concept that organisations are 
formed of interlocked behaviours, not interlocked people. People are only in-
volved in a group to the extent that their behaviours are interlocked with those of 
other members of the group (or other actions aimed at preserving the stability of 
the collective structures). Individuals are members of many different groups and 
may simultaneously be engaged in one group through interlocking behaviours 
while on the lookout for people with whom to engage in reciprocal behaviour. 
An important point made by Weick (1979, 96) is that “to predict [a] person’s be-
haviour in any one group, we must know the investment that person has in the 
behaviours interlocked in the group plus the extent to which significant behav-
iours are tied up elsewhere”. Applied to committed stakeholders in effectual net-
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works, this suggests that to understand stakeholder behaviour within the network, 
we must also seek to understand the other interests and commitments they pos-
sess that may be more or less important to them than their commitment to the 
effectual process.  
In addition to being only partially included, it can be said that stakeholders to 
effectual processes are only loosely coupled (Weick, 1979, pp. 111–112) to the 
network, and the network as a whole is nearly-decomposable (Sarasvathy & 
Simon, 2000). That is, the stakeholders are stable subassemblies of the larger 
system of the effectual network and, while they are loosely interdependent, they 
still retain a large amount of independence. Like the analogy of the watchmakers 
used by both Weick and Sarasvathy and Simon, the effectual network resembles 
a watch made of a number of nearly-decomposable subassemblies rather than a 
large assemblage of individual parts. If a watchmaker is interrupted during the 
assembly process, a watch made of 1000 individual parts will need to reassem-
bled slowly, piece by piece, from the beginning, while a watch made of 10 subas-
semblies which in turn are comprised of 10 sub-subassemblies, will be able to be 
reassembled much more quickly. It is this independence of stakeholders in addi-
tion to their interdependence which gives effectual processes an evolutionary 
character. If the process is interrupted by various exogenous contingencies, and if 
one stakeholder or another drops out from the network, this does not mean the 
whole network will collapse, but it may adapt and evolve.  
To summarise, prospective stakeholders begin with diverse, subjective ends in 
mind when deciding whether or not to make a commitment to an effectual pro-
cess. This is their commitment motive. They will evaluate how their means can 
be combined with those they believe to be under the control of the effectual net-
work. A combination of how important their means are to existing members of 
the network and the power of their own motives will determine how much they 
will be included in, and how strongly they will be coupled to, the network’s ac-
tivities. Once committed, their means are combined with those of the network 
and they must converge towards common network goals that are intersubjective-
ly negotiated and made sense of by all affected network members. 
Combing the preceding discussion from this chapter and Chapter 4 together 
with the dynamic model of the effectual network and the new market as an effec-
tual artefact from Sarasvathy and Dew (2005b) illustrated in Figure 10 back in 
chapter 3, I have remodelled the process with a focus on the accumulation of 
stakeholder commitments and their effects, illustrated in Figure 21, below.  
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Figure 21 A dynamic model of the accumulation of stakeholders in an effec-
tual process 
Figure 21 shows that stakeholders’ decisions to make their commitments to ef-
fectual processes will be subjective and individual, depending on their idiosyn-
cratic motives and personal means. Following commitment, however, decision-
making becomes intersubjective; an ongoing negotiation and collective sense-
making about what the ultimate artefact of the process should be. This negotia-
tion is not, however, democratic, nor is it between parties of equal importance as 
different stakeholders will each have different strengths of voice depending on 
the centrality and importance of the means they have thus far contributed. Each 
new commitment disrupts the existing ecology and alters the intersubjective 
market creation design space by increasing or decreasing uncertainty, and creat-
ing equivocality surrounding the questions of “what are we doing?” and “what 
should we do?” This sends a ripple of enactment and sensemaking activity 
through the community of stakeholders beginning with those whose commit-
ments are most affected by the new reality. Extant stakeholders must decide 
whether to maintain their commitments at the status quo, to modify their com-
mitments, or to withdraw their commitment from the effectuation process alto-
gether. Once the cycle of sensemaking is complete, the consensus among stake-
holders might be that this particular effectual process is complete (the stakehold-
ers are satisfied that the purpose of their commitment has been fulfilled) in which 
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ket, or the process continues through interactions with other potential stakehold-
ers. 
Each new stakeholder commitment alters the market creation design space in 
three main ways (to a greater or lesser extent depending on the stakeholder): new 
goals are introduced or existing goals are strengthened or modified, new means 
are made available and, new constraints are imposed on the behaviour of others. 
Goals are affected depending on what the new stakeholder wants from the pro-
cess. New means are the identity of the stakeholder, their knowledge, access to 
their networks, and other resources that are potentially useful to the existing net-
work members, that the stakeholder will make available to the network, and are 
the currency by which the stakeholder purchases voice.  Constraints depend on 
how important others feel it is to satisfy that stakeholder’s desires in order to en-
sure that the stakeholder will contribute and behave in a certain way that benefits 
them and, in turn, lock other members into a particular way of behaving thereby 
gradually increasing overall path dependence for the network. I believe that by 
using the typology of different stakeholder commitments I developed in chapter 4 
I can draw some general propositions about how each type of commitment will 
affect the effectual process in relation to goals, means, and constraints, and, in 
turn, will affect the type of commitments the network is subsequently able to at-
tract. I discuss these propositions and summarise them at the conclusion of the 
following four sections. 
5.4.1 General effect of causal commitments to effectuation processes 
A stakeholder who makes a causal commitment to an effectual network introduc-
es clear goals by definition. For example, in the case of Kim, the causal stake-
holder given above, she knows exactly what she wants from the commitment, 
and her commitment commissions Pat and his extant network to fulfil this goal. 
To this end she will provide the network with new means. However, these means 
will be limited only to what she believes is required to achieve her goal, e.g. 
monetary investment, market data etc. The effect of such a commitment will be 
that it places significant constraints on what the network is able to do, subject to 
how important other extant members of the network believe the commitment to 
be, i.e. how much voice the stakeholder has purchased through her commitment. 
For example, if Kim’s goal of having a marketing platform for dog products is 
easily achieved by the network as a peripheral activity, then it will establish firm 
constraints only for that area. However, if the commitment is significant in rela-
tion to the network’s overall activities, it will, of course, result in firm constraints 
across the board. For example, if Kim is one of Pat’s first stakeholders to come 
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on board, and is financing his entire venture, he will be restricted to only taking 
actions that serve Kim’s purposes.  
Such a stakeholder’s effect on the network’s market creation design space will 
likewise be dependent on the overall significance of the stakeholder’s commit-
ment. If it affects only a small part of the extant network’s activities then it will 
reduce uncertainty, ambiguity, and isotropy for only that area. However, if the 
stakeholder purchases significant voice, then the stakeholder’s goals become the 
network’s goals and uncertainty, ambiguity, and isotropy are significantly re-
duced or even eliminated. The same effect will occur if many stakeholders each 
purchase a small amount of voice, but all share the same goals. 
In any case, the significant reduction in, or elimination of, uncertainty will in-
crease the attractiveness of network membership to prospective causal stakehold-
ers who share the same goals. On the other hand, the path dependence that such a 
commitment places on an effectual process, particularly if it affects the entirety 
of the network, will reduce the attractiveness of the network to potential stake-
holders who are effectual in their reasoning. Furthermore, if the new goals that a 
causal commitment introduces to the process are at odds with the goals or sensi-
bilities of existing members, those extant stakeholders may withdraw their com-
mitments. 
Proposition 9a: A commitment based on causal reasoning will introduce one 
or more new, clear goals. 
Proposition 9b: A commitment based on causal reasoning will provide new 
means to the network but they will be limited to only that which the stakeholder 
deems specifically necessary to achieve their goals. 
Proposition 9c: A commitment based on causal reasoning will place firm con-
straints on the network in relation to the stakeholder’s desired ends. How much 
of the network’s activities these constraints apply to will depend on how much 
voice the stakeholder purchased through their commitment. 
Proposition 9d: A commitment based on causal reasoning will reduce uncer-
tainty, goal ambiguity, and environmental isotropy significantly in relation to the 
stakeholder’s desired ends. 
Proposition 9e: As a result of a commitment based on causal reasoning, the 
reduction in uncertainties in relation to the new stakeholder’s goals will make 
commitment more attractive for causally minded individuals who share the same 
goals. The increase in path dependence may reduce the attractiveness of network 
membership to effectually reasoning individuals. Existing members of the net-
work who do not share these goals may end their commitments. 
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5.4.2 General effect of effectual stakeholder commitments to effectuation 
processes 
As previously noted, effectual reasoning begins with a generalised aspiration or 
aspirations rather than concrete goals. As such, a commitment based on this form 
of reasoning may introduce one or more goals to the effectual network, but they 
will not be clear or well formed, e.g. Nick’s ideas regarding how mobile apps 
may be developed to service the fish farming industry. Likewise, because a 
stakeholder using effectual reasoning is not guided by clear goals, the means that 
they will contribute are unlikely to be particularly specific or tangible beyond 
whatever personal financial resources they are willing to put forward in order to 
purchase equity and, consequently, voice. The means that such stakeholders will 
contribute are more likely to be embedded within their identity, knowledge, and 
networks. Furthermore, because the goals they contribute are vague, and means 
they contribute are nonspecific, it is not in their interest to impose constraints 
upon the network to any great degree. They will be flexible and open to negotia-
tion about possible trajectories for the effectual process. 
As for the effect of the effectually reasoning stakeholder on the intersubjec-
tively negotiated market creation design space; reductions in uncertainty, goal 
ambiguity, and environmental isotropy will only be marginal. Who the stake-
holder is might establish certain bounds around isotropy i.e. in the case of Nick, 
the network should focus its attentions on information in the environment relat-
ing to fish farming. Uncertainties are reduced through Nick’s knowledge of aq-
uaculture, and introducing this industry as a potential target industry will some-
what reduce goal ambiguity. However, it is not set in stone that a fish farming 
app is what the effectual artefact will ultimately be; it is only one possibility and 
will be subject to exogenous contingencies and subsequent stakeholder commit-
ments (such as the fish farmers withdrawing as potential customers).  
The marginal reduction in uncertainty, ambiguity, and isotropy represented by 
an effectually reasoning stakeholder making a commitment to an effectual net-
work may increase, slightly, the network’s attractiveness to potential stakehold-
ers who follow causal reasoning. For example, Nick joining the network and an-
nouncing that he intends to steer the process towards servicing the aquaculture 
industry may make commitment more desirable to potential customers within 
that industry. They may approach or be approached by Nick or another member 
of the network with clear goals on how they believe the network could develop a 
particular artefact that will be of benefit to them. 
Proposition 10a: A commitment based on effectual reasoning will introduce 
new potential goals; however, they will not be well formed. 
Proposition 10b: A commitment based on effectual reasoning will contribute 
various new means in the form of the stakeholder’s identity, knowledge, and 
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networks, and how much they choose to pay, in terms of capital investment, for 
voice. 
Proposition 10c: As a result of a commitment based on effectual reasoning, 
the network will become only slightly more constrained insofar as the new stake-
holder indicates a potential desirable trajectory. 
Proposition 10d: A commitment based on effectual reasoning will reduce un-
certainty, goal ambiguity, and environmental isotropy, but only slightly. 
Proposition 10e: As a result of a commitment based on causal reasoning, the 
overall slight reduction in uncertainties may make commitment to the network a 
little more attractive to causally minded individuals. 
5.4.3 General effect of faith-based commitments to effectuation processes 
In subchapter 5.2, I discussed how, unlike all the other types of commitment 
which involve the stakeholder taking some kind of active role in the network in 
their post commitment behaviour, stakeholders who make their commitments to 
effectual processes on the basis of faith will likely only play a passive role in 
subsequent network activity. Combining this with the fact that a faith based 
commitment is made to either a person, as in the case of a Type A faith based 
commitment, or the belief in an imagined future, as in the case of a Type B faith 
based commitment, both types of commitment only reflect the network goals that 
exist at the time the commitments are made. Neither type of commitment adds 
any new goals. The existing goals or aspirations of the effectual network remain 
unchanged in the case of a Type A commitment, or may potentially be strength-
ened in the case of Type B commitments, as Type B commitments indicate that 
current goals hold at least some value to certain individuals.  
Commitments made by faith reasoning stakeholders will provide the network 
with new means; however, these means are likely to merely be whatever material 
resources the stakeholders choose to invest, whether it be cash, or some non-
monetary contribution (such as free advertising or the use of real estate). They 
are unlikely to contribute access to new identity, knowledge, and network based 
means as all of these means suggest more active participation in subsequent net-
work activity.  
Faith reasoning stakeholders’ passive stance toward decision-making in sub-
sequent network activity also means that these types of stakeholders impose few 
new constraints on the network. The constraints they represent extend only as far 
as decision makers within the network not wanting to betray their trust and con-
fidence. These constraints may, however, be magnified through the accumulation 
of larger numbers of faith reasoning stakeholders who share the same personal 
trust in those to whom they are making their commitments, as in the case of Type 
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A, or predictive overconfidence in a particular imagined future, as in the case of 
Type B, simply because this increases the negative consequences of betrayal. 
Faith based commitments have little effect on the effectual network’s market 
creation design space other than a slight increase in goal ambiguity. Goal ambi-
guity is slightly reduced due to the fact that such commitments indicate that the 
stated goals or aspirations of the network or entrepreneur at the time of commit-
ment hold at least some value (in the case of Type B) or are not foolish enough to 
discourage confidence (in the case of Type A). This slight reduction in goal am-
biguity may make the effectual network more attractive to causally reasoning 
individuals who share the same imagined goals. As more stakeholders make 
commitments, either faith based or causal, towards these goals, this has a com-
pounding effect in reducing goal ambiguity and uncertainty. For example, a pro-
totype product on a crowd funding website with few or no initial contributions 
may only attract investors with faith in the concept, but as more and more indi-
viduals invest, the decrease in uncertainty will attract investments from more 
causally minded individuals. 
Proposition 11a: A commitment based on faith reasoning will either strength-
en, or will not alter, existing goals.  
Proposition 11b: A commitment based on faith reasoning will make new 
means available to the network, but these may be limited to only the material 
resources invested by the stakeholder. 
Proposition 11c: As a result of a commitment based on faith reasoning, few 
new constraints are placed on the network as the stakeholder takes a passive 
stance towards decision making. 
Proposition 11d: A commitment based on faith reasoning indicates a particu-
lar set of desired ends, thereby slightly reducing goal ambiguity. 
Proposition 11e: As a result of a commitment based on faith reasoning, the 
small reduction in goal ambiguity may make commitment slightly more attrac-
tive to causally reasoning individuals who share the same goals. 
5.4.4 General effect of self-belief based commitments to effectuation pro-
cesses 
A commitment from a self-belief reasoning stakeholder will have an effect on goals 
and means more or less indistinguishable from that of the effectual stakeholder. 
They may introduce one or more new potential goals to the network, though they 
will not be well formed, and the means they contribute will be nonspecific and 
mostly embedded within the individual’s identity, knowledge, and networks. These 
means will be supplemented by whatever additional tangible resources, such as 
cash, they bring to the network that they will use to exchange for voice. 
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Where the self-belief reasoning stakeholder differs from the effectual stake-
holder is that, as I discussed in chapter 4, unlike effectual stakeholders, self-
belief reasoning stakeholders are undeterred by apparent path dependence within 
the effectual process. This means that, should a self-belief based commitment be 
allowed by existing network members during a time that uncertainties, ambigui-
ties, and environmental isotropy within the market creation design space are few, 
this represents the loosening of constraints on the network; i.e. a self-belief driv-
en commitment at a time of high path dependence for an effectual network means 
that at least some network members are willing to explore new courses of action.  
The upshot of a self-belief based commitment being made to a formerly path 
dependent process is that it will introduce new uncertainties, goal ambiguities, 
and isotropy to the network’s market creation design space. This will open the 
network up to the possibility of attracting new commitments from prospective 
effectually reasoning stakeholders to take the process in new directions. Howev-
er, change to the network’s direction may be met with resistance from previously 
committed causal stakeholders, and some may even withdraw their commit-
ments. 
Proposition 12a: A commitment based on self-belief reasoning will introduce 
new potential goals; however, they will not be well formed. 
Proposition 12b: A commitment based on self-belief reasoning will contribute 
various new means in the form of the stakeholder’s identity, knowledge, and 
networks, and how much they choose to pay, in terms of capital investment, for 
voice. 
Proposition 12c: If a self-belief driven stakeholder is allowed to make a com-
mitment, it represents a loosening of constraints on the existing network. 
Proposition 12d: A commitment by a self-belief driven stakeholder will create 
new uncertainties for a relatively stable and path dependent existing network. 
Uncertainty, goal ambiguity, and isotropy will all increase. 
Proposition 12e: Existing causally minded stakeholders may resist the change 
caused by the self-belief driven stakeholder. On the other hand, the change may 
make membership to the network more appealing to new, effectual stakeholders. 
5.5 Summary of the Theoretical Propositions of this Chapter 
In this chapter I have sought to answer the second and third sub questions I posed 
at the beginning of this dissertation: How are commitments secured by an effec-
tual entrepreneur? And how do different stakeholder commitments impact the 
way in which the opportunity creation process unfolds? The answers to these 
questions are summarised in Table 9 and Table 10 below. 
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Table 9 Securing stakeholder commitments under uncertainty - three ac-
tions 
Action How Result 





A small causal commitment that will introduce lim-
ited means specific to a particular goal. 
Submit to stake-
holder’s goals 
A large causal commitment that places significant 
constraints on the effectual network and limits the 




Over time by de-
veloping a working 
relationship 
An ongoing, collaborative effectual partnership. 
Appeal to 
affect 
Persuasiveness A faith based commitment that imposes few con-
straints, provides new, tangible means, but little 
collaboration in decision-making. 
In subchapters 5.1 and 5.2 I explained how different stakeholders may make 
commitments to an entrepreneur and associated effectual network at any time 
depending on the decision-making frames they employ based on the reasoning 
strategies they possess. In such cases, it is only up to the entrepreneur (or whom-
ever actor is involved in the interaction with the stakeholder) to simply recognise 
the potential stakeholder’s general predilection towards reasoning so they might 
be able to negotiate the commitment with the stakeholder based on a shared un-
derstanding of what a potential commitment might mean for both parties. The 
very basic strategies summarised in Table 9 may be utilised by an entrepreneur 
where a stakeholder is initially more reluctant to make a commitment due to high 
perceived uncertainty combined with a low tolerance to bear it. These strategies 
may seem self-evident, however, the utility in visualising these different courses 
of action in the way that I have done in subchapter 5.3 is in the recognition that 
the person negotiating the commitment has the potential to influence the underly-
ing motive of the commitment, and is therefore able to exert some control over 
how the process of effectuation proceeds rather than simply ‘going with the 
flow’. 
If the focal entrepreneur of an effectual process recognises his or her ability to 
influence the motive and reasoning under which a stakeholder makes their com-
mitment to an effectual network, he or she then has the ability to control, to a 
certain extent, how the process unfolds in ways that might be preferable. This is 
done by understanding the generic effects on the network that different types of 
reasoning may have, as shown in Table 10, and then negotiating or choosing be-
tween commitments depending on what effects are deemed to be preferable at 
any point in time. 
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Table 10 Effect on effectual network of stakeholder commitments based on 
different motives 
 Generic Commitment Motive 
Effects on - Causal Effectual Faith Self-belief 
Goals New goals. Few 
but clear. 
New goals. 






Many ideas but 
all vague. 







































































For instance, if an entrepreneur recognises the risks inherent in becoming dominat-
ed be a limited number of stakeholders with a lot of voice and causal reasoning, he 
or she might instead negotiate smaller commitments from the same stakeholders, 
or negotiate the commitments to be based upon effectual reasoning instead. Alter-
natively, an entrepreneur who wishes to maintain control over decision-making 
and the flexibility to respond to contingencies may want to seek out a large number 
of smaller commitments based on more passive faith based reasoning.  
Combining the simple propositions of this chapter summarised in in Table 9 
and Table 10, and using them as a tool for analysis and decision-making, opens 
up a large number of potential courses of action for entrepreneurs or other actors 
who are aware that they are engaged in processes of effectual transformation. 
Different outcomes can be imagined for different combinations of stakeholders, 
for the order in which stakeholder commitments are agglomerated, and for which 
stakeholders’ diverse ends or motives are emphasised over others.  
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
The primary aim of the analysis I have presented in the previous two chapters is 
to elaborate on the possible effects that different categories of committed stake-
holders may have on the new market creation process under uncertainty – partic-
ularly with a focus on how these commitments resolve the effectual entrepre-
neur’s issues of resource scarcity and the effectual network’s transition from 
general aspirations towards concrete goals. Now that my analysis is complete and 
my findings have been presented, I would like to return to the metaphor of an 
entrepreneur being akin to a person tasked with deciding what to cook for dinner, 
and extend it to take into account these considerations. As I established in Chap-
ter 1, the cook in question is resource poor and has access to only salt, a pot, and 
a spatula with which to prepare an entire dinner to a party of guests. Let us now 
say that the cook lives with four housemates who each have their own utensils 
and sections of the refrigerator and pantry. Let us also say that each of the 
housemates is of a particular mind when it comes to the subject of dinner – each 
corresponding to one of the ideal types I described in Chapter 5. 
The first housemate (housemate #1) is predominantly causal in reasoning. She 
is also in possession of a whole turkey. The second housemate (housemate #2) is 
an experienced chef, an effectuator just like our cook. He has a variety of kitch-
enware and a cupboard full of herbs and spices. The third housemate (housemate 
#3) is the cook’s best friend. She has absolute faith in the cook and confidence in 
the cook’s abilities, and has a fridge drawer full of root vegetables. The fourth 
and final housemate (housemate #4) is an enthusiastic novice cook who is moti-
vated by a strong sense of self-belief in his cooking abilities. He has been watch-
ing Youtube videos of different recipes all week, has a particular interest in Mo-
roccan cuisine, and has a mishmash of different cooking implements and ingredi-
ents. 
From this scenario we can imagine a number of different outcomes depending 
on the sequence in which the different housemates are enlisted into the cooking 
process. If the cook first approaches housemate #1, housemate #1 might decline 
participation right off the bat, because she has no reason to believe that the cook 
will be able to transform her precious turkey into the roast dinner she wants. If 
the cook approaches housemate #2 first, he may be happy to ride the effectual 
wave to see what sort of dinner it turns out. Though, with housemate #2’s help, 
they still only have a range of herbs, spices, and utensils, but nothing substantive 
to cook. Housemate #3 is happy to hand over her vegetables at any time, because 
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she has faith that the cook will produce a lovely meal no matter what (and is al-
ways prepared to forgive a poorly made meal out of friendship). Housemate #1 
may be willing to contribute the turkey at this point, because having housemate 
#2’s expertise as a chef and housemate #3’s vegetables, has drastically increased 
the chances that they will be able prepare the roast turkey dinner she so desires. 
Of course, if she does provide her turkey, this means that housemates #2 and #3 
have to also settle for a standard roast turkey dinner and not something more ad-
venturous. It also means that housemate #4 may be less than welcome to join in, 
because his liberal use of spices is worrisome to housemate #1’s blander tastes.  
If the cook and housemates #2 and #3 decide that they do not want a simple 
roast turkey, they can still prepare a variety of vegetarian dishes. They could also 
team up with housemate #4 to prepare a spicy vegetable tagine. If they do, how-
ever, settle for the turkey, and everything turns out successfully, for future din-
ners, housemate #1 may be more receptive to alternative suggestions. The cook 
of the hour would have proven him or herself to be capable of cooking a nice 
dinner and, through an ongoing relationship with the cook and housemate #2, 
housemate #1 may learn to be more experimental in the kitchen. 
The (possibly overlong) metaphor above is simply one of a number of scenari-
os for cooperation between an effectual actor and committed stakeholders hold-
ing different reasoning strategies that can be imagined by using the typology and 
process I have explicated within this study. I believe I have shown a hopefully 
convincing argument for a more complex understanding of the role of stakehold-
ers in effectual processes than the simple ‘self-selected’ effectual stakeholder that 
has been presented within the extant literature thus far. In the remainder of this, 
the final chapter, I will identify and explore some of the theoretical and primary 
practical implications of this study.  
6.1 Theoretical Implications 
This study has shed light on opportunity creation as an intersubjective process. It 
has laid the foundations for understanding how different actors with significantly 
different logics may be able to cooperate, collaborate, and contribute to common, 
mutually beneficial ends. While previous theorising on the subject assumed that 
entrepreneurs and committed stakeholders would share similar rationales and 
decision making strategies, this study has theorised that this is an unnecessary 
assumption to make. In Table 11, on the following page, I present a summary of 
the main contributions of this study as answers to the main research question and 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The key theoretical implication of this study is the argument that given a multi-
actor, intersubjective process of entrepreneurial new market creation as is de-
scribed by effectuation, we must go beyond the assumptions of reasoning as be-
ing classified as either effectual or causal, and consider also reasoning and logic 
that may not be based upon instrumental rationality, but subjective rationality 
instead. While different actors in entrepreneurial processes may be motivated by 
any of an infinite number of different reasons, the typology presented in this 
study offers a parsimonious yet conceptually powerful and meaningful way for 
categorising them and predicting their common behaviours.  
Not only does this recognition of subjective rationality (of both a teleological 
and non-teleological kind) contribute to a more sophisticated understanding of 
the process of effectuation, it also provides a new link between effectuation theo-
ry and other entrepreneurship and decision-making theories. It opens effectuation 
theory up to recent developments in entrepreneurship relating to the role of af-
fect, of trust and persuasive leadership, and shows how these different concepts 
and constructs can be connected to it in a systematic and logical way. Further-
more, by contributing to effectuation theory in a way inspired by, and consistent 
with, the principles of pragmatism, this study helps to reorient effectuation back 
to its pragmatist roots. 
6.1.1 Implications for international entrepreneurship 
In Chapter 2, I explained how the routine behaviours and decision making heuris-
tics that are employed by actors in their day to day lives can be understood as 
habits – habits that are acted upon as a matter of course until a problem is faced 
where the habit no longer offers an acceptable solution. These habits are very 
contextual in their manifestation and need to be understood in terms of the actors 
situatedness in a stream of experience and within the actor’s unique social con-
text. The conditions under which actors use or develop certain forms of decision-
making rationales as a matter of habit are particularly relevant in an international 
or cross-border context. The main implications for international entrepreneurship 
of the theory developed within study is that it can be used to generate a new set 
of research questions relating to engaging stakeholders in international entrepre-
neurship. In Chapter 1, I discussed the three branches of international entrepre-
neurship research identified by Jones et al., (2011). Type A studies, which con-
cern entrepreneurial internationalisation; Type B studies, which are international 
comparisons of entrepreneurial behaviours by countries or cultures, and; Type C 
studies, which compare how entrepreneurial internationalisation differs across 
countries or cultures. I will now briefly explore some potential research questions 
that can be generated towards each of these three branches. 
154 
Type A studies examine entrepreneurial internationalisation or, in other words, 
they are concerned with how individuals create international opportunities. Maine-
la et al. (2014, p. 16) define international opportunity as: “a situation that both 
spans and integrates elements from multiple national contexts in which entrepre-
neurial action and interaction transform the manifestations of economic activity”. 
This study has shown that the process of opportunity creation involves a continu-
ous interaction and sense-making between multiple actors in the construction of an 
intersubjective market creation design space. This raises questions such as: 
• How does cultural or geographic distance affect the type of reasoning 
stakeholders use when making commitments to international opportunity 
creation processes? 
• How do institutional differences across different national contexts affect 
the type of reasoning stakeholders use when making commitments to in-
ternational opportunity creation processes? 
• How does cultural or geographic distance affect an entrepreneur’s ability 
to modify the reasoning strategies used by stakeholders in international 
opportunity creation processes? Or, 
• How do entrepreneurs and stakeholders in international opportunity creation 
processes intersubjectively perceive their market creation design space? 
• How does stakeholder reasoning influence entry mode for entrepreneurial 
new ventures? 
Research on entrepreneurial internationalisation and international opportunity 
creation should consider how cross-cultural, cross border intersubjectivity affects 
these processes.  
Type B research looks at international comparisons of entrepreneurial behav-
iours by countries or cultures. Synthesising the theorising of this study with cul-
tural dimensions (e.g. Hofstede, 1984) might generate some novel insights. For 
example, one could imagine that cultures which tend to be more collectivistic or 
family oriented in their social actions may exhibit more faith based stakeholder 
orientations in commitment forming. Furthermore, studies that compare how the 
stakeholder accumulation process might differ across countries and cultures (i.e. 
how commitments are negotiated, what are the expectations of stakeholders, how 
do they perceive their commitment decision space etc.) may also lead to greater 
understanding of how cross-cultural ventures face challenges, and further devel-
op theories and concepts such as cultural and psychic distance17. We can use this 
study to generate novel research questions that examine the role of culture in 
stakeholder behaviour in entrepreneurship. For example: 
• How do stakeholder reasoning strategies differ across different cultures 
or countries? 
                                                 
17 See Sousa and Bradley (2006) for a relatively recent comparison of the two concepts. 
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• How does the interaction between entrepreneur and stakeholders differ 
across different cultures or countries? 
• How do stakeholders in different cultures or countries perceive their 
commitment decisions spaces? 
Finally, Type C studies compare how entrepreneurial internationalisation dif-
fers across countries or cultures. Taking the findings of this study, we can exam-
ine entrepreneurial behaviours in different cultural contexts by observing how 
entrepreneurs in these contexts engage stakeholders in the internationalisation of 
their firms. Do entrepreneurs in different countries interact with potential foreign 
stakeholders in ways that can be understood using the typology of stakeholder 
commitment rationales?  Possible research questions include: 
• How do entrepreneurs in different country and cultural contexts present 
international opportunities to potential stakeholders at home? 
• How do entrepreneurs in different country and cultural contexts present 
international opportunities to potential stakeholders overseas? 
• Are there patterns to the ways in which firms in different country and 
cultural contexts accumulate and engage stakeholders towards interna-
tional opportunities? 
Studies on different entry modes and how they are utilised differently across 
countries and cultures could potentially be enhanced by utilising a commitment 
rationale lens based upon the typology developed in this study. 
6.1.2 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
There are two principal limitations to this study. The first is the fact that I have 
taken a very narrow focus in selecting the literature and theoretical discussion I 
have utilised in my analysis and the second is the fact that I have not conducted 
an empirical investigation to test the validity and reliability of my theoretical ar-
guments. In relation to the first limitation, by taking this narrow focus on effectu-
ation, I have chosen to ignore, or only give a cursory treatment to, potentially 
rich and relevant streams of literature that may help our understanding of stake-
holder behaviour and the stakeholder commitment decision. This includes, from 
economics, ‘prospect theory’, which illustrates behaviour on the part of decision 
makers in response to future prospects of different probabilities for gains and 
losses which are inconsistent with standard economic rationality (leading to risk 
seeking and risk aversion in situations such as purchasing insurance and gam-
bling). Incorporating prospect theory into the typology I have developed in this 
study could potentially create greater insight into the decision-making behaviour 
of those extrinsically motivated, faith-rational individuals. Another stream of 
literature that I have only touched upon briefly is motivation. While I have fo-
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cused on the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, the study of 
motivation is, on the whole, much richer than just this, and there has been calls 
for more research into entrepreneurial opportunity that pays particular attention 
to the heterogeneous motivations of individuals within the entrepreneurial pro-
cess. For example ‘prosocial motivation’, defined as “the desire to expend effort 
based on a concern for helping or contributing to other people” (Shepherd, 2015, 
p. 500), could potentially contribute to better understanding the reasoning of  
stakeholders driven by both faith and self-belief. 
The most obvious limitation to this study is the fact that it is not based upon 
empirical observation, but has been deduced, and induced, from a meta-analysis 
of extant academic literature. This essentially means that the findings of this 
study, though they may be logically sound, remain rudimentary and unverified, 
and should be treated with caution until they undergo empirical testing. But how 
should the theory development of this study be tested empirically? I envisage a 
number of ways in which the theorising of this study can be tested and further 
developed empirically, using both positivist and constructivist epistemologies, 
and qualitative and quantitative methods, however care must be taken to make 
sure that, whichever method is used, it is applied correctly. I believe that the ty-
pology itself should be investigated using a variance approach based upon cross 
sectional, qualitative data. The process model will, of course, be best suited to a 
process research approach, also using qualitative data. Quantitative approaches 
using positivist epistemology may be useful in measuring and verifying the dis-
creet psychological variables that form the second-order behavioural and heuris-
tic constructs that are predicted by the ideal types of reasoning strategies. 
In relation to the development and testing of the typology presented in this 
study, I return to Doty and Glick’s fifth guideline for typology development: 
“Typological theories must be tested with conceptual and analytical models that 
are consistent with the theory”. The ideal types described in the typology devel-
oped in this study are very complex and multidimensional first-order constructs. 
They predict a range of different heuristics and behaviours, and assume that these 
are highly context specific. As such, I do not believe they are well suited for test-
ing using quantitative methods. Instead, I believe that it will be possible to inves-
tigate the typology empirically by gathering detailed qualitative data from sub-
jects identified as stakeholders within opportunity creation processes. The data 
should be real-time rather than retrospective, and should include a great deal of 
contextualisation. For example, to determine a stakeholder’s orientation towards 
teleology and rationality, detailed and open questions should be asked about what 
are their expectations regarding their commitment, what are their reasons for 
making their commitment, and how do they perceive their commitment decision 
space in terms of uncertainty and ambiguity. Contextual data would be on issues 
such as the stakeholder’s relationship, and history, with the focal entrepreneur, 
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their preferences and normative beliefs, and the various other commitments they 
are simultaneously engaged in. Future studies in this vein should be able to un-
cover the relationships between different forms of reasoning and how they trans-
late into behaviour, specifically in relation to how they contribute to the creation 
of new entrepreneurial ventures. This study has only suggested a limited number 
of behaviours associated with each ideal-type of reasoning; empirical studies 
conducted in the manner suggested above will undoubtedly uncover others. 
To explore the processes described in this study, event driven, process re-
search using longitudinal case studies such as those described by Aldrich (2001), 
Van de Ven and Engleman (2004) Van de Ven (2005) should be used to collect 
detailed qualitative data. The data collected should be real-time and should en-
compass a number of details, such as: how the stakeholder perceived the com-
mitment at the time it was made; how the stakeholder perceived uncertainty and 
ambiguity in relation to the commitment decision at the time in which it was 
made, and the present time; details about the stakeholder’s networks, knowledge, 
and resources at the time in which the commitment was made, and the present 
time; the other commitments they had at the time the commitment was made, and 
the present time (including personal and family commitments, as well as profes-
sional commitments) and; their expectations and intentions going forwards as 
they remember them at the time the commitment was made, as well as the pre-
sent time. Each new commitment and major network decision should be treated 
as an event, and the aforementioned sets of data should be, if possible, collected 
for each focal stakeholder. Studies conducted in this manner will be able to gen-
erate rich narratives on how stakeholder reasoning and behaviour changes over 
the course of a new venture creation process, and how this, in turn, shapes the 
process. There are currently no studies I am aware of that take such a firmly 
stakeholder oriented focus.  
Finally, I believe that experimental research designs to uncover the relation-
ships between the cognitive, psychological variables denoted by the different 
behaviours and heuristics predicted by the different types of reasoning strategies 
could provide valuable insight into stakeholder decision making. Such studies 
would involve carefully controlled experiments, in which the subjects are asked 
to make decisions (which have positive or negative consequences) under certain 
conditions of uncertainty, and in relation to another individual who will be the 
analogue for an entrepreneur. The aim will be to discover how these decisions 
will differ depending on contextual factors connecting the decision maker and the 
other individual. This is the type of research that is typical for the field of social 
psychology18. Using these methods, researchers could test various causal rela-
                                                 
18 See, for example, the work of the work of Ajzen, (2002), and Madden, Ellen, and Ajzen, (1992) on the 
theory of planned behaviour. 
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tionships, such as: between different forms of rationality, and orientation to teleo-
logical or non-teleological action; affect and decision-making under conditions 
ambiguity, and uncertainty; social norms and commitment decisions etc. Experi-
mental research such as this will be able to contribute more explanatory power 
and resolution to the typology I have described in this study and, in my opinion, 
is the best way in which positivist science is able to contribute to the understand-
ing of organisational phenomena – superior to that of large scale quantitative re-
search using survey data. 
6.2 Practical Implications 
In Chapter’s 1 and 2, I discussed how an important aim of this study was for it to 
be problem driven, with an emphasis on practical utility (Corley & Gioia, 2011), 
and that it should have pragmatic utility (Worren et al., 2002). As such, the theo-
ry building and propositions generated by this study are designed to have as 
much practical utility as theoretical utility. How this practical utility, or pragmat-
ic validity, was sought in this study is shown in Table 12, below. 
Table 12 Representing theory as tools for practitioners within this study 
(adapted from Worren et al., 2002, p. 1232) 
Mode of  
representation 
Description Requirements for achiev-
ing pragmatic validity 






Testability through explicit, 
causal propositions 
One set of explicit causal 
propositions relating to com-
mitment ideal types 
Second set of propositions 
relating to process outcomes 
of ideal-type commitments 








- Operational definitions of 
constructs 
- Descriptions of how im-
plementation is to proceed 
to achieve desired out-
comes 
- Vivid imagery and per-
suasiveness 
- Plausibility through logi-
cal consistency in the or-
dering of the underlying 
plot 
A narrative based thought 
experiment throughout the 
study, used to show the rela-
tionships between ideal types 
and second-order logics and 
behaviours, how to understand 
and use the typology, and how 









Appropriate symbolic and 
iconic representation of 
concepts and relationships 
A typology along dimensions 
of rationality and teleology 
showing four ideal types of 
reasoning that may be used in 
making commitments 
A process model showing the 
way in which commitments 
affect the intersubjective pro-
cess problem-space and col-
lective decision-making 
Worren et al. (2002) describe three different modes that can be used represent 
theory so as to assist practitioners. These are propositional, narrative, and visual. 
I have used all three in this study, as is shown in Table 12.  The ‘products of the-
orising’ I promised in subchapter 2.3, a typology, a process model, and a set of 
propositions, can be used in the continued theoretical development of our under-
standing of the entrepreneurial creation of new markets, and are also intended to 
be directly relevant to practice as tools that can assist in decision-making, and 
analysis. The narrative I created through the thought experiment of “Pat’s Apps” 
contextualises the propositions of this study in realistic scenarios and, hopefully, 
in a persuasive way. In the following two sections I will describe the implications 
of this study for practitioners, including active and prospective entrepreneurs, 
managers, and policy makers. 
6.2.1 Implications for active and prospective entrepreneurs, and managers 
The introduction of effectuation theory provided entrepreneurs with a persuasive 
alternative to the teleological, planning and predicting strategies that long domi-
nated entrepreneurship theory. Effectuation offered a detailed explanation for 
how, in the pursuit of creating a new venture, a non-predictive action oriented 
approach may in fact be more useful. To a certain extent, the contribution of this 
study shifts this focus back towards prediction – suggesting that even though the 
uncertainties and ambiguities of the market creation design space limits the pre-
dictability of future outcomes significantly, there are still aspects of entrepreneur-
ial decision making in which prediction may be useful. Certain general process 
outcomes can be anticipated when the natures of different stakeholder commit-
ments are considered. An entrepreneur will be better able to control the way in 
which an effectual process unfolds (control being an essential criterion of effec-
tual logic), if A) they understand how to attract and secure commitments from 
different types of stakeholders, and B) if they are able to anticipate how different 
stakeholders will behave subsequent to commitment. 
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The process of opportunity creation described by extant effectuation theory 
suggests that entrepreneurs first evaluate their means, (identity, knowledge, and 
networks); secondly they evaluate what they can do with those means and; third-
ly, they seek out stakeholder commitments by interacting with people within 
their networks. This study offers practical implications on this third point, by of-
fering additional insight on who to interact with and how to interact with them. 
Returning to our hypothetical prospective entrepreneur, Pat, consider the situa-
tion in which he has already passed through the first two steps, and is now inter-
acting with potential stakeholders within his immediate network. What happens 
if his network includes Kim, Nick, Pete, Phoebe, and Boris simultaneously? 
While the extant effectuation literature suggests that Pat should (or will) interact 
with each of them in turn in his daily life, and whoever makes a real commitment 
will be the one who becomes part of the effectual process, an approach based on 
the propositions of this study suggests that it may be a useful exercise for him to 
consider, in his interactions, how commitment from these individuals may affect 
his venture creation process going forwards, and how it may affect those com-
mitments he has already secured. 
If Pat meets Kim first, he may be tempted to do everything he can to secure a 
commitment from her in order to secure the resources she has at her disposal (i.e. 
money) so that he can quickly forge ahead with establishing a firm. However, 
that may put him at significant risk should she, at a later time, decide that the re-
lationship is too costly and opts to terminate it. To protect himself and his nas-
cent firm from this eventuality, it may be wise for him to negotiate a smaller 
commitment initially (using the affordable loss principle), in such a case he may 
somehow have to bring Kim around to a more effectual way of reasoning and 
behaving.  
Alternatively, he may choose to keep a potential commitment from Kim in 
mind, but first approach other types of stakeholders. While he could approach 
a fellow effectuator like Nick, he (or Nick) might find that there is not much 
utility in a commitment between them both given that neither of them have 
access to any substantial amount of real resources. Access to Nick’s network 
may present more opportunities for interacting with a larger range of individu-
als and a commitment from a self-belief driven individual like Boris might 
give Pat some new ideas about potential goals; however, the issue of resources 
remains. If, on the other hand, Pat has a number of people from whom he is 
able to secure faith based commitments, such as the Petes and the Pheobes, 
then he could begin to accumulate resources while keeping constraints to a 
minimum. This may put him in a better position for negotiating more instru-
mentally rational commitments at a later time from potential stakeholders such 
as Kim and Nick. 
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Pat should also carefully consider the different ways in which he identifies 
and interacts with potential collaborators. Certain forums and contexts may pre-
sent a greater number of certain kinds of potential stakeholder. This includes 
contexts for face to face interaction such as conferences and tradeshows, cold-
calling, and science parks, or online, on internet forums, blogging, and social 
media. There are significant differences between, for example, seeking equity 
investments from business angels and venture capitalists, or crowdsourcing fi-
nance for a new venture on websites such as GoFundMe, Kickstarter, or Patre-
on. While there is new research emerging about the effect partners using differ-
ent forms of logic and reasoning have on the entrepreneurial processes of new 
firms (for example, Pahnke, Katila, & Eisenhardt, 2015), I believe that all of 
these differences can potentially be analysed using the typology from this 
study. In doing so, an entrepreneur will be better able to anticipate potential 
threats or opportunities, and will be able to better evaluate potential courses of 
action. 
Based on the contributions of this study, I would recommend to any prospec-
tive or active entrepreneur, or manager, that in your interactions with anyone 
who could potentially be a benefit to, or could benefit from, your enterprise, you 
should consider three things in relation to that person: what are their means? 
What is their motive? And, how would they perceive a commitment to your en-
terprise as an opportunity? Essentially, you should ask yourself: 
1. Means –  
a. What kind of new means could this individual contribute to my 
enterprise? 
b. How will these new means affect those with whom I have al-
ready formed commitments? 
2. Motive –  
a. By what reasoning could this individual plausibly contribute 
new means to my enterprise?  
b. How does their reasoning affect the way in which I should inter-
act and negotiate with them?  
c. How will their reasoning affect those with whom I have already 
formed commitments? 
3. Opportunity –  
a. How might this individual perceive a commitment to my enter-
prise as an opportunity 
b. How does this perception affect the way in which I should inter-
act and negotiate with them?  
c. How will this perception affect those with whom I have already 
formed commitments? 
162 
By asking these simple questions, one can quickly develop a mental representa-
tion of their own entrepreneurial process and the various individuals who form 
the network of stakeholders committed to the process.  In addition to this, these 
questions offer an intersubjective perspective to plural meanings and objectives 
that the process represents to all of the different actors, actual and prospective.  
For managers, this study highlights how external actors, specifically entre-
preneurs, can potentially be used by established firms to co-create mutually 
beneficial opportunities. Managers within established firms should also under-
stand how their rationales and those of entrepreneurs may differ, and how this 
translates into different behaviours and different manifestations of decision-
making. If managers are able to see a common problem-space with an entrepre-
neur, and if they are able to evaluate it from the perspective of the entrepreneur 
and of other actors, they will be in a better position to negotiate commitments 
and act in ways that are more effective for all parties. This study suggests that 
while managers in established firms may prefer the instrumental, teleological 
rationale of causation, when they are engaged in co-creation with external ac-
tors, it may pay to adopt the more non-teleological decision making strategies 
from effectual reasoning.  
6.2.2 Implications for policy makers 
Stimulating and supporting an effective national innovation system is a vital goal 
for any country’s policymakers; even more so for small, open economies such as 
Finland or New Zealand. The theory development in this study offers a number 
of implications for policy makers towards these ends. A broad implication is that 
a wide variety of different stakeholders who hold very different rationales may 
all be important in the process of new venture creation. For example, potential 
stakeholders may be categorised as: 
• Groups who may make causal commitments 
o Established firms seeking new opportunities 
o Venture capitalists 
• Groups who may make effectual commitments 
o Other entrepreneurs 
o Business angels 
• Groups who may make faith commitments 
o People who share specific niche interests 
o People who support particular causes 
• Groups who may make self-belief commitments 
o Aspiring entrepreneurs 
o Individuals with specific skill-sets 
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A perennial issue in policy-making is the limited access to capital, with stake-
holders on one side arguing that there is not enough capital, and stakeholders on 
the other side arguing that there are not enough opportunities to invest in. The 
problem is not so much that there are neither opportunities nor capital, but that 
the heterogeneous ways that stakeholders reason about these issues are often in-
congruous with one another. For instance, a potential investor’s causal focus will 
lead them to turn away entrepreneurs seeking capital based on effectually created 
opportunities. In this case, the role of policy makers should be to, firstly, be 
aware of these different types of potential stakeholders, and understand their mo-
tivations, expectations, potential benefits and potential risks, and; secondly, to 
enact policies and policy instruments that connect entrepreneurs to these groups 
where positive interactions are possible. This suggests the need for a broader un-
derstanding of who the valuable supporters of new ventures are, and how they 
can be brought into the fold. For some entrepreneurial new firms, it may be bene-
ficial to connect them early on with providers of venture capital. For others, the 
nature of the new venture might mean that a better place to start would be with 
certain niche interest groups, or other entrepreneurs. The theorisation I have con-
ducted in this study has the potential to provide policy makers with a richer un-
derstanding of the ways that entrepreneurs can secure the resources (including, 
but not only, capital) necessary to grow the business – this contributes to the pol-
icy analysis process, including problem identification having regard to the policy 
goals, which is the first stage in the policy process. 
Another policy implication is that different stakeholders may be important at 
different times, and that it is not necessary for an entrepreneur to have a particu-
larly clear goal or clear plans before support should be given. A good place to 
start in supporting entrepreneurship may be to provide different forums where 
aspiring entrepreneurs are able to meet one another, and a wide range of potential 
stakeholders. Programmes could be organised at physical locations, such as sci-
ence parks or universities, or searchable databases could be created linking en-
trepreneurs and stakeholders by skills, needs, or interests. In many cases, linking 
prospective entrepreneurs with tangible resources, such as access to finance, may 
not be as important as helping them expand their networks, and familiarising 
them with latent needs or goals that may exist in the social environment. 
Finally, this study suggests other possible policy interventions which would 
make the government itself an active stakeholder in effectual processes as a col-
laborator, funder, or customer. Policy makers should contemplate where they 
would, or could, locate the government as a network creator, funder and custom-
er, both within the matrix and along the way, to secure maximum leverage of 
government capabilities. This research may help those public sector actors in-
volved in active facilitation roles of public/private partnerships and collabora-
tions to better understand the characteristics and hence needs of both their target 
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firms (many of whom will follow effectual logic) and the potential stakeholders 
of these firms.  This improved understanding can then be reflected in more effec-
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